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Switzerland's experience in the Second World War differs markedly from that of
any other European nation and offers a unique historical opportunity to study
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existential threat. Entirely on its own and surrounded by an extremely aggressive enemy
block, Switzerland had to struggle in that hazy, difficult-to-define situation between war
and peace, which in modern terms would be referred to as "low intensity conflict". Thus
military and civilian authorities were literally forced to think in terms of modern national
security policy and to adopt a holistic security philosophy. It became apparent that the
disproportionate role of the military component did not measure up to the threat and was
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I. INTRODUCTION
The character of human society, and with it the phenomenon of war, has undergone
significant changes since Clausewitz defined war as "an act of force" in the sense of a
"physical duel."' The rapid mechanization of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries eventually permeated all spheres of human existence. Societal structures
became increasingly complex, and today are characterized by a multifaceted
interdependency between regional and national societies. This interdependency has also
become increasingly subtle and dense. As a disadvantage, it has simultaneously
increased the vulnerability of modern, industrial society. Particularly important for
strategic planning, it has increased the possibility of outside interference and harm
through the use of force.
Technological advances have had particular impact on the area of warfare. The
potential effects of the machinery of modern warfare have reached immeasurability,
leading to radical changes in operational planning and thinking. The consequences of this
transformation became apparent suddenly and brutally in the First World War. As a rapid
military breakthrough was not forthcoming and the traditional art of strategic
maneuvering died on the killing fields of Flanders and France, the struggle deteriorated
into bloody trench warfare. This development had the effect of shifting strategy from
Clausewitz, On War, p. 75.
traditional military victory over the opponent's forces to an effort to break down the
opponent's resistance with all possible means, leading directly to the tragedy of Verdun.
As warfare spread and gained in intensity, it became increasingly necessary to
mobilize all of society and all national resources. Non-military aspects were thrust into
an increasingly important role in strategic decisionmaking. Modern strategy increasingly
pushed warfare beyond the military realm, forming the basis of total war. 2 This concept
has survived in some form to this day, though it has undergone major changes. The
absurdity of nuclear war, coupled with the increasing vulnerability of modern society,
called for finely differentiated and more subtle use of force. The fragility of modern
industrial nations has made aggressors feel more and more that it is both more promising
and more economical to forgo the final step of using brute military force and instead rely
on the wide variety of means short of war which may be used to influence their enemies.
Today the tools of "low-intensity conflict" offer the opportunity to achieve the traditional
objectives of war in accordance with the vulnerability of modern society. Nonetheless,
the British Admiralty's conclusion on the First World War still captures the essence of
modern conflict, whether or not it reaches the point of open war:
Nothing can be clearer than the fact that modern war resolves itself into an
attempt to throttle the national life. Waged by the whole power of the nation, its
ultimate object is to bring pressure on the mass of the enemy people, distressing
them by every possible means so as to compel the enemy's government to submit to
term.
3
Cf. Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914-145," in: Paret, Makers
of Modern Strategy, p. 527 ff.
3 Cited in Bond, War and Society in Europe 1870-1970, p. 144.
Although Switzerland escaped military aggression in both the First and Second
World Wars, it was certainly not able to avoid this general trend in modern warfare. In
the Second World War, in particular, Switzerland faced threats which initiated and
sometimes anticipated postwar developments.
Switzerland's experience in the Second World War differs markedly from that of
any other European nation. Since Switzerland's historical experience is different, so too
is the historical consciousness of its people, the nation's historical legacy. Often key
historic events perceived as a positive collective experience tend to congeal into a
national myth, while negative ones become a national trauma. If a nation does not deal
properly with historical facts and situations, myths and traumas may have repressive or
even disastrous consequences in the continued life of that people.
The acute threat to Switzerland during the Second World War is perceived by the
Swiss people as one of the key historic events of the twentieth century, and historic myths
have grown up around the National Reduit. 4 The Reduit is the point on which the myths
have crystallized, but its historic outgrowths in the last fifty years extend far beyond it.
They have clouded the historical view of related issues, such as the operational freedom
of the commander-in-chief5 and the readiness, strength, and combat ability of the Swiss
Army during active duty. Switzerland's remarkable escape from military attack and the
4 The Reduit National, or national stronghold or redoubt. See Minott.
The Swiss Army has only one full general, who is the commander-in-chief of all Swiss forces
and is elected by the nation' s parliament in emergency situations such as war or border
deployment. His German title is thus simply Der General.
uniqueness of the strategic situation the country was forced into in the Second World War
have done much to strengthen the myths surrounding the National Reduit.
No other nation of Europe experienced the Second World War in a situation that
could even be called comparable. Although the results are rosy in hindsight, it is a fact
that in the summer of 1 940 Switzerland was in a quite hopeless situation, a situation that
was unique for Europe at that time. Entirely on its own and surrounded by an extremely
aggressive enemy block, Switzerland lived under a constant military threat for nearly five
years and had to struggle for its very survival as an independent nation. Switzerland was
in that hazy, difficult-to-define situation between war and peace, facing a threat that often
verged on war and which in modern terms would be referred to as a "low intensity
conflict."
6
It was a situation of conflict which not only lasted half a decade: In addition to
the military threat it involved a broad spectrum of non-military threats.
It was in this situation that Switzerland had its own, special "experience of war." It
was spared from war "only inasmuch as it was not subject to outright military attack.
However, it did not avoid war in its entirety." 7 This special experience is remarkably
unique in history. Once freed from any distortion stemming from the myths surrounding
the National Reduit, 8 this experience is of inestimable value for today's Swiss security.
The Field Manual 100-20 of the Headquarters Department of the Army and the Air Force
contains the following definition of low-intensity conflict. "Low intensity conflict is a
political-military confrontation between contending states and groups below conventional war and
above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of
competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of
armed force. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, international
and military instruments".
"Igel im Krieg - ein Trugbild," Friedenszeitung 61/86, p. 25.
Cf. Schaufelberger, Das "Reduit national" 1940, ein militarhistorischer Sonderfall;
Odermatt, Zwischen Realitat und militarischem Mythos: Zur Entstehung der Reduitstrategie im Jahre
The experience is not limited to the military question of warfare, but involves practically
all aspects of modern defense policy. In this way it is far more fruitful and valuable than
traditional war experience gained on the battlefield.
The High Command of the Swiss Army, on which this study will mainly focus, was
literally forced to think in terms of modern defense policy by the unique threat of the
Second World War. Although some aspects of overall defense had to be considered from
time to time, there was little consciously holistic thought in the military leadership. The
need to maintain military readiness during five politically, economically, and
psychologically difficult years forced of all aspects relevant to defense to be considered.
As a result, it was impossible for the High Command to concern itself with only the
traditional sphere of warfare, particularly as traditional warfare fortunately never came
into play. In this situation, it was only by including all relevant political, economic and
psychological factors that intelligent, realistic military decisions could be made—if at all.
This shift in the highest military decisionmaking echelons away from purely military
considerations toward "civilian" considerations was relatively well-noticed and
articulated. Without today's defense terminology, the somewhat confused concept
"national defense instead of warfare" was used. The hidden conflict between these two
terms shows that warfare was far from being recognized as one component in an overall
defense policy at that time.
1940; Meyer, Die schweizerische Reduit-Strategie im Zweiten Weltkrieg, and "Das Reduit - ein
militarischer Mythos", Neue Zurcher Zeitung, May 8, 1984.
Switzerland's fundamental defense objective, then as now, was to guarantee peace
in freedom and independence. 9 This goal led logically to a quite traditional military
posture practiced since time immemorial and contained in Syrus' "si vis pacem, para
bellum:" Prevention of war through readiness. The technical term for the corresponding
Swiss concept, dissuasion, is derived from the Latin word dissuadere, 'advise against,
prevent, discourage,' and was introduced by French author General Andre Beaufre in the
strategic discussion of the nuclear age. 10 This "handy" French term was used by
Switzerland to designate its strategy of "preventing war through readiness and a strong
territorial defense."
From the beginning, Swiss strategic thinking in the Second World War showed a
certain adherence to "dissuasive" principles. This approach can be detected in the
structuring of the first line of defense, the "Limmat Line," and becomes quite obvious in
the discussion of the Reduit strategy. The ultimate goal of concentrating military forces
in the Alps, in the "National Reduit," was dissuasion. One purpose was to show a
potential enemy that if it attacked Switzerland, it would have to contend with a drawn
out, tenacious mountain battle, with little chance of gaining the key Alpine passes so
important for the Axis.
Dissuasion also requires credibility, which is much more than a purely military
question. There is a close interrelationship between dissuasion and overall defense
Cf. Schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik im Wandel, p. 30.
Daniker, Dissuasion, p. 11. The Swiss/French term has been used throughout this
document, although the concept shares many features with deterrence.
" Ibid., p. 22.
policy. First, a potential aggressor must recognize that it faces heavy losses in return for
any potential gains. Second, it must realize that the defender is practically guaranteed to
use its potential to cause losses. If either of these basic conditions is not fulfilled, the
dissuasive argument is severely damaged, if not eliminated entirely. 12
Switzerland's perilous situation in the Second World War showed quite clearly that
dissuasion can only be effective in combination with the political, economic, and
psychological components of defense policy. Consciously or not, the constant criticism
of the National Reduit was always based on insufficient integration of the Reduit strategy
into an overall defense concept. This discrepancy is shown by the pointed remarks of
Lieutenant General Prisi, Commander of the Second Army Corps: "There is no point
defending mountains and glaciers while the Central Plains, with its substantial economic
assets and a majority of the population, is simply handed over to the enemy." 13 In fact
there is some doubt whether the morale of the troops in the National Reduit would have
held out and the strategy prevailed, had the Germans resorted to terrorist acts against the
civilian population in the weakly defended Central Plains. 14 Moreover, Prisi's statement
reveals a complete lack of awareness of the dissuasive component of the Reduit
strategy.
15
Dissuasive strategy and overall defense complement one another to form a
12
Ibid., pp. 16-17.
13 Minutes of the meeting of July 6, 1940, p. 10. BAr E 5795/145.
According to Odermatt, British Field Marshall Montgomery called the Reduit concept
"impracticable nonsense" because German terrorism in the Central Plains could have quickly broken
the morale of the troops in the Reduit. Odermatt, Zwischen Realitat und Mythos, Zur Entstehung der
ReduitstrategieimJahre1940,Pan2, p. 551.
Even the German Alpine Reduit existed only in the fears of the Allied High Command, it
had a noticeable dissuasive effect at the end of the war [cf. Minott, The fortress that never was, p.
87}.
single unit. An intense desire for independence and self-assertion, an economic defense,
a foreign policy aimed at defending independence, and social homogeneity are absolute
prerequisites not only for an effective dissuasive strategy, but for territorial defense in
general. This has never been shown more clearly in recent Swiss history than during
World War II.
In fact, the problem of "national defense versus warfare" harbors an immense
potential for conflict. A conflict that became more significant and painful as the war
wore on and national resources were increasingly exhausted. Whatever was invested in
maintaining military readiness through material and personnel means was an unavoidable
drain on other areas of overall defense, particularly the economy and supply. Moreover,
the freedom for military measures was increasingly restricted by other aspects of overall
defense and often disappeared entirely. In World War II, the Swiss military leadership
was trapped in a triple bind between the requirements of an overall defense policy, the
principles of dissuasion and territorial defense of a small state, and the principles and
requirements of conventional warfare valid at that time. No adequate concept or
leadership structure for such a situation yet existed, and the Army High Command was
forced into a leadership role in terms of defense policy. The stress was such that in May,
1941, the Chief of the Supreme Swiss Commander's Personal Staff made the resigned
observation that the problem of national defense had become a matter of squaring the
circle and was insoluble despite the utmost efforts of those involved. 16 As far as military
lb Chief of Staff, May 1941, p. 2. BAr E 5795/86. Major Barbey was the Supreme Swiss
Commander' s Chief of Staff from June 11, 1940. [Gautschi, General Henri Guisan, p. 151].
defense, the operational freedom of the Army leadership, the military's readiness, its
reaction time to emergencies, and the strength and training of the Army were constantly
threatened.
II. OPERATIONAL FREEDOM
A. APPROACHES TO SECURITY POLICY
1. The Supreme Swiss Commander's Fundamental Duty
The "directives" 17 the Bundesrat 1 * issued to the Supreme Swiss Commander on
August 31, 1939, were based on the Military Organization Law of 1907. The law
instructed the Bundesrat to inform the Supreme Swiss Commander via the
Bundesversammlung^ of the objectives it felt he should accomplish using troop call-ups.
The Bundesrat was to inform the Supreme Swiss Commander by means of specific
"instructions" and "directives". 20 This formulation, dating to 1874, was based on a
philosophy from the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 and the resulting border
deployment. At that time the waging of war, the sum of all necessary military measures,
was quite distinct from all other responsibilities of the government in wartime. 21 Waging
war was still considered an independent, special area of governmental self-assertion in an
emergency situation.
The French text uses the term instructions. Cf. directive by the Bundesrat to Mr. Henri
Guisanot August 31, 1939. BAr E 5795/193.
The Swiss Bundesrat or Federal Council is the nation's council of ministers or cabinet. The
term is also used as a title before an individual Bundesrat member's name.
Bundesversammlung is the collective name for the two houses of parliament.
20
Kurz, Der schweizerische General, p. 4.
21
Ibid., p. 5. In "Die Bedeutung des Berichtes General Guisans uber den Aktivdienst
1939-1945 fur die Gestaltung des schweizerischen Wehrwesens," p. 93, Hofer reports that "the
Army had to assume another active responsibility in 1939 without the experience of the First World
War being validated. The original text of Part V of the Military Organization Law of 1907 was still
in force, with the exception of Article 211. The deficiencies of this text had already been
demonstrated between 1914 and 1918."
10
During the General Mobilization of 1939, this approach was revealed to be
hopelessly outmoded. The beginnings of a comprehensive defense policy begin to
become discernible in the Bundesrafs "directives" 22 to the Supreme Swiss Commander:
"It is your duty to use any appropriate military means to guarantee the nation's
independence and defend the territorial integrity of the nation." 23
The second part of the directive, to defend the territorial integrity of the nation,
can be understood in the strict military sense of defending an area, but this is not the case
with the first part of the directive. Guaranteeing the nation's independence is without
doubt an overall strategic goal, touching on other areas relating to the complex domain of
defense policy. However, the Bundesrat seems to have foreseen the problem of
limitations between military defense and other defense-related tasks. It instructed the
Supreme Swiss Commander to use "military means," but avoided the clear defense-policy
objective of "safeguarding the freedom of the people," as had been suggested by Colonel
von Erlach.
24 Von Erlach saw the duty of the Supreme Swiss Commander as "defending
the independence of the nation and the freedom of the people by any suitable military
means.
"
2i No doubt the Bundesrat had its reasons for replacing "the freedom of the
For the legal force of the instructions see Siegenthaler, Der Oberbefehlshaber nach
schweizerischem Staatsrecht, p. 86 ii, and the report on the position of the Supreme Swiss
Commander, author unknown, of October 9, 1 940. BAr E 5795/1 93.
23
Report by the Supreme Swiss Commander, p. 241
.
Von Erlach, a Colonel in the General Staff, headed the Operations Division from August 28
to December 31, 1939. The division was headed from January 1 to January 15, 1940, by Colonel
Germann, from January 15 to June 8, 1940, by Colonel Struby, from June 8, 1940 to December 13,
1943, by Colonel Gonard, and from January 1, 1944, to August 20, 1945, by Major Zublin (report
by the Chief of General Staff, p. 1 74).
Colonel von Erlach to Supreme Swiss Commander, August 30, 1939. BAr E 5795/193.
Colonel von Erlach noted in signing: "I produced the below instruction to the Supreme Swiss
Commander based on the instruction of 1914 after discussing it with Colonels Frick and Kissling. It
will be translated into French by Captain Sordet and will be delivered by Kissling to the Bundesrat
11
people" with the more militarily meaningful "territorial integrity." Though this change
may appear, on its surface, to be insignificant, it seems to indicate the Bundesrafs efforts
to shift military defense and the Supreme Swiss Commander from the overall realm of
strategic defense to a purely military focus.
26
No one, neither the Supreme Swiss Commander nor the Bundesrat, was able to
predict in 1939 that the war would last more than five years and that Switzerland would
be placed in an unprecedented, hopeless military situation. It was even harder to predict
that defending the independence of Switzerland would extend far beyond the use of
military measures and would require cooperation and coordination between all available
defense resources. The seeds of the resulting conflict between the demands of waging
war and those of a comprehensive defense policy had already been planted in the
Bundesrafs "directives" to the Supreme Swiss Commander. The independence of the
nation could certainly not be defended exclusively through military means during the
difficult times of the Second World War.
The Supreme Swiss Commander only disagreed with his basic duty as it was
formulated inasmuch as he believed he detected a discrepancy between the formulation of
Article 210 of the Military Organization Law (in French) and the formulation in the first
paragraph of the instructions in German. 27
tor preparation of Bundesrat document 0800. 8/30/39, 18:30."
This statement contradicts Gautschi, General Henri Guisan, p. 81, who claims that von
Erlach' s text was "fully adopted as to its material contents."
27 Report by the Supreme Swiss Commander, p. 243.
12
Guisan always understood his duty in the broad sense of dissuasion and
associated overall defense. This is clear from the introduction to his Report to the
Bundesversammlung. He interpreted the role of the Army as providing a military
argument that could be used in addition to political and economic arguments to dissuade
any attack being considered and guarantee the nation the greatest possible security. 28
The longer the war continued and the more the intellectual, psychological, and
material resources of Switzerland were exhausted, the more distressing grew the
discrepancy between the requirements of a comprehensive defense policy designed to
guarantee the overall independence of Switzerland and the demands of constant strategic
military preparedness. Two schools of thought developed among Army leaders, one
focusing on overall defense policy and the other focusing steadfastly, if not always
consistently, on military strategy. The latter group felt that the duty of the Army
leadership was "warfare" and not "national defense." 29 It correctly recognized that "the
concept of national defense (in the sense of the overall defense-policy view) "had
replaced the elementary laws of waging war." 30 For Lieutenant General Wille, 31 more a
proponent of the military school, neutrality concerns had no place in the military
28 Report by the Supreme Swiss Commander, p. 6.
29 Minutes of the meeting of July 6, 1940, p. 13. BAr E 5795/145.
30
Wille, personal memo, May 31, 1940. BAr E 5795/85.
Lieutenant General Wille was pushed into the administrative position of a head of training
of the Swiss Army at the beginning of active duty. He remained there until his retirement at the end
of 1942. According to Kreis, Auf den Spuren von La Charite, p. 163, the Wille family was known
for being pro-German. "Ulrich Wille, warned of in French reports in 1917 because he supposedly
exercised a bad influence on his father, General Ulrich Wille, had an undoubtedly German-oriented
military philosophy which earned him, particularly among Swiss-French elements, a reputation as a
rather Prussian general excessively fond of drills and formality. He was the son of a Countess von
Bismarck and the father of three daughters who had married Germans. In 1937, the youngest
married the son of the German Foreign Secretary, von Weizsaecker."
13
decisionmaking process at that time and represented undue interference: "The
Confederation's neutrality policy must not be allowed to prevent the Army command
from quickly massing all available means of combat wherever the danger of violation of
our neutrality is greatest at a given moment, depending on the situation of the European
war."" A few weeks later, however, Wille, too, showed support for foreign-policy
measures vis-d-vis Germany. 33
2. Neutrality Considerations
After Poland was overrun and German troops marched into Western Europe, the
Supreme Swiss Commander decided to concentrate the bulk of Swiss forces in the North.
This operation to amass troops brought to light basic differences between the Army
commanders. The Chief of General Staff at the time had serious doubts. He admitted
that "the unpredictability of Nazi Germany" might appear more dangerous than "France,
which is more stable," but considered it a fatal error to give away an operational position
by taking corresponding military measures. He believed that the security of the nation
was equally dependent on "a military policy of neutrality" and strategic actions. 34 This is
truly a remarkable statement coming from the nation's highest-ranking military planner. 35
Personal memo from Wille to the Supreme Swiss Commander, May 31, 1940. BAr E
5795/85.
33 Minutes of the meeting of June 22, 1940, p. 4. BAr E 5795/145.
Chief of General Staff to Supreme Swiss Commander, December 28, 1939, p. 2. BAr E
5795/301.
According to the Report by the Chief of General Staff, p. 11, the following were his duties
and powers: Procuring documents for decisions by the Army Commander (intelligence on the
enemy, status of the Swiss Army, supply situation of the Swiss Army), receiving the Supreme Swiss
Commander' s decisions and carrying them out through orders and instructions, monitoring
implementation thereof, organizing communication and mediation, answering for the preparedness
of the Army (organizing transport and reinforcements), and organizing training and leadership for
maneuvers.
14
Not only the planned troop concentration was rejected by Labhart: The
foreign-policy component was so important to him that he was also against obtaining the
financial means for erecting the defensive structures associated with the personnel
concentration: "If we want to avoid the accusation of taking sides, we must not use
almost all our financial means in the North. Otherwise, our minor efforts in the West will
look like diversions intended to demonstrate just how neutral we are; they will look
exceedingly suspicious." 36
The Supreme Swiss Commander seemed to qualify his position somewhat in his
reply. He pointed out that he certainly did not exclude the possibility of attack from the
West and South, but simply considered the North the highest priority. He had no plans to
transfer additional troops to the Northern and Eastern parts of Switzerland. By leaving
one Army corps there and creating a fourth corps, 37 he wanted to show his determination
not to neglect this front. The corps in the west would include three units and the
corresponding frontier troops. 38 Obviously, the Supreme Swiss Commander thoroughly
considered the foreign-policy angle in his strategic considerations, but without giving
them supremacy as the Chief of General Staff did. In this way, Guisan consciously ran
Chief of General Staff to Supreme Swiss Commander, December 28, 1939, p. 2. BAr E
5795/301.
The Supreme Swiss Commander' s order creating the Fourth Army Corps under the
command of the former Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Labhart, came on December 16,
1939. [Gautschi, General Henri Guisan, p. 107]. After being given command of the Fourth Army
Corps, Labhart officially remained Chairman of the General Staff Division until he left active duty,
which led to constant frictions. As Head of the General Staff Division, he remained in close contact
with the Minister of Defense, who had been his Chief of Staff before being elected to the Bundesrat.
This conflicting arrangement led to lasting frictions [Ernst, Die Konzeption der schweizerischen
Landesverteidigung, p. 458, note 13].
Supreme Swiss Commander to Chief of General Staff, December 30, 1939, pp. 1-2. BAr E
5795/301 . For the strained personal relations between the Supreme Swiss Commander and the
Chief of General Staff see Gautschi, General Henri Guisan, p. 1 04 ff.
15
the risk of violating Item 2 of the Bundesrafs "directives." These "directives" had given
him a clear duty to include neutrality considerations in all military measures "so long as
our frontiers and our independence are not threatened by a foreign power." 39 The
Supreme Swiss Commander reported to the Bundesversammlung that he was quite aware
of the fact that despite precautions such as reduced unit size, an intelligence apparatus
such as the one the Germans maintained in Switzerland could detect at least six of the
nine divisions between Sargans and Basel. Moreover, the deployment of certain units of
the First Division near Dietikon on the Limmat might betray the presence of an additional
division, bringing the number of divisions that might show foreign nations the structure
and deployment strength of the northern Army position up to seven. The risk was thus
twofold: Military, inasmuch as preparations would be betrayed, and political, since the
strategy showed that Switzerland was less worried about the West and less well-prepared
there, as well.
40
The Supreme Swiss Commander ignored neutrality issues only in principle here,
opting for the clearly North-oriented "Limmat Line." In practice, he declined to occupy
the Army Position with all available forces because of these very foreign-policy
considerations41 and only transferred in troops step by step. 42 Thus, for reasons of
neutrality, a totally "inefficient distribution of the Army along the entire length of the
Army Position" was adopted. 43 Even when the German military attacked France and the





Gonard, Samuel. "Die strategischen Probleme der Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg," in:
Kurz, Die Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg, p. 46.
43
Situation Report, July 10, 1940, p. 2. BAr E 5795/304.
16
second General Mobilization of the Swiss Army occurred on May 11, 1 940, the
deployment still did not serve "purely the complete implementation of the operational
plan developed for the 'Northern scenario.'" This was precluded by the neutrality of
Switzerland.
44
In October of 1 940, Lieutenant General Labhart, now commander of the Fourth
Army Corps, tried to dissuade the Supreme Swiss Commander from erecting more
artillery casemates in the area defended by the Fourth Army Corps, citing "financial,
tactical, and, mainly, political considerations." 45 He referred to a poor opinion about
Switzerland in Germany, and linked these observations to the tactical level. For this
reason, he suggested erecting infantry blockades on the streets, which would not cause as
much fuss in Germany. 46
In his response, the Supreme Swiss Commander thoroughly addressed Labhart's
objections and then sharply opposed the idea that the Army leadership should concern
itself with "what the Germans may think about our structures:"
We shall conduct our national defense as we see fit, without concerning
ourselves with the opinions of other countries. Otherwise, we would have no right
to speak of national defense or independence. We will be more respected the
stronger our will to resist.
47
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Report by the Supreme Swiss Commander, p. 28.
Supreme Swiss Commander to Commander of the Fourth Army Corps, November 15,
1940, p. 1. BArE 5795/142.
Commander of the Fourth Army Corps to Supreme Swiss Commander, October 30, 1940,
p. 3. BAr E 5795/142. A review of the plans for constructing artillery casemates in the central
region requested in September by Bundesrat Kobelt was limited to financial and strategic
considerations relating to their military utility.
Supreme Swiss Commander to the Commander of the Fourth Army Corps, November 15,
1940, pp. 4-5. BAr E 5795/142.
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With the overwhelming victory of German troops in France, the entry of Italy
into the war, and the complete surrounding of Switzerland by Axis powers in the early
Summer of 1940, neutrality concerns logically moved to the background in strategic
decisionmaking. Switzerland's single neighbor would either seek war or live in relative
peace with the nation.
48
Nevertheless foreign-policy concerns did continue to appear on
various occasions. For example, in the preliminaries to the Reduit decision, new
foreign-policy concerns were voiced, this time by the Supreme Swiss Commander
himself. On the day of the cease-fire in France, the Supreme Swiss Commander
requested that the possibility of partial demobilization be included in the upcoming
strategic conferences. He felt that it was better to undertake such demobilization
unilaterally before the Germans demanded it.49 Commander Wille, who would plead at
another meeting just a few days later for "warfare" instead of "national defense," now
pointed out that the number of troops mobilized would be "very closely watched" by
Germany, which sooner or later would lead to inquiries, if not outright demands. Given
this situation, he favored "an inconspicuous reduction of troop strength" along the Army
Position. Taking up positions in the Alpine area would be postponed until later. Wille
suggested that for reasons of preparedness and security, the Army troops deployed should
remain "as a cleanup detachment to complete activities they had begun." He defended this
position by alleging that "this way, keeping troops in the Army's deployment position
will no doubt be accepted by Germany as well." 50
Minutes of the meeting of June 24, 1940, p. 6. BA r E 5795/145.
49 Minutes of the meeting of June 22, 1940, p. 3. BA r E 5795/145.
50
Ibid., p. 4. BArE 5795/145.
Foreign-policy concerns on the part of the Army leadership were considered in
relation to the reduction of troops, particularly in conjunction with mobilization policy,
such as when ways were being sought to avoid the Bundesrat dragging its feet on
mobilization due to foreign-policy concerns. Arguments based on neutrality and foreign
policy gradually began to lose their significance for military decisionmaking and were
overshadowed by other defense-policy concerns, particularly by worries about the mood
of the people and the morale of the troops.
3. Operational Process and Readiness
At a meeting of the National Defense Commission51 on March 20, 1939, the
Minister of Defense voiced his concern that the real danger to Switzerland might lie in
defeatism and in the public's mistrust of the Bundesrat and the Army leadership. 52
However, there was little sign of this during the General Mobilization of September 2,
1939. The beginning of active service proceeded much as planned for the Army and
public officials. The sequence of events during the announcement of frontier deployment
a few days before the General Mobilization, the election of the Commander in Chief by a
joint session of parliament, the Bundesrafs neutrality declaration, and the call-up for the
General Mobilization on September 1, 1939, took place largely in the sequence that had
been planned for. 53 Switzerland's politico-military situation also differed little from that
of the summer of 1914. Once again the country's two neighbors, France and Germany,
The Minister of Defense's advisory council on military defense questions, consisting of the
commander of each corps.
Minutes of the National Defense Commission, March 20, 1939. BAr E 27/4060.
Cf. Bonjour, Geschichte der schweizerischen Neutralist, Volume IV, p. 1 9 ff.
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were at war and Switzerland was "highly susceptible to the fallout from this 'duel.'" As at
the beginning of World War I, it was also expected, in the summer of 1939, that Swiss
territory might become "the target of first strikes" by the warring neighbors. 54 After the
General Mobilization of September 2, 1939, the Swiss Army initially adapted a standby
position.
The rapid victory of the Wehrmacht in Poland and the reinforcement of German
troop strength along the Rhine and in the German-Swiss frontier region forced the Army
High Command to shift from the initial "mobilization position" 55 to a defensive posture
aimed toward the north. This line of defense, known as the "Limmat Line" followed the
natural barriers of Lake Walen and Lake Zurich and the Limmat River to the heights of
the Basler Jura south of Basel. 56
The conflict between military defense and other areas of defense policy was
apparent in this early operational decision by the Army High Command. The Chief of
General Staff, Lieutenant General Labhart, reminded the Supreme Swiss Commander of
"the repeated official protests to the Bundesrat by the eastern cantons and its assurances
that the frontier would be defended." He noted that any other operational solution would
place the Bundesrat in "a most difficult situation." 57 The Supreme Swiss Commander
was fully aware of the psychological difficulties, and therefore did not agree to reduce the
S4 Report by the Supreme Swiss Commander, pp. 11-12.
Report by the Supreme Swiss Commander, p. 1 3.
Cf Gonard, "Die strategischen Probleme der Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg," in
Hans-Rudolf Kurz, Die Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg, p. 43 ff.
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Report by the Chief of General Staff, September 22, 1 939. BAr E 5795/300.
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St. Maurice ml**™ Gotthard
Figure 1. The Limmat Line.
The discussion about the standby position was suddenly interrupted by the rapid
events in the west and quickly overshadowed by far more significant problems. After
Germany's invasion of France on May 10, 1940, the Swiss Army was called up again, in a
second General
,
Mobilization. The unexpected speed of the French defeat threw
Switzerland into a completely new, desperate strategic situation. Looking back at the
58
Situation Report, July 10, 1940 p. 2. BAr E 5795/304.
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moment that Switzerland was completely surrounded by Axis powers, the Supreme Swiss
Commander described it as the only situation during the war "that we were never able to
imagine beforehand in all its brutality and far-reaching consequences." 59 It not only
called for new operational decisions, as were subsequently expressed in the Reduit
strategy, but also changed the entire military climate of Switzerland in a decisive fashion.
In his Geschichte der schweizerischen Neutralitat, Basel historian Edgar
Bonjour describes the mood in Switzerland after the collapse of France under the
revealing title "Despondent and Ready to Surrender." 60 Though the mood shortly before
the invasion of France was characterized by occasional outbreaks of displeasure,
revealing more of a carefree self-interest than any profound, widespread uneasiness, 61 the
mood after France's spectacular fall shifted to total uncertainty, despondency, anger, and
despair.
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After the German-French armistice was signed, the mood was characterized
partially by unjustified relief over the supposed end of the war in Europe63 and partially
Report by the Supreme Swiss Commander, p. 10.
Bonjour, Geschichte der schweizerischen Neutralitat, Vol. IV. p. 141 ff.
On March 4, 1940, some thirty soldiers of the oldest age group submitted a petition to the
Bundesrat expressing their dissatisfaction with renewed deployment, saying that the new
deployment was very unpopular all across Switzerland. [BAr E 27/14245, Vol. 9]. In a letter to the
Commander of Mountain Brigade 1 1 , the Zermatt Spa and Tourist Association complained about the
hindrance military measures placed on tourism. The complaint culminated in the spiteful and
idiotic phrase "if we can no longer trust the tourists, then we really are ready to be ravished..." [BAr
E 27/13184]. Cf. Commander of the Eighth Division to the Commander of the Third Army Corps,
May 2, 1 940 [BAr E 5795/1 39] on the poor morale of Mountain Rifle Battalion 45.
When the Swiss Consul General in Munich traveled in Switzerland in his diplomatic car,
which bore German license plates, soldiers both on and off duty cursed him with derogatory terms
for the Germans [Memo by the Supreme Swiss Commander, May 24, 1940. BAr E 5795/160].
The Union Romande du Tourisme complained on July 8, 1940, about "the strict military
controls on Swiss citizens in certain Alpine regions, which severely damage tourism" [BAr E
27/1 31 84]. The Chamber of Commerce of the canton of Geneva asked the cantonal government to
use all its influence to keep the restricted military areas in the canton of Geneva from being
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by defeatism,64 as documented in a letter from the Swiss Noncommissioned Officer's
Association, a quite patriotic organization. The letter describes a war between the Swiss
Army and a modern, well-equipped, experienced enemy as completely senseless. It
recommends offering no resistance at all, which would at least prevent the destruction of
the nation.
65 The closer to the frontier, the more demobilization was favored among
certain sectors of the population. 66
It was in this extremely fragile and unpredictable situation of civilian "morale
crisis," "which affected the civilian population and, to a certain extent, the Army after the
armistice in France," 67 that the Army High Command was forced to reevaluate the
situation. The Supreme Swiss Commander described this decisive military move in his
report to the Bundesversammlung with the accurate but very un-military term "mental
housecleaning." Here he made it clear that what was occurring was not only a military
process, but one that also had to "address the psychological needs of the populace." 68
After the fall of France and Italy's entry into the war, the all-round defensive
front amounted to a total of 670 km. The available means would have provided for only
"a very thin defensive line" which would have little chance of withstanding the onslaught
of a modern enemy. 69 Thus the Army's commanders had to face the basic question of
enforced too strictly, since the effects on farmers and winegrowers would be unbearable [BAr E
27/13184, November 25, 1940].
64
Ibid., p. 208.
Bonjour, Ceschichte der schweizerischen Neutralist, Volume IV, p. 141.
Cf. Supreme Swiss Commander to the President of the Government of the canton of Vaud,
where he addresses two letters on regarding the civilian population's apprehension about the
reduction in frontier troops (demobilization of the middle and older age classes in Mountain Brigade
1 ), July 26, 1 940. BAr E 27/1 31 80.




whether to discard the expense "in terms of both time and money" invested in developing
the Army Position and spread the forces along the entire frontier instead. Among other
grounds, there were important psychological reasons against giving up the existing Army
Position, even if it meant that a large portion of the country would be handed over to the
enemy practically without a struggle. Thus the Supreme Swiss Commander initially
opted for a compromise and divided the Army into three groups: The frontier troops
maintained their previous task of guarding the frontier and "were expected to sacrifice
themselves fully for the Army, even in hopeless situations." The strongest-defended areas
of the existing Army Position were to serve as a "stalling resistance" and eventually join
parts of the Army to defend the Alpine area. According to the Supreme Swiss
Commander, this would allow the areas of particular economic importance in the central
part of the country to maintain their usefulness at least during the initial phase of the
battle.
70
After time, the central position would be reinforced and the part of the Army
eartagged for stalling resistance would be reduced.
After 1941, only the reinforced light troops and a few infantry and Territorial
Units remained to repulse an enemy attack on the Central Plains, while the bulk of the
Army, consisting of four army corps, would defend the Alpine area. 71 Finally, all the
troops deployed in the Central Plains were replaced by the Light Brigades. 72
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations to Chief of General Staff on suggested actions, p. 1
June 22, 1940. BAr E 27/14231
.
70
Situation Report, July 10, 1940. BAr E 5795/304.
Report by the Chief of General Staff, pp. 36-37.
72
Report by the Supreme Swiss Commander, p. 44.
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The defense of the Reduit was given its final form in Operational Order No. 13
of May 24, 1941: The frontier troops held the frontier; in the Central Plains were the
"stalling" Light Brigades; the bulk of the Army (four corps) were kept in the Alpine area.
However, it still took some two years until the National Reduit was fully prepared for
combat, with the defensive structures at its gateways completed and the necessary
supplies of ammunition, rations, and military equipment in place. 73
Sargans
St. Maurice Gotthard
Figure 2. The National Reduit
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Bonjour, Geschichte der schweizerischen Neitralitat, Vol. IV, p. 1 76.
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The Supreme Swiss Commander ordered all commanders of combat troops and
the Territorial Units
74 from the battalion level upward to attend the now legendary Riitli
Conference on July 25, 1940, to explain the significance of the new operational plan. 75 In
this way, the Supreme Swiss Commander again showed that the political dimension of
restoring and maintaining the people's will to resist was extremely important to him.
Operational decisions were made in relation to psychological defense considerations, if
not entirely subordinated to them.
Reports on troop morale after the Riitli Conference reveal little positive effect.
Hausammann's report of August 13, 1940, said that 75% of the men no longer believed
that an order to fight would be given if an attack came. Another 15% did not care. Only
10% believed it "steadfastly," but they did not believe they could win. 76 A report on
increasing the Army's strength in its central position also referred to a defeatist attitude in
some military circles. The impression was that "the old Army Position was only being
held by frontier troops and a few Territorial Units while the good defensive structures
The course of events in Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, and France showed that a
nationwide resistance organization had to be created in addition to the front-line troops. The
territorial organization already existing in skeletal form was fleshed out. The territorial militias
consisted of territorial battalions, which were generally not the equals of Army battalions, in terms of
both training and equipment, auxiliary guard units, industrial guards, local militias, civil-air
protection, motorized dragoons, and basic-training units. At the end of May, 1940, the troop
strength was listed as 44,000 men (not including industrial guards and local militias). Their task was
mainly to hinder sabotage, to fight airborne troops or tanks breaking through the lines, and to
prevent the civilian population from fleeing in panic [Report by the Chief of General Staff, p. 243
ff.].
Report by the Supreme Swiss Commander, p. 210 ff.
Report by Major Hans Hausammann, August 13, 1940. BAr E 5795/124. Hausammann
was the founder and director of Ha Bureau, a privately operated news service with close ties to the
responsible sectors of the Army High Command.
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built with an investment of much money and much effort would not even be used for
preliminary defense."
77
However, the withdrawal to the National Reduit seems to have had a positive
effect on the morale of at least some of the troops. According to Lieutenant General
Miescher, the men of the Eighth Division displayed a "much more confident and greatly
improved mood" after being moved to the Central Area, but the men still arrived with
poor morale in general. The Commander of the Second Army Corps had no doubts about
the will to resist of the officers, but the campaigns conducted thus far by the German
Wehrmacht did have a negative impact on the enlisted men's will to resist. 78
Once the basic strategic reorientation had taken place, the struggle to obtain the
means held to be militarily necessary for carrying out the Reduit plan became
increasingly visible. The less the military aspects of national defense were visible to the
general public, the more the Army High Command had to concern itself with "national
defense" instead of "warfare." The longer the war went on, the more difficult it was for
the Army leadership to obtain the necessary means. As the years passed and the military
threat was not constantly apparent to the public or to the troops, military duties and the
need for reinforcements were perceived as more of a strain: They became increasingly
difficult to understand or to support. 79
Report concerning further strengthening of the Central Position, September 23, 1940, p. 3.
BAr E 27/14321.
78 Minutes of the Meeting of October 1 9, 1 940. BAr E 5795/1 45.
Report by the Supreme Swiss Commander, p. 227.
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Even the best plans are of little help if they are not implemented in a militarily
intelligent fashion and supported by motivated troops with good morale. At the end of
1941, the Supreme Swiss Commander reported to his Army Unit Commanders on this
problem, noting that "the value of a field Army" not in active battle "was put to a severe
test of morale." There was no point "in completing training and making great material
sacrifices if the engines of morale were not fired up" to provide peak performance at all
times. 80 Maintaining the will to fight and the morale of the troops was extremely
important. 81 The necessity of this is made apparent by a memo from the head of the
Wartime Nutrition Office to the Supreme Swiss Commander, pointing out the worsening
morale of many of the troops. The changed military situation in Europe no longer made
"the maintenance of a strong military machine" appear necessary, and the shortage of
manpower made it extremely difficult to harvest the crops. 82
The Army leadership also seemed to be concerned about this development. An
opinion of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations in the summer of 1941 stated that "if the
(well-grounded) demands of the economy...were not satisfied within a reasonable period,"
there would be a danger that the mood of the people would deteriorate and turn against
the Army. 83 In this climate, military entities needed to display great tact in their
interactions with the people, which of course was not always the case. Particular
Minutes of the meeting of December 5-6, 1 941
, p. 14 ff. BAr E 5795/1 46.
81
Cf. Cautschi, General Henri Guisan, p. 618 ff
.
82 Head of the Wartime Nutrition Office to the Supreme Swiss Commander, September 4,
1940, p. 2. BAr E 5795/522.
83 Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations to Chief of General Staff, June 19, 1941. BAr E
27/5653.
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attention had to be paid to the psychological effects of official letters, particularly when
denying some request or responding to an appeal. Correspondents had to be polite
without losing their authority and military writing style should not be characterized by
curtness—this according to a memo from the Swiss High Command. 84
There were countless complaints about "wasted time" in military service. What
took six weeks "could be done in two with proper distribution of labor." The general
mood of the men on military duty worsened constantly because the soldiers could not see
any point in what they were doing. 85 Criticism of the Army brought considerable
political pressure on the Army leadership and led to a rather acrimonious correspondence
between the Supreme Swiss Commander and the Minister of Defense, particularly when
it came to dealing with anonymous complaints to the Bundesrat. The Minister of
Defense felt that it was his duty to read such complaints and investigate the charges
leveled in them. Since they were mainly based on true facts, the Minister of Defense was
not completely misguided in this endeavor. Thus at a meeting with the Supreme Swiss
Commander in mid-December, 1941, the Minister of Defense gave the Supreme Swiss
Commander an anonymous postcard complaining about inhumane treatment of recruits,
supposed mutinies, overcrowded hospitals, and the "torment" caused by the soldiers. 86
Minutes of the meeting of September 1 9, 1 942, p. 8. BAr E 5795/87. Throughout the war,
the Supreme Swiss Commander suffered from the trauma of the General Strike of 1918, and this
affected his military decisionmaking. When ending the wartime status of some transport firms was
being discussed in the spring of 1942, the Supreme Swiss Commander argued against the plan,
noting that in 1918 the employees of the demilitarized streetcars had formed a sort of red militia,
hindering anti-strike measures [Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, July 7, 1942.
BAr E 5795/155].
Minister of Defense to Supreme Swiss Commander, December 12, 1 941 . BAr E 5795/1 55.
Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, January 3, 1942, p. 1. BAr E
5795/155.
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The commanders of the troops in question were irritated by the investigations
ordered by the Supreme Swiss Commander and made no secret of their indignation. The
Supreme Swiss Commander forwarded the responses, unedited but with a sharp
commentary, to the Minister of Defense. He agreed with the Minister of Defense that
"the no doubt well-meaning complaints" should not be simply ignored, but pointed out
that "the unjustified criticisms and accusations had increased noticeably" of late,
revealing not well-meaning comments but "spiteful outbursts" and "slanderous excesses."
The Supreme Swiss Commander perceived "certain tendencies in the growing criticism of
the Army" and wished to avoid encouraging them. He noted in closing that he counted
on the Minister of Defense's understanding if he ignored such anonymous letters in the
future.
87 Bundesrat Kobelt "protested strongly" against the criticism that he simply
passed on citizen complaints to the Army unsolved. He believed that it was his duty to
pursue such complaints and felt that for this reason, he could expect the Supreme Swiss
Commander to not let them go unnoticed. 88
Stress and weariness became increasingly visible, so much so that some men
maimed themselves to avoid military service. 89 The Army leadership tried to counter this
with increased communication and openness towards the troops, systematically analyzing
morale and evaluating reports on rumors that were making the rounds. In early 1 943 the
Army leadership canceled call-ups, giving rise to numerous rumors. The Personnel
87
Ibid.
Minister of Defense to Supreme Swiss Commander, January 19, 1942. BAr E 5795/155.
Gautschi, General Henri Guisan, pp. 620-21.
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Division evaluated and categorized these rumors, "to provide an overview of the morale
of the citizenry." 90
The following were the main rumors as analyzed by the Personnel Division:
Canceling the call-ups had its roots a betrayal of the previous relief plan. This
rumor reflected the near-hysterical fear of spying that had been fueled by several
arrests in recent days.
Pressure from Germany once again served to explain the unexplained. Among
workers, in particular, it was said that Germany had demanded reductions in the
active troops so that there would be more workers to produce for Germany. This
showed a lingering mistrust in the will to resist of the authorities, dating back to
1940.
Throughout Switzerland, people tried to explain the cancellation of call-ups by
saying that a general mobilization of the Swiss Army would become necessary in
the spring. Because of this, the theory went, the Army leadership wanted to allow
soldiers a chance to rest beforehand. It is worth noting that the reason for this
General Mobilization was supposed to be the collapse of the Axis and chaos outside
Switzerland's frontiers.
In his report to the Supreme Swiss Commander, the Army Personnel Director expressed the
following opinion on the interdependence between troop morale and the morale of the civilian
population: "Once it became apparent that active duty would last longer, it became as important to
analyze the mood of the civilian population as to monitor the morale and discipline of the soldiers.
This is part of the nature of a militia-type army: It would be a vain enterprise to attempt to positively
influence the will to resist of the population during only the brief periods of required service or to
leave the soldiers' morale to fate and the many defeatist influences during the better part of the year,
that is, during their civilian activities." [Report by the Chief of General Staff, p. 226.]
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The rumor most widespread throughout the population, according to reports, said
that the danger for Switzerland was over for good thanks to developments on the
Eastern Front. Peace would not be long in coming. The Army leadership and the
Bundesrat had quickly and happily seen the consequences and thus begun the
demobilization. In farming circles it was also said that this "demobilization" was
due to the influence of farmers' associations.
No doubt the last rumor was the most dangerous for Swiss readiness, since it led
the people to fall back into "carelessness and passivity." After all, it could be assumed
that new call-ups that the people were not psychologically prepared for would prompt
renewed, harsh discord. 91 The commanders' reports of "little understanding for the
necessity for the calling up troops, increased influence of civilian opinions,
war-weariness, and mushrooming efforts to evade military service through means short of
disfigurement," showed no sign of stopping. 92 In the French-speaking areas of
Switzerland towards the end of the war an unhealthy mood developed which harmed the
morale of the troops, particularly frontier troops. 93
The dimensions of an integral national defense became visible even if the
security-policy terminology was still unclear. Given the fluctuations in morale, the
Head of the Psychological Section to Chief of Army Personnel, February 4, 1943. BAr E
27/ 14245, Vol. 44. The War Log of the German Navy even reports of a mood swing "of broad
sectors of the Swiss population toward favoring German' s to save Europe" from Bolshevism. The
pro-German rally anonymously organized in Switzerland is reportedly one of the proofs. Some even
spoke out publicly in favor of Switzerland joining the war on the German side. The prestige of the
English reportedly "declined substantially" [War Log of the German Navy, March 11,1 942, p. 1 89.
BMARM7/341.
92
Cf. "Enlisted Quarterly Report," 1944. BAr E 5795/90.
"Etat d' esprit de la population suisse dans certaines regions," November 20, 1944. BAr E
5795/129.
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operational decisionmaking process increasingly succumbed to the influence of internal
politics and was no longer able to do justice to the external threats with the necessary
flexibility. The psychological limits of military actions increased, and variations in any
area of overall defense impacted more and more directly the military's freedom of action.
This was true in the material arena, as well.
4. Material Limitations
Until mid-February, 1940, a custom was practiced in the construction industry
whereby companies had the right to call back from the Army those expert laborers
necessary to keep their business alive. For the following months, the Chief Army
Engineer demanded a fundamental change to give priority to the Army and allow it to
"pull in the skilled construction workers it needed from private industry." Also, all
unemployed persons who could not find a job in private industry would be used in the
construction of Army fortifications and roads, so as "to use all the country's labor
capacity."
94
In the spring of 1940 the Supreme Swiss Commander suggested to the
Bundesrat that it cut back public works to save productive labor for military construction
projects. He said the rapid decline in unemployment in the preceding weeks threatened to
preclude work of fortification-building being carried out "as the military and political
situations require" because of a shortage of labor. 95 The request was not dealt with until
one month later, at the Bundesrat meeting of May 17, 1940. At that time the Bundesrat
decided to first carry out comprehensive studies on the effects of such an action. 96 At the
Chief Army Engineer to Supreme Swiss Commander, p. 6, February 16, 1940. BAr E
5795/521.
Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, April 1 6, 1 940. BAr E 5795/524.
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beginning of June the Chief Army Engineer again pointed out to the Chief of General
Staff that work on the Army Position was far behind. Under the impression of the
dramatic breakthrough of German tank forces in the West, he also demanded more rapid
construction of tank barriers, which could only be done using civilian labor, since the
Army was totally occupied with building combat positions and dugouts. 97 The Supreme
Swiss Commander again recurred to the Bundesrat, this time demanding that "the entire
productive labor force of the country be placed in the service of national defense." 98
Because of the anticipated shortage of building material, the Supreme Swiss Commander
asked the Bundesrat to review the following measures:
Placing construction materials, particularly supporting steel, under a controlled
economy and releasing them only for projects that were in the interest of the
national defense, until further notice.
Making civilian projects contingent on approval from the officials responsible for
controlling the war economy. Civilian construction projects would only be
approved if they met an urgent need, did not require any supporting steel, and could
be carried out by labor not used for building fortifications.
Reviewing measures to ensure the ability to smelt Swiss ore and produce steel on
short notice.
The labor shortage was the only hindrance to the emergency construction of tank
barriers. For this reason, "the entire Swiss construction industry not required for other




Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, June 1 , 1 940. BAr E 57595/1 53.
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defense tasks such as air-raid shelters, war-industry construction, etc.," should be placed
in the service of "fortification building."
99
Typical of Guisan's holistic thinking of is the fact that the concept of "national
defense" used here also includes other areas of overall defense, such as the military
industry and protection of civilians. However, it must be added that increased
construction of fortifications was not allowed to proceed at the expense of workers
already in the Army. Instead, the construction industry was to be maintained to complete
military assignments with its own personnel without resorting to leave for soldiers. This
would have served only to shift, not to increase, construction performance. 100 In
mid-June 1940 the War, Industry, and Labor Office had a meeting on restoring civilian
construction and the general obligation to work. 101 This meeting appeared effective, 102
but there was little benefit for the Army Position, and the discussion was overtaken by
events. At a meeting on July 6, 1940, Lieutenant General Wille noted that the Army
Position could no longer be maintained under the existing conditions "according to the
applicable laws of warfare," and that no more money should be invested in it in the




After the obligation to work was implemented by regulation on September 2, 1939, a new
regulation was issued on February 11, 1941: Traditional farm laborers were definitively tied to their
place of work and persons subject to the obligation to work could be dispatched to serve in
agriculture. [Maurer, Anbauschlacht, p. 117 ff.] In addition, the unemployed were used for Army
work [cf. "Bildung von Arbeitsdetachementen fur die Landesverteidigung," Bundesrat Minutes, May
21, 1940, BAr Vol. 397, p. 880, and memo from the Commander of the Fourth Army Corps to
Supreme Swiss Commander reporting good experiences with the use of unemployed labor, January
12, 1940. BAr E 5795/142].




103 Shortly thereafter the Supreme Swiss Commander made a fundamental decision
to withdraw the bulk of the Army into the Alpine area. 104
Until 1941, the individual Army units were granted a short-term, lump-sum
construction bond series for fortifications, what became known as a "time bond." But this
system seems to have promoted a certain lack of planning, and bonds were requested in
the same way. In addition, the Reduit decision introduced a new stage of construction,
with several large projects to be built by civilian construction companies, whereas Army
units had previously built many makeshift structures themselves. 105 The National Reduit
was based on three main forts, at St. Maurice, Gotthard, and Sargans. The latter was
practically built during active duty, and the other two were renovated and expanded. The
southern and eastern limits of the National Reduit were combined with the frontier
defenses, but the corridors leading in from the North had to be completely fortified and
closed off. 106
In the spring of 1941, the Bundesrat suggested to the Army leadership that it
switch from "time bonds" to bonds for a specific project. The Army leadership leaned
more towards the viewpoint that Army unit commanders should be allowed complete
operational freedom in the building of fortifications. But this solution was inevitably tied
to reduced consistency, which also resulted in increased costs. 107 Here again, a conflict
with civilian authorities was predestined. At a meeting on September 8, 1941, the
Minutes of the meeting of July 6, 1940, p. 13. BAr E 5795/145.
Cf. Odermatt, Zur Genese der Reduitstrategie, p. 74 ii.
Report by the Bundesrat, pp. 48-49.
Report by the Chief of General Staff, p. 209.
Report by the Bundesrat, p. 48-49.
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Minister of Defense recalled again that the only projects that should be undertaken were
those that were "absolutely and urgently necessary" and had to be available in the shortest
time possible. Moreover, no projects should be undertaken for which there was currently
no crew. Bundesrat Kobelt also did not hesitate to state his opinion on the military
usefulness of large projects, saying that in areas of forests and cliffs it was preferable to
build many small fortifications than to build a system of large, extremely vulnerable
structures.
108 Days later the Supreme Swiss Commander requested that the matter of
fortification-building be reevaluated by the Army Corps and a clear order of priorities
produced. 109
In early 1941, the Bundesrat approved a bond series for building fortifications. 110
That April, the Supreme Swiss Commander submitted the request for the first issue of the
"major fortification bond series," which was approved on May 7, 1941. This first issue
consisted of 104 million Swiss francs for building permanent facilities for the Army
Command and defensive units and 38 million francs for artillery defenses in the Alpine
area.
1
" When the Supreme Swiss Commander requested the second issue, or some 75
million francs, there was resistance on the part of the Bundesrat. The bond issue was
fully approved, 112 but the Bundesrat demanded a new review of the entire fortification
plan. There was little it could say against expanding the three large forts at Sargans,
Gotthard, and St. Maurice. Instead it criticized the planned artillery fortifications, which
Minutes of the meeting on the relief plan 1941/42, September 8, 1941. BAr E 5795/146.
1(19 Minutes of the meeting of September 9, 1941, p. 3. BAr E 5795/146.
Minister of Defense to Supreme Swiss Commander, September 24, 1 941
, p. 1 , E 5795/521
.
Minister of Defense to Supreme Swiss Commander, September 1 5, 1 941
, p. 1 , E 5795/521
Minister of Defense to Supreme Swiss Commander, September 24, 1941. p. 1, E
5795/521.
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cost an average of four to eight million francs each and took more than three years to
build. The Bundesrat believed that this type of structure would not be useful in this war
and should not be funded. "Given the massive sums that would have to be invested in
these structures," the Bundesrat felt that a new review of these plans was "urgently
necessary.""
3 The Supreme Swiss Commander reacted indignantly that he was not aware
of any new evaluation criteria and asked the Bundesrat to please indicate them to him. 114
The technically very polite response of the Minister of Defense also contained some digs
at the Supreme Swiss Commander, such as when Kobelt stated that he had previously
discussed the question of the permanent facilities with various commanding officers,
including some Army unit commanders, and they had confirmed his view that "the value
of the large permanent facilities was not great beyond doubt." Experience in this war so
far had also been unable to dislodge this belief. For this reason, he wanted the following
questions resolved:
Was there really a justified need?
Did the expected long-term benefits justify the up-front costs?
Were there sufficient materials and labor?
Could the weapons required be delivered within a feasible period?
Could the officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men required be
provided without excessively weakening the other units? 115
Minister of Defense to Supreme Swiss Commander, September 15, 1941 . BAr E 5795/521.
Supreme Swiss Commander to the Minister of Defense, September 20, 1941. BAr E
5795/521.
Minister of Defense to Supreme Swiss Commander, September 24, 1 941 , E 5795/521
.
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The Supreme Swiss Commander pointed out that he had already made cuts in
I
the planned fortifications before submitting the requests.
116
Still, nearly 400 million
francs were invested in fortification building in 1941 with the approval of the bond series
I
requested.
117 The government expended a total of some 550 million francs in fortifying
frontiers and terrain by the end of 1942. The overall military expenditures for 1942
amounted to a princely 1.02 million francs.
The Parliament also increasingly tried to curb expenses for national defense. At
I
the end of 1941, the Senate Select Committee" 8 concerned with the matter "urgently"
asked the Bundesrat "to push on energetically with its efforts to sharply reduce military
expenditures without weakening the morale or readiness of the country." The financial
prospects for Switzerland were causing "great concern." 119 In mid-October, 1942, the
Senate Select Committee decided to reduce expenditures on civil air protection, the
women's auxiliary, and mobilization and to not make bonds used retroactive. 120 So it is
no surprise that in 1943 the Bundesrat again asked the Supreme Swiss Commander to
economize. Although the Bundesrat had never doubted the "necessity and
appropriateness" of the fortifications, the country's tight financial situation and the
Supreme Swiss Commander to the Minister of Defense, November 11,1941. BAr E
5795/521.
Minister of Defense to Supreme Swiss Commander, 24.9.1 941
, p. 3. BAr 5795/521
.
At the beginning of the war, Parliament gave the Bundesrat special emergency powers
which allowed it to make decisions independent of other Swiss councils and the constitution with
only subsequent parliamentary approval. However, Parliament insisted on creating a select
committee representing both houses which the Bundesrat was to consult before important decisions
whenever possible.
Resolution of the Senate Select Committee on spending cuts in the Army, November 3,
1941. BAr E 5795/1 55.
,2n
Resolution of the Senate Select Committee, October 1 6, 1 942. BAr E 5795/1 56.
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increasing shortage of building materials forced it to request "the greatest possible
economy" from the Supreme Swiss Commander. The Bundesrat also asked the Supreme
Swiss Commander to review carefully the troop commander's requests for construction
tasks, "to see if the same goals could not be achieved with more modest means" 121 The
Bundesrat still had nothing against expanding fortifications recognized to have lasting
geostrategic value, such as St. Maurice, Gotthard, and Sargans, or against building
defensive gateways into Switzerland. What it wanted to abstain from building were
structures of "temporary value," and it refused in principle to consider of lasting value
any fortification built in the National Reduit. 122
Strengthening fortifications was not only a major component of the defense
philosophy at the time, but was also an important part of dissuasion. This is visible from
documents later recovered from the German High Command, dated September, 1942, and
stating that "fortification" by the Swiss Army would allow it "to give an invader serious
resistance at the frontiers and to maintain itself in the National Reduit for a lengthy
period." 123
Bundesrat to Supreme Swiss Commander, January 12, 1943, p. 4. BAr E 5795/88.
Ibid.
Kleines Orientierungsheft Schweiz, German Wehrmacht, Foreign Armies West department,
September, 1942, p. 34, BMA RH D 18/173. See also Haider, Kriegstagebuch, Vol. II, p. 127,
where he reports that Swiss frontier positions in the jura mountains are strong.
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B. THE PHILOSOPHY OF DISSUASION
1. Retreat to Dissuasion
a. The Limmat Line
The first signs of dissuasion began to become visible in the debate on
operational use of the Swiss Army in the Second World War. In requesting expansion of
his Corps' permanent position at the end of 1939, the Commander of the Third Army
Corps, Lieutenant General Miescher, said he believed that seven stages of construction
could develop a northern fortification, a "region fortifiee," that would "keep the country
from war as a result of its strength." He rejected the criticism that expenses for such
fortifications were too high and would impinge upon the equipping and the
maneuverability of the field Army, saying that more important things were at stake, such
as protecting the country and keeping it out of war, thereby achieving untold "material
and emotional savings." For this reason, he believed everything should be concentrated
on "preventing the violation of our nation as well as is humanly possible." 124 Like other
members of the Army High Command, 125 he feared the tremendous psychological and
economic consequences of losing one sixth of Swiss territory and one third of its
population. Miescher felt that the greatest lesson of modern wars was the fact that the
theater of war itself was the most expensive seat in the house. For this reason, Miescher
saw that it was necessary to make a potential attack appear pointless from the very
Commander of the Third Army Corps to the Supreme Swiss Commander, December, 6,
1939. pp. 20-22. BArE 5795/301.
In an operational study dated November 2, 1939, the Chief of General Staff summarized
the problem in a single observation: "No matter how painful it may be to give up both Northeastern
Switzerland and Southeastern Switzerland from the very beginning, attempting to defend them with
inadequate means would be highly perilous for the nation as a whole." [BAr E 5795/301
.]
41
beginning. 126 The reason for Miescher's dissuasive viewpoint appears to be the quite
legitimate hope that strategic decisionmaking could avoid an attack and its fateful
consequences. Thus Miescher's attitude appears to be more an after-the-fact shift to a
dissuasive philosophy than a fundamental strategic position with the goal of "achieving
such a high degree of readiness and defensive ability through civilian and military efforts
that a potential enemy is kept from attacking." 127
Later the Army High Command also credited the Army Position with
dissuasion. A situation report dated July 10, 1940, highlighted the dissuasive effect of the
Army Position probably based to some degree on optimism and rationalization. "Given
our choice of the Army Position, its being occupied by the entire Army, and the expected
aid of an ally [France], plus the good performance of the troops, we not only can count on
a strong resistance in case of attack, but also a dissuasive effect in that on consideration,
an attacker would decide not to make war on our country. There have been repeated
signs that the disappearance of the threat is due in large part to the growing impression
abroad of our will to resist and our ability to resist." 128 This ability to resist was shown at
the beginning of the war in the deployment to the Army Position. Chief of General Staff
Labhart was not foreign to such thoughts, 129 which the Supreme Swiss Commander also
accepted and supported when he expressly referred to the necessity to do everything
possible to keep Switzerland from being drawn into the war. 130
Wb Commander of the Third Army Corps to the Supreme Swiss Commander, December 6,
1939, p. 3/4. BArE 5795/301.
127 Daniker, Dissuasion, p. 39.
Chief of General Staff to Supreme Swiss Commander, draft situation report, July 10, 1940,
p. 2. BAr E 5795/304.
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Cf. Chief of General Staff to Supreme Swiss Commander, 28.12.1939. BAr E 5795/301.
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These examples show that the philosophy of dissuasion took hold in the
Army leadership early in the Second World War. When Major General Huber 131
developed the philosophical foundations for future strategy, which had to be adapted to
totally different circumstances after the fall of France, he, too, used an approach clearly
based on the principle of dissuasion:
Under the current circumstances, Switzerland will only be spared direct
attack by Germany if the German General Staffs estimation shows that any fight
with us will be long and difficult and that war with us will create a new source of
destabilization in the center of Europe which will be a detriment to Germany's
long-term plans. Thus the goal of our national defense consists of convincing our
neighbors that we will offer a tough resistance and that it will take much time and
great resources to defeat us. n2
This not only laid the basis for future strategic actions, but also made it clear
that the only acceptable defense philosophy would be one that included all aspects of
defense. Indeed, this is the only way a small nation can do justice to the concept of
dissuasion. In dissuasion practiced by small nations, "the sum of all means for defending
or regaining national freedom and independence" must be the source of convincing
dissuasion. 133 The conflict between overall defense and military readiness that was first
hinted at in the Bundesrafs "instructions" to the Supreme Swiss Commander had now
entered the realm of military-strategic decisionmaking.
Supreme Swiss Commander to Chief of General Staff, December 30, 1939, p. 1. BAr E
5795/301.
Major General Jakob Huber followed Lieutenant General Labhart as interim Chief of
General staff at the beginning of 1 940.
Chief of General Staff to Supreme Swiss Commander, draft situation report, July 1 0, 1 940,
pp. 3-4. This argumentation was adopted almost word for word by the Supreme Swiss Commander
in his "Note concernant le nouveau dispositif de defense" of July 12, 1940, informing the Minister of
Defense of the Reduit decision. Seep. 2. BAr E 27/14321.
133 Daniker, Dissuasion, p. 38.
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b. The National Reduit
The lines of thought that later converged into the Reduit strategy were
apparent as early as the spring of 1940, during the search for a fallback from the "Limmat
Line." At that time, the Supreme Swiss Commander sought to find a position in the
Central Plains to which the Army could be withdrawn if the Army Position were
penetrated.
134 A study by the Chief of General Staff came to the conclusion that the best
area was not the Central Plains, but the foothills of the Alps and the mountains
themselves. 135
Given Germany's spectacular entry into France, Colonel Germann 136 was
assigned "to study the possibility of withdrawal to a Reduit position if there is an
unstoppable breakthrough in the Army Position." In his study, Germann came to the
conclusion that once fighting began, it would be impossible to withdraw the necessary
number of men to defend those areas to a rear position in the Alps and foothills. So the
only alternatives would be either to continue fighting on the Army Position without
possibility of withdrawal or to place sufficient forces in the central part of the country "to
build the core of a tough Reduit Position" beforehand. It is noteworthy that Germann,
who normally made a strictly military presentation of his argument, here slipped into a
Schaufelberger, Das Reduit National 1940, ein militarhistorischer Sonderfall, p. 210.
Study by the Chief of General Staff on a fallback position for the northern scenario, July 1 7,
1940. BAr E 5795/303.
Colonel Adolf O. Germann, who had been a professor of criminal law at the University of
Basel since 1930, was the militia commander of Infantry Regiment 32 and served as Chief of Staff of
the Second Army Corps. When the Second World War broke out, he first served in Operations,
where he was heavily involved in preparing the North and South invasion scenarios. After a brief
interlude as Head of Operations, he was placed directly under the Chief of General Staff in April,
1 940, to work on strategic problems [Odermatt, Zur Genesis der Reduit-Strategie, p. 25, Note 35].
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sort of dissuasive argument as soon as he touched on the subject of the National Reduit:
"The purpose of the Reduit Position would be to prove the right of a free Swiss People to
exist...."
137
The Reduit concept was nothing new. As a symbol of the Swiss desire for
freedom and independence, it was anchored so firmly in Swiss national, historical
heritage that it was always associated with resistive capacity, even with dissuasion.
When France collapsed and Switzerland found itself surrounded by the Axis, new
dissuasion issues arose: It had to be made clear to the Axis powers, who now depended
more than ever on the Alpine passes, that these routes would be wiped out for a long time
if Switzerland were attacked, and that any attacker would also have to contend with a
"stubborn resistance" including "drawn-out guerrilla warfare in the Alps." Thus a military
attack on Switzerland could only appear worthwhile to the Axis if they could count on
gaining control of transit routes, the industrial infrastructure, and other assets more or less
unharmed. For this reason, it was essential for Switzerland to make it clear to the Axis
early on that if attacked, it would make its infrastructure, particularly the transit routes
through the Alps, unusable enough that "they could not be restored within a foreseeable
period." 138 However, the defense efforts would only be credible and the dissuasion for a
potential enemy effective if military actions were convincing from a strategic-operational
viewpoint and if determination and self-assertiveness were apparent. This aspect must
have been particularly important for Switzerland and reduced its room for maneuvering in
Colonel Germann to Chief of General Staff, June 22, 1940, p. 4. BAr E 27/14321
.
138 Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations to Chief of General Staff, June 22, 1 940, pp. 2-3. BAr
E 27/14321.
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the summer of 1940, given the defeatist mood of the country after the fall of France. The
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations also pointed out in no uncertain terms in a study
submitted to the Supreme Swiss Commander that he believed there was no question of
simply giving up the previous lines of defense (frontier areas and Army Position). Not
only would this prompt the public to see the difficulty constructed "Limmat Line" as "a
rather shortsighted national-defense measure:" It would also have a devastating effect on
the will to resist of both the civilian populace and the Army. For this reason, Striiby
suggested leaving the frontier troops in their existing areas, continuing to occupy the
strongest segments of the Army Position with parts of the Army at least during an initial
phase, and using the bulk of the Army to set up a Central Position in the Alps. 139 Here
Striiby, too, was clearly thinking in terms of dissuasion. 140
Strangely enough, the concept of dissuasion was given no significance in a
preparatory meeting attended by all five corps commanders and the Chief of General
Staff and led by the Supreme Swiss Commander. While Wille, Miescher, and Labhart
basically supported setting up a Central Position, the Commander of the Second Army
Corps and the Chief of General Staff wanted to maintain the Army Position with reduced
forces and develop a Central Reserve made up of three units. Lieutenant General Lardelli
wanted to wait for the outcome of the Bundesrat decisions. 141 Meanwhile, former Chief
of General Staff Labhart had expressed his own ideas on a Central Position in a personal
Study by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations submitted to the Supreme Swiss
Commander, July 1, 1940, p. 5 ff.. BAr E 27/14321
.
Ibid., p.3.
141 Minutes of the meeting of June 22, 1940, p. 11. BAr E 5795/145.
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letter to the Supreme Swiss Commander the day before the meeting. He discussed the
dissuasive effects on the political arena of what he saw as an Army credibly deployed.
Labhart believed the Army was the only trump card Switzerland had "to face down
extensive German demands." He felt that Switzerland could appear quite ready to
negotiate, but also had to make it clear that "we will respond with force to demands that
affect our honor or our integrity, even if we have no hope of winning a military battle." If
anything could contribute to controlling excessive demands, it would only be "this
martial attitude on the part of the people, who are prepared to make any imaginable
sacrifice for freedom." Labhart believed that the prerequisite for this was a defensive
position corresponding to the Army's strength: "An Army.. .spread thin does not provide
any bargaining chips that can be taken seriously at the bargaining table." 142
Even though the modern term dissuasion was still not commonly employed at
the beginning of the Second World War and the concept had not yet been understood in
all its complexity, dissuasive tendencies were still quite visible in the thinking of various
commanders. The Army leadership also repeatedly succumbed to the very
understandable temptation of smothering thoughts of possible armed conflict and
concerns about the obvious weaknesses and inadequacies of Swiss preparations with a
belief in the dissuasive effect of the military's indisputably remarkable efforts. A "Note
sur l'organisation defensive" in the summer of 1941 attempted to draw lessons from the
experience of the War thus far. It came to the very depressing conclusion that the only
Personal letter from the Commander of the Fourth Army Corps to the Supreme Swiss
Commander, June 21, 1940, p. 4. BAr E 27/14321.
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chance for a small country like Switzerland was to make military intervention by the
attacker as expensive as possible, that is, to inflict a maximum of damage on him. The
report noted that Switzerland held the trump card of railroad routes through the Alps,
which it had to keep at all costs, or it had to destroy the routes so that they would not be
usable within a foreseeable time period.
143 The less the Army leadership was convinced
of the lasting dissuasive effect of the strategic positions as a whole, the more it
concentrated (with good reason) on the Alpine crossings. In the Supreme Swiss
Commander's view, the main threat at the end of 1941 was that Switzerland might have to
reject an effort by the Axis to transport troops and materiel through Switzerland, leading
to a surprise attack. But as the Supreme Swiss Commander wrote, "it is well known
abroad that such a move would have little or no chance of success due to the heavy
monitoring and defense of the railroad lines, so the enemy will probably not make such
an attack."'
44
This claim was not supported by reality. Besides the Cavalry, only four
reinforced infantry regiments were on active duty at the time, so it would have been a
misstatement "to say that part of the Swiss Army was still mobilized." In this situation,
the Supreme Swiss Commander believed that it was important not to give the impression
abroad that "our words cannot be backed up by deeds." 145 The discrepancy that had
developed between Switzerland's true military readiness and the logic of dissuasion was
Ui
"Note sur I' organisation defensive," May 24, 1941, p. 2. BAr 5795/86.
Supreme Swiss Commander to the Minister of Defense and the Bundesrat, December 10,
1941, p. 1. BAr E 27/14253.
Report on the general military-political situation and its effect on Switzerland, December 9,
1941, pp. 3-4. BAr E 27/14253.
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growing wider. But still, dissuasive viewpoints cropped up more and more in the High
Command's argumentation. This continued when the German Army was fighting the
allies within Europe. As the Supreme Swiss Commander stated, the risk of escalation
into military battles was lower "the more the fighting ability and the training level of our
Army are respected abroad." 146 The lack of an overall security concept became
increasingly visible.
2. Imbalance in Security Policy
During the meeting of June 22, 1940, Prisi criticized the idea of withdrawing the
bulk of the Army to the Alpine area. He said that giving away three fourths of the
country was not a way to defend the nation, but simply a way "to defend the Army."
147
At the July 6 meeting he repeated his basic criticism of the Reduit strategy.
148 While
Wille, Miescher, and Labhart continued to support something resembling the subsequent
Reduit plan, the Commander of the Second Army Corps was of a decidedly different
opinion, which he added to the minutes in a written statement one day after the
meeting. 149 Like his immediate subordinates, 150 Prisi saw no workable strategic
Supreme Swiss Commander to the Minister of Defense, June 21, 1944, p. 1. BAr E
27/5653.
147
Minutes of the meeting of June 22, 1940, p. 7. BAr E 5795/145.
Hofer is mistaken when he states that the first criticism of how the Army was being used
was leveled "as early as 1942" [Hofer, Die Bedeutung des Berichtes General Guisans uber den
Aktivdienst 1939-1945, p. 116]. Actually, criticisms began when the Reduit decision was first
made.
Commander of the Second Army Corps to Supreme Swiss Commander, July 8, 1 940. BAr E
5795/304.
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Division Commander, June 24, 1940. BAr E 27/14321.
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alternative to the Army Position and was opposed in general to the dissuasive philosophy
underlying the Reduit strategy:
The Swiss Army has never been an end in itself. It has always been a
military means of national defense. A strategy with the sole objective of bringing
the Army into safety is complete nonsense under today's circumstances [sic]. It can
only be considered as a provisional measure when expecting a change in situation
within a reasonable period. However, there is no such situation affecting our
national frontiers today. 151
Criticism of the Reduit strategy never really ceased before the end of the war. In
the summer of 1941, the Minister of Defense gave the Senate Select Committee his
opinion on criticism of the Reduit strategy, answering in the affirmative the question of
whether the National Reduit was a proper military position. 152 This did not keep
Nationalrat 151, Major General Eugen Bircher from sending the Ministry of Defense a
critical report a year later, in which he made derisive statements about the Army High
Command's Reduit strategy. Bircher largely echoed Prisi's view, saying that the Army
had become an end in itself and could no longer fulfill its duty to the government. 154
These examples show quite clearly that the dissuasive philosophy was still far from
universally held among the Army leadership at that time.
In fact, it was difficult to justify the Reduit strategy without referring to its
dissuasive features. Otherwise, it was easy from the military and psychological
Commander of the Second Army Corps to the Supreme Swiss Commander, re: operational
deployment of the Army, July 8, 1940, p. 2. E 5795/304.
1,2 Oral report by the Minister of Defense to the Senate Select Committee, July 10, 1941. BAr
E 5795/1 54.
The Nationalrat is the equivalent of the American House of Representatives. Nationalrat is
also the title of its members.
Bonjour, Ceschichte der schweizerischen Neutralist, Vol. IV, p. 178, note 22.
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viewpoints to list good arguments against the Reduit, which numerous critics constantly
did.
In the summer of 1941 the Supreme Swiss Commander asked General Staff
officers of all ranks to participate in the planned military reform by making their own
suggestions "based on their experience on active duty and keeping in mind the techniques
of modern warfare." Over thirty General Staff officers and instructors, mainly young
men, responded to the Supreme Swiss Commander's request, 155 but only twenty referred
explicitly to military reform. The rest limited themselves to specific issues or discussed
strategic matters.
Here, too, there were two fundamentally different schools of thought: One
demanded "a return to a mobile field Army capable of any action. 156 A "new, mobile,
responsible Army should be sent into the Central Plains instead of the old, depressed
Army that retreated to the Reduit in 1940. " I57 Representatives of this school of thought
believed the National Reduit was definitely an emergency solution, "a strategy based on a
moment of abject weakness," and likened it to Weygand's defense of France in the
summer of 1940. 158 In fact, the Reduit strategy can quite justifiably be called an
emergency solution, one that included several serious disadvantages:
Giving up the most valuable parts of the country
Splitting up the forces, spreading the fronts too far apart
Critical summary of the suggestions solicited by the Supreme Swiss Commander, May 6,





"Studie Liber Arbeiten der Generalstabs- und Instruktionsoffiziere zur Reorganisation der
Armee,"May 15, 1942, p. 30. BAr E 5795/260.
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Sacrificing unnecessarily a large portion of frontier troops
Sacrificing the Territorial Units of the Central Plains with very little in return
Difficult mobilization
Poor situation for facing enemy bombings
Poor accommodations for men and horses
Morally unsatisfying warfare, with no possibility of wiping out the enemy
For the representatives of this school of thought, this meant that the Army was
actually not carrying out its constitutional role.
159
According to Captain Ziiblin, 160 one
representative of this school of thought, the fundamental task of national defense was to
protect the land and people from foreign domination, destruction, and plundering. Purely
from the viewpoint of the principles of warfare, dissuasive considerations would seem to
have no place here, which is clearly expressed in Ziiblin's opinion. Ziiblin could see no
point in handing over valuable terrain "just to make it difficult for the enemy to attain its
goal, the Alpine crossings." 161
The other school of thought wanted to reduce the Army to a single purpose and
organize the defensive forces accordingly. 162 An articulate proponent of this idea was
Captain Alfred Ernst, 163 who believed there was no chance for successful military
Critical summary of the suggestions solicited by the Supreme Swiss Commander May 6,
1942, pp. 10-11. BAr E 5795/260.
Captain A. Zublin, attorney and officer in the General Staff of the Eighth Division, was the
brother of the career officer and future Lieutenant General of the same name.
"Studie uber Arbeiten der Generalstabs- und Instruktionsoffiziere zur Reorganisation der
Armee," May 15, 1942, p. 32. BAr E 5795/260.
Critical summary of the suggestions solicited by the Supreme Swiss Commander, May 6,
1942, p. 14. E 5795/260.
Later Commander of the Second Army Corps and editor of Die Konzeption der
schweizenschen Landesverteidigung 1815-1 966.
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assertion of independence against an enemy with superior forces 164 and was no doubt
correct in inferring that the Swiss military in the Second World War was not designed for
active duty lasting several years.
165 He saw the purpose of fighting in "defending our
honor and thereby attaining the preconditions" for regaining the nation's freedom if the
overall political climate changed. This philosophy rejected the idea of building "hermetic
fronts," instead suggesting a network of "fortified strongholds supplied with munitions
and rations." 166 Unlike the other school, this school of thought was satisfied with fighting
to win time and sap the enemy's strength. 167 Although their viewpoint was based more on
national defense in the modern sense of overall defense and was less critical of Reduit
strategy, it is noteworthy that the proponents of this school also paid little attention to the
dissuasive background of the Reduit strategy. This confirms the suspicion that the
dissuasive aspects of the Reduit strategy were not yet firmly anchored in the strategic
thinking of the Swiss Army leadership. The Supreme Swiss Commander hung onto his
dissuasive philosophy, as is seen in his response to a request by the Commander of the
Fourth Army Corps: Based on the results of strategic maneuvers by the staff of the Fourth
Army Corps, Labhart had asked for the Fourth Army Corps' share of the National Reduit
to be reduced. In responding, the Supreme Swiss Commander reminded him of the
dissuasive philosophy of the Reduit strategy. If Switzerland were attacked militarily by a
major power "with strong enough means," it was practically inevitable that Switzerland
,64
Ibid., S. 6.
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would lose. For this reason, it had always been the basis of Swiss neutrality "to use the
training, armament, and deployment of our Army to make an attack on our country
appear so difficult that the enemy would see that it would not be worth the means that
would have to be invested and the sacrifices it would involve." He pointed out that this
was the goal of the Swiss Reduit strategy. 168 For this reason, the Supreme Swiss
Commander was not willing to grant precedence to military considerations.
Psychological considerations moved him to reject the changes suggested by the
Commander of the Fourth Army Corps, which he found perfectly understandable from a
tactical point of view. Continual reassignment of positions would shake confidence in
the Army leadership. The Supreme Swiss Commander believed it more important "to
stick to a decision already made" than to approve changes, no matter how well-founded
they might be from a military point of view. The threat of defeatism could only be
countered by emphasizing the will to resist, and confidence in the Army leadership was
very important to this end. But this confidence would be at risk if the people were given
the feeling "that the Army leadership itself is not sure of the appropriateness" of the
measures previously decided upon. The Supreme Swiss Commander felt that repeatedly
changing assignments would serve to strengthen this impression, even if such changes
were quite justified from a purely military standpoint. 169 Here we see national defense
taking precedence over warfare.
Supreme Swiss Commander to the Commander of the Fourth Army Corps, June 12, 1942,
p. 1. BAr E 5795/144.
Ibid., S. 2.
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The Reduit strategy as a whole was also repeatedly discussed. For example, the
question of whether the National Reduit should be maintained was a topic for operational
maneuvers.
170 Moreover, the Reduit strategy was marked until the end of the war with all
the disadvantages of improvisation despite all the efforts to expand and strengthen it. As
late as October, 1 944, the Commander of the First Army Corps said the National Reduit
"showed signs of hasty improvisation" and traced the shortcomings in cooperation
between the different troops in the National Reduit back to the rushed development of the
position in the summer of 1940. There had been no "overall plan" for the operational
decision at the time, nor had there been a "unified approach." 171 The editor of the remarks
on Ziiblin's "critical summary" was no doubt right when he stated that the Reduit strategy
had, in fact, been an emergency solution, but had not been undertaken lightly. Moreover,
it had required some courage to implement the plan consistently "without the Army or the
nation suffering any harm." 172 However, harm could only be avoided if other aspects of
security, such as supply and the willingness of the people to fight, were given precedence
over purely military considerations. For as an emergency solution to the desperate
strategic situation of the summer of 1 940, the Reduit strategy not only was impossible to
justify as part of an overall security policy; in fact it was a substitute for the complete
lack thereof. The unceasing criticism of the Reduit strategy and the growing conflicts
Report on lessons from operational maneuvers, June 11,1 943. BAr E 5795/401
.
Commander of the First Army Corps to Supreme Swiss Commander, October 12, 1944.
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between civilian and military authorities were also ultimately rooted in this imbalance in
the area of security policy.
The criticism of the Reduit strategy shows clearly that the strategy only made
sense in terms of dissuasion. Dissuasion, in turn, means credibility at all levels. This can
only be achieved if the military defense strategy is based on an overall defense
philosophy. If it is not, as was the case of the Swiss Reduit strategy in the Second World
War, the strategy inevitably goes awry: Neither the rules of warfare, nor "civilian"
security-policy demands, nor the principle of dissuasion are done justice. 173 One of the
most important dissuasive aspects of military defense is doubtless the continuous
presence of a sufficiently ready army.
At a meeting on January 26, 1 943, the Army Chief of Personnel said that for certain reasons
it must be concluded "that Switzerland's ability to resist cannot be regarded as positively" as desired.
There was an impression that Switzerland was mainly concerned about Swiss businesses and its high
standard of living [Minutes of the meeting of the Dispensation Commission, January 26, 1943, p.
3. BArE 5795/147].
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III. PRESENCE AND READINESS
A. CONFLICTS OVER SCOPE OF AUTHORITY
The relations between the Bundesrat and the Army leadership during the nearly six
years of active duty were not always smooth and free of conflict. In his biography of the
Supreme Swiss Commander, Gautschi reports "crisis-scale disagreements due not only to
questions of fact but also to personal rivalries."
174
This observation is no doubt valid, but
we will only discuss factual differences and their effects on military readiness here. One
question that gave rise to disagreements between the Bundesrat (or individual members
thereof) and the Supreme Swiss Commander was the scope and the timing of troop
call-ups. The seeds of this conflict were planted in the Bundesrat's directives to the
Supreme Swiss Commander, in the following passage, to wit: "It is incumbent upon you,
in particular, to determine if and when the Bundesrat should call up other parts of the
Army or the entire Army." 175 There was also a French version, but the German version,
in particular, allowed for different interpretations. 176 The statement appeared to qualify
the Supreme Swiss Commander's primacy in troop call-ups in accordance with Article
210 of the Military Organization Law.
Shortly after the General Mobilization at the beginning of September, 1939, the
Supreme Swiss Commander asked the Minister of Defense at that time, Bundesrat Rudolf
174 Gautschi, General Henri Guisan, p. 424.
Report by the Supreme Swiss Commander, p. 241
.
Gautschi, General Henri Guisan, p. 81.
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Minger, to clarify the meaning of the first paragraph of the Bundesrat's directives with
regard to Article 210 of the Military Organization Law, which stated: "If the Supreme
Swiss Commander requests that additional parts of the Army be called up, it shall be
ordered and carried out by the Bundesrat." 111 A chronological summary of all of the
Supreme Swiss Commander's moves relating to this matter contains a laconic comment
on the above query: "There is no trace of an answer; the question was the subject of
various oral consultations." 178 In the summer of 1941, the Supreme Swiss Commander
asked the Chief of General Staff to have a lawyer determine the boundary of authority
between the Bundesrat and the Supreme Swiss Commander. He said that the Bundesrat
had obviously forgotten that it was its duty to carry out any troop call-ups requested by
the Supreme Swiss Commander. For this reason he found it appropriate to "remind the
Bundesrat of the full scope of the authority of the Supreme Swiss Commander." 179
Colonel Adolf Germann, a General Staff Officer and Professor of criminal law at the
University of Basel, came to the following conclusion in his brief legal opinion on the
matter: "It is only due to significant political considerations that the Bundesrat may fail to
grant immediately the Supreme Swiss Commander's request to implement a call-up;" the
Bundesrat would be undertaking a serious responsibility for any lost time. In the case of
lengthy periods of active duty, he said, the Bundesrat would have to name significant
political grounds, but it must also be remembered that calling up troops during active
duty "was always significant to the survival of the nation," and therefore only political
177
"Commentaires," 1941, p. 1. BAr E 5795/89.
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considerations that also might affect the survival of the nation could justify the
Bundesrafs refusal. 180 Colonel Logoz, legal advisor of the Army Staff and Professor of
Jurisprudence at the University of Geneva,
181 found even more clearly that the Supreme
Swiss Commander alone was responsible for determining the necessity and "military
opportuneness" of calling up troops. In the case of a difference of opinion, the Bundesrat
had only two possibilities at its disposal: Modify its instructions to the Supreme Swiss
Commander or have recourse to the authority that elected the Supreme Swiss
Commander, the Bundesversammlung. Another legal opinion concurred with these two
about the Supreme Swiss Commander's authority and said that any other interpretation,
"particularly any opinion allowing the Bundesrat to not implement a call-up," constituted
constraint of the text of the Military Organization Law. 182
After further correspondence on this subject between the Supreme Swiss
Commander and the Minister of Defense, 183 the Supreme Swiss Commander sent a letter
to the Minister of Defense in October, 1941, in which he said "I am pleased to report that
as of your letter of September 24, 1 94 1 , there will be no further uncertainties on the scope
of Article 210 of the Military Organization Law." 184
However, at the beginning of 1944 the Minister of Defense presented the Supreme
Swiss Commander with a legal opinion from the Head of the Justice Department. The
opinion states that the legislator assumed "that the cooperation between the entities
180
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184
"Repertoire chronologique," p. 2. BAr E 5795/193.
59
representing the highest political and military authority" was imperative. The rule was an
outgrowth of the militia system and intended to divide responsibility between the civilian
and military authorities. The opinion culminated in the statement that the Bundesrat was
not required by law "to follow any request by the Supreme Swiss Commander to call up
troops." "One might conclude this from the wording of Article 210, but if this were the
case it would make no legal sense to involve the Bundesrat at all and not simply declare
the Supreme Swiss Commander alone fully responsible for call-ups." 185 The Minister of
Defense agreed fully with this viewpoint and noted that the division of authority between
military and political entities had always caused difficulties and there had never been any
definitive resolution of the problem. He recalled the experience of the active duty
between 1914 and 1918, which still applied: "Experience. ..has shown how difficult it is to
determine to what point the Army leadership has complete freedom in its decision, a
boundary that the Army may not overstep if it does not wish to infringe on the area
reserved for the political authorities, an area which they may not give up." The Bundesrat
correctly pointed out that cooperation depended as heavily on personalities as on the
regulations. Kobelt was happy to recall that during the previous active duty it had always
been possible "to clear up differing opinions about this division of authority through
personal contact between the two parties" and was confident that this would also be the
case in the future.
186
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In his response, the Supreme Swiss Commander endorsed this statement, but
reiterated his basic opinion on the issue without changing it. In his view, the legal
provisions were clear. He believed he had not only the "right to request," but also the
"right to order." Guisan even went so far as to say that depending on the
military-political situation of the country, the Supreme Swiss Commander might have to
undertake independently the duty "which he had obligated himself to perform when
chosen for his position." 187 The discussion then waned with a retort by the Justice
Department to the Supreme Swiss Commander's opinion, only to come to the fore again
on the question of the scale of troop call-ups.
B. CONFLICT OVER TROOP CALL-UPS
The first test of strength between the Bundesrat and the Supreme Swiss
Commander over troop call-ups came at New Year's 1942/43, when the Supreme Swiss
Commander attempted to update the 1943 relief plan to counter the increased threat. In
changing the relief plan submitted only a few weeks before, the Supreme Swiss
Commander asked for an increase in military readiness by adding a mobile reserve and
calling up "eight specially-armed infantry regiments" to secure mountain passes and the
gateways to the National Reduit. The purpose was to close the gaps in the relief plan
recently approved by the Bundesrat for the months of December, January, and
February. 188 The economic needs of both agriculture and industry had to be placed
Supreme Swiss Commander to the Minister of Defense, February 8, 1944, p. 3. BAr E
27/14253.
' 88 Minutes of the meeting of November 23, 1942, pp. 1-2. BAr E 5795/146.
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second to military defense in this situation.
189 The Army Personnel Director described the
facts of the matter as follows:
Switzerland faces the dilemma of either producing food, which will place us
in a good supply situation but increase the threat of attack, or reducing our standard
of living by, say, 20%. That would still be above the standards of other countries,
and we will have the security of a stronger national defense. 190
The Bundesrat did agree with the early call-up and extra service for light troops,
but did not come to a decision on the infantry regiments for some time. Instead it called a
meeting with the Army leadership to lay the foundations for a decision to be drafted at the
next regular Bundesrat session. At the meeting with the Army leadership, it became clear
that the Bundesrat and the Army leadership read the situation quite differently. The
Bundesrat considered the current military threat much less dangerous than did the
Supreme Swiss Commander, but it found the economic situation of the nation more
precarious than he. 191
The Supreme Swiss Commander believed that according to the existing relief plan,
there were enough troops on duty before early December 1942 and after mid-February
1943, but there would be a large gap from late December until mid-February, which the
potential aggressors were no doubt also aware of. The increased service of light troops
approved by the Bundesrat was far from sufficient to fulfill the Army's three main
Instructions for drafting the service plan to take effect March 1 , 1 943, January 30, 1 943, p.
3. BAr E 27/14245, Vol. 44.
Minutes of the Meeting of the Dispensation Commission, January 26, 1943, p. 3. BAr E
5795/147.
191 Minutes of the Meeting of November 23, 1942, pp. 1-2, BAr E 5795/146. The meeting
was attended by the heads of the Military, Economy, and Political Departments, the Supreme Swiss
Commander, the Chief of General Staff, and the Ministry of Defense department secretary.
62
objectives of protecting the Alpine passes, the airfields, and the gateways to the National
Reduit. In the Supreme Swiss commander's view, the light troops could protect the
airfields, but not the gateways to the National Reduit and the Alpine passes. Only
auxiliary watch companies were available for these tasks, which was totally
insufficient.
192 Lacking one element would mean throwing into question the entire
security deployment, which the Supreme Swiss Commander considered "an inseparable
whole." Accepting a temporary solution would mean sacrificing a certain share of
security.
193 The Bundesrats delegation believed that "reductions can be found if the
Army leadership revises its figures," and asked the Supreme Swiss Commander to
"review the question of additional military readiness independent of the approvals already
granted for light troops." The Supreme Swiss Commander was not convinced by the
Bundesrat members' arguments, but said he was not only willing to undertake the review,
but, surprisingly, also declared somewhat prematurely that he estimated that at least four
regiments were needed. 194 This was then the extent of the troop call-up approved by the
Bundesrat several days later. 195
On December 22, 1942, the Supreme Swiss Commander submitted to the
Bundesrat the relief plan to take affect in March 1943. Based on known German troop
movements into Italy and the occupation of Alpine crossings, the Supreme Swiss
Commander considered the danger of a German attack on Switzerland to have increased.
ibid.
"Elements de discussion pour la conference du 23.1 1 .1 942," p. 1 . BAr E 5795/87.
194 Minutes of the Meeting of November 23, 1 942, p. 4. BAr E 5795/1 46.
Cf. Bundesrat to Supreme Swiss Commander, January 12, 1943, p. 2.. BAr E 5795/88 and
Gautschi, General Guisan, p. 435 ff.
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For this reason, he asked the Bundesrat to increase the troops called up to 1 1 regiments as
of March, 1943. 196 According to the Supreme Swiss Commander, the necessary degree
of safety had been reached only when all possible airstrips were guarded and the railroad
lines and the gateways to the National Reduit were sufficiently protected that
mobilization in the Alpine area could be earned out promptly. 197 This notion led to the
conclusion that the current relief plan "not only needed modifications as to details; its
basic principles had to be scrapped." Accordingly, the troops should be called up for two
months with, at most, 20 days' leave, and the numerical strength of units could not be
allowed to go below 65% of normal. The Supreme Swiss Commander admitted that this
would make increased agricultural production difficult, but recalled the central question
of whether the people could be expected to withstand "certain restrictions" in the interest
of security or whether economic considerations should be the sole determining factor. 198
At the end of 1942 the Supreme Swiss Commander presented the Bundesrat his
annual report on Army activities. 199 In the report, he referred again to the unsolved
problem of timely call-ups during future mobilizations. He said that the Army's readiness
Supreme Swiss Commander to the Minister of Defense, December 22, 1942. BAr
27/14245, Vol. 44. When the Minister of Defense asked why English airplanes making night raids
on Southern Germany had not been fired upon by Swiss air defenses, the Supreme Swiss
Commander answered that the air defenses had been withdrawn to protect the Alpine passes
[Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, December 2, 1942. BAr E 5795/156].
197 Minutes of the meeting of January 19, 1943, p. 2. BAr E 5795/147.
Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, December 22, 1942. BAr E 27/14245
Vol. 44.
"Expose au Conseil Federal sur I' activite de I' armee 1942," December 24, 1942. BAr E
5795/156. In his General Henri Guisan, p. 434, Gautschi reports that "from 1941 on the Supreme
Swiss Commander presented annual reports summarizing the Army's activities in the past year and
the problems yet to be resolved. His reason for presenting these written reports was that since May,
1941, he had not had a chance to appear in person before the Bundesrat. For this reason, he was
moved to submit written summaries on pressing issues that needed to be resolved for the benefit of
all."
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was based above all else on speedy call-up of the necessary personnel, on the timing and
conditions under which the Army leadership had sufficient mobilized and concentrated
forces.
200 A note by the Supreme Swiss commander's personal staff states that the report
was written in a very polite, conciliatory style. When on January 6, 1943, the Bundesrat
had not yet answered the request regarding the relief plan to be implemented that March,
the Supreme Swiss Commander reiterated his requests in a situation report. 201 The
Bundesrat took 21 days to respond to the various reports by the Supreme Swiss
Commander. Unlike the Army High Command, the Bundesrat saw no increased threat
for Switzerland in the landing of allied troops in North Africa and Germany's occupation
of the previously unoccupied part of France. It did not see any major change in the
situation since November of 1942. It even dared to predict that if Germany were really
reconsidering an attack on Switzerland, "a factual comparison of the advantages and
disadvantages. ..could hardly result in anything that did not favor the maintaining the
status quo." Therefore the Bundesrat also saw no reason to rule favorably on the Supreme
Swiss commander's suggestion of completely rewriting the military-service plan and
revising the deferment and leave system. However, the Bundesrat did agree with the
Supreme Swiss Commander that in cases of immediate threat of war, rapid mobilization
and a well-ordered call-up of the Army would be of "the greatest significance." In a
somewhat cynical postscript the Bundesrat .expressed its expectation that the Army
leadership would take all necessary preparations to this end. 202 Obviously, it would be a
"Expose au Conseil Federal sur I' activite de I' armee 1942," December 24, 1942, p. 13.
BAr 5795/1 56.
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very tactless interference in the Supreme Swiss commander's area of authority if the
Bundesrat spoke out in detail on the appropriateness of troop call-ups and their military
usefulness, as it in fact did in a memo dated January 12, 1943. In this memo, it told the
Supreme Swiss Commander that the initial suggestion to increase in the number of
regiments from four to eight and to use them to occupy the gateways to the Reduit "was
no guarantee of safe mobilization and calling-up of troops." Moreover, the Bundesrat
suggested considering whether it might prove better as far as protecting mobilization and
troop call-ups if frontier fortifications were better occupied and the sensitivity of the mine
structures along the frontier were increased or even if the frontier troops were mustered. 203
At a meeting of the Army leadership to discuss the 1943 relief plan, the corps
commanders' opinions on the scope of the troop call-up varied, but most of them agreed
with the Supreme Swiss Commander's situation report. The Commander of the Second
Army Corps suggested eliminating fixed relief plans entirely in view of the rapidly
changing threat and issuing "a general order" on how much military service each man
must perform each year. He found fixed relief plans dangerous for psychological
reasons; there was no room for half-measures. About one third of the entire Army would
have to be called up to guarantee the required amount of security. 204 For the Commander
of the First Army Corps, the troops on duty were hardly even a symbolic gesture. But the
Commander of the Fourth Army Corps favored maintaining the current system. He
202 Bundesrat to Supreme Swiss Commander, January 1 2, 1 943. BAr E 5795/88.
203
Ibid., p. 2.
In his memo to the Bundesrat, the Supreme Swiss Commander countered this extreme
example with his own solution of 1 1 Regiments [Supreme Swiss Commander to Bundesrat, January
19, 1943, p. 4. BAr E 27/14253].
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warned against returning to the old system of leave for one third of those in each unit: "It
is better to have fewer units with a full complement than to have a massive Army where
everyone is on vacation." The Chief of General Staff noted that it was time to shift from
the 1942 principle of training service to a principle of readiness service.
205
In unusually blunt language and an obviously angered tone,206 the Supreme Swiss
Commander then once again presented his opinion, referring in a postscript to the
unpredictability of the German High Command, which had often chosen "radical
solutions instead of apparently more obvious alternatives." If they had to withdraw to the
Alps, the Germans would hardly be prepared, he said, to leave one third of this Alpine
Front to the Swiss Army. The ability of the Swiss Army was indeed well-esteemed, but
this esteem applied only to the case of deployment of the Army. The most important
consideration was to ensure that men, horses, and vehicles could reach the Reduit in time.
The Supreme Swiss Commander believed that any enemy attack would be aimed at this
weak point, "that any attack would be based on surprise, on destroying mobilization and
preventing the troops' marching into the National Reduit," while the hills and flat areas
leading to the Reduit would be the first occupied. 207 He protested particularly the
Bundesrat's opinion that signs of increased danger could be recognized early: "On the
205 Minutes of the meeting of January 1 9, 1 943. BAr E 5795/1 47.
The tensions between the Bundesrat and the Supreme Swiss Commander were doubtless
also fueled by the controversy over the Supreme Swiss Commander' s son' s promotion to colonel in
early 1943. The promotion was opposed by the Bundesrat and was soon reversed. Cf. Gautschi,
General Henri Guisan, p. 437 ff., and Braunschweig., Geheimer Draht nach Berlin, p. 182 ff. The
fact that the letter from the Bundesrat of January 12, 1943, was signed only by the Chancellor and
was not market "secret" or personally addressed also caused misgivings in the Army High Command.
Supreme Swiss Commander to Bundesrat, January 19, 1943, p. 2. BAr E 5795/151 and E
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contrary, I believe that it is precisely this mistaken security and trust that is one of the
most important preconditions for an enemy attack." He said that if nothing were to be
learned from history, there would be no point in the Army's task and "we would be better
off to simply dismiss the few troops still on duty." It would be better to show their
strength than be forced to actually use them. 208 Along with most of his direct
subordinates, the Supreme Swiss Commander believed that 1 1 regiments were "the
absolute minimum" to ensure mobilization of the Army in the case of a surprise attack.
For this reason, he resubmitted his request to muster up to 1 1 regiments in addition to the
guard troops as of March, 1943. If the threat allowed it, the troop strength could then be
reduced to aid agriculture. However, the soldiers in the regiments would be placed on
active duty for one month only. The existing rules on leave and deferment would be
tightened and soldiers would be granted up to 10 days' leave in emergencies so long as
at least 80% of the total men remained at their posts. 209
In its response the Bundesrat first expressed "shock regarding the style and tone of
this memo" which deviated markedly from the convention "for correspondence between
the Commander of the Army and the nation's highest executive branch." The Bundesrat
protested particularly against the accusation that it paid more attention to economic
considerations than to military security. It was well within the scope of the national
interests the Bundesrat was sworn to protect to pay due attention to other, equally





keeping the economy alive. It was quite understandable that the Army should be focused
on its military duty, but the Bundesrat could and would not be swayed in its
all-encompassing duty, which included the military as well.
210 The Bundesrat held firm
to its earlier position of refraining from large troop call-ups so as to allow agriculture
sufficient labor. Moreover, the Supreme Swiss Commander was asked to not call troops
of every age from the same geographic area at the same time, except for frontier troops.
A meeting between the Minister of Defense and the Chief of General Staff seems to
have produced some rapprochement. Consequently, it was decided "not to call up twenty
or more regiments during February and March." It was planned to postpone these troops'
service until April, May, or June and not to call up more troops than the call-up plan
stated for the period from February to June. 2 " In his response, the Supreme Swiss
Commander once again highlighted the difference between a situation report and the
Bundesrat's report and added that the old military principle of "une mission, un chef, des
moyens" was not being adhered to if he were denied the necessary troops to carry out the
mission assigned to him in August, 1939. He also complained about the egoism of the
Swiss people, who read daily news reports about the suffering in the countries at war, yet
were not prepared to make even the smallest sacrifice. 212 Leaves were then limited to
20% of the total troop strength and relief service was limited to 34 days. 213 The
Bundesrat distanced itself somewhat from its situation report, saying that certain
Bundesrat to Supreme Swiss Commander, January 22, 1943, p. 1. BAr E 5795/151.
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elements of the Army High Command's situation report it was based on had not been
available to it. Increased alertness was no doubt needed, but too much preventive
positioning of troops should also be avoided, the Bundesrat said. 214 The Supreme Swiss
Commander once again objected to a passage of the draft announcement to the Bundesrat
on relief duty, the leave system, and deferments. He said that the formulation "increased
efforts are necessary to defend the nation's security in addition to assuring supplies and
maintaining the economy" made military defense look like a secondary purpose. 215
There was a similar disagreement between the Bundesrat and the Supreme Swiss
Commander in the summer of 1944, when the Allies landed in Normandy. The Supreme
Swiss Commander asked for all frontier troops, the Light Brigades except for the Light
Cavalry, and the antiaircraft and civil-air units. 216 The Bundesrat refused to mobilize the
frontier troops and only approved calling the Light Brigades and the air and air-defense
units. Then the Supreme Swiss Commander again reminded the Bundesrat that its
behavior was in violation of Article 210 of the Military Organization Law and constituted
interference by civilian agencies into the authority of the Army Commander in Chief. 217
The Supreme Swiss Commander insisted on his demands but it was not until June 10 that
the Bundesrat agreed to call up the frontier troops. It still did not do it in the way the
Supreme Swiss Commander wanted, by posting public notices: It used the discrete,
time-taking method of sending out call-up cards. 218 After this new conflict on troop
Notes on the February 1, 1943, meeting between the Minister of Defense, the Supreme
Swiss Commander and the Chief of General Staff, pp. 1-2. BAr E 5795/147.
2,5 Major Bracher to Minister of Defense, March 8, 1943. BAr E 27/14245, Vol. 44.
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call-ups, the Supreme Swiss Commander pointed out that it had caused several days'
delay in implementing the planned security measures. He said that it had shown quite
clearly the dangers of ineffectual limits between the authority of the Bundesrat and the
Supreme Swiss Commander. 219 The Bundesrat said it had considered the landings in
Normandy a positive development and thus did not want to worsen the supply situation in
Switzerland by calling up troops. However, psychological considerations had also been
involved in addition to these economic concerns. An emergency call-up with public
posters could be expected to cause substantial worry among the civilian population. 220
The correspondence between the Minister of Defense and the Army High Command on
this topic continued in the same style. 221 It was ironic when, one month later, the
Bundesrat announced that it would release some of the troops called "with the proviso
that if there is a renewed threat, we will use yellow posters, not just postcards, to call
them up again." 222
On July 6, the Senate Select Committee joined the controversy over troop call-ups.
It not only asked the Bundesrat the reasons for such a massive troop call-up, but also
brought up the possibility of amending Article 210 of the Military Organization Law. To
forestall a disagreement with the Army High Command, the Bundesrat declined, saying
that with the releases, the reasons for such an action had ceased to exist. The Bundesrat
informed the Supreme Swiss Commander that it had done this "even though it would
219
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have been easier to let him explain his justification for going against the opinion of the
Bundesrat by himself." 223
C. MOBILIZATION
Before the War, it was impossible to predict the situation that would develop for
Switzerland. Any preparations that were made were intended for a high-intensity
conflict. This was also the case when it came to mobilization. For this reason, the
original structure of the Army Staff did not include a separate section that could have
dealt with mobilization issues on a regular basis. When Switzerland did not enter the war
and low intensity conflict, or, as the Chief of General Staff put it, "armed neutrality"
remained the order of the day, a section had to be created immediately to deal with "the
logistics of troop call-ups and releases." The newly-created Mobilization Section not only
had to prepare for mobilization in case of war, but was also responsible for the
mobilization and demobilization of relief forces. 224
Just before war broke out, on August 28, 1939, the Bundesrat decided to call up
the frontier troops
225
the next day as a precaution. However, it refused to simultaneously
place the Army on standby, as the Chief of General Staff had requested. 226 The General
Mobilization of September 2, 1939, placed some 430,000 Army troops on active duty227
"Repertoire chronologique," p. 7. BAr E 5795/193.
Report by the Chief of General Staff, p. 273.
225 According to Gautschi, p. 72, the number of frontier troops called up was 50,000, "and
the staffs of the military units, the mobilization organs, the antiaircraft and air-raid services, and the
mine service were also called up, as part of a ' total mobilization.'
"
226 Meeting of the General Staff, August, 28, 1939. BAr E 5795/348. See also Bonjour,
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and prepared over 40,000 horses and 10,000 vehicles for action.
228
Mobilizing the entire
Army generally proceeded without incident. Only minor frictions are reported. For
example, the mobilization of some troops in the Second Division was delayed due to late
trains. In some places there were not enough horses, or volunteers not required to serve
fell in.
229
There were two methods for calling up troops. The first was public, using the
available means of propagation, such as posters, radio, the public telephone and telegraph
network, the railway's transmission network, loudspeakers in train stations, pamphleting
from airplanes, etc. The second method was the "silent call-up:" The men being called
were mailed cards with their marching orders. Public call-ups used general call-up
posters and yellow posters for mobilization of specific units, for example frontier troops.
Both the public and "silent" methods had advantages and disadvantages. The public
call-up allowed the authorities to call specific units, not the entire Army, for short
periods, while using postcards took more time. The advantages of this method were
greater secrecy including the ability to keep hidden the scope of the call-up. This method
was often used, not only for relief duty, but also for partial mobilizations. 230 To spare
Although the figures on p. 53 of the Chief of General Staff's report do not include
auxiliaries, it is doubtful whether the number of mobilized men in September, 1939, should also
include the 200,000 drafted auxiliaries and the other 250,000 mobilized in May, 1940, as it does in
Cautschi [Cautschi, General Henri Guisan, p. 84 and p. 184]; cf. Bonjour, Geschichte der
schweizerischen Neutralist, Vol. V, p. 153, note 29, and Rosch, Bedrohte Schweiz, p. 68, note 21
.
According to the report by the Army Chief of Personnel, p. 245, the strength of the Army, including
auxiliaries and local militias, was some 400,000 in 1939 and approximately 500,000 in May, 1940,
and increased to 850,000 during the course of active duty.
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agriculture, relief service and partial mobilizations were not allowed to use horses and
men from the same area, as was allowed during General Mobilizations. This requirement
involved major disadvantages, but had to be maintained. 231
At the beginning of November, 1939, the Supreme Swiss Commander asked the
Bundesrat to grant him the authority to make small troop call-ups numbering less than a
regiment himself. The Bundesrat responded only partially to the request and maintained
that when calling up bodies of troops, the Supreme Swiss Commander had to submit a
request.
232 The Supreme Swiss Commander strongly protested this statement and said
that according to Article 210 of the Military Organization Law, the Bundesrat was
required to approve the troops he requested. 233 Two days later the Minister of Defense
assured him that Article 210 of the Military Organization Law would be respected. 234
However, the Supreme Swiss Commander considered the authority conceded to him by
the Bundesrat to be far from sufficient and "insignificant for our national defense." 235
The recent experiences of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, and Norway had
"shown as clearly as can be" that the Swiss mobilization system would not be sufficient
in the case of a surprise attack, despite constant improvements: "The military will only be
able to properly do its duty if everyone subject to the draft can be called up immediately
at the same time," according to the Minister of Defense. 236 The Supreme Swiss
Commander suggested formally issuing instructions on the duty of every man subject to
231
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military service ahead of time in case of a surprise attack. Accordingly, the Bundesrat
should authorize the Supreme Swiss Commander to implement an emergency
mobilization immediately "within the bounds of the directives issued to him."
The Bundesrat did in fact agree to mobilization in the case of surprise attack, but
did not fully implement the Supreme Swiss Commander's suggestion. It disagreed in
particular with the idea "that...the Supreme Swiss Commander would receive a carte
blanche he could use any time and under any circumstances" in case of attack. It insisted
on the following wording: "If the circumstances require it, the Supreme Swiss
Commander is authorized to implement mobilization himself immediately." 237 The
Bundesrat explained in a cover letter to the Supreme Swiss Commander that its
interpretation was that he could not use his authority until hostilities had commenced.238
On the same day, the Supreme Swiss Commander and the Bundesrat issued
instructions for action by military men not currently on active duty in the case of surprise
attack.
239 The sheet was glued into the service folder of each of the men and was
supposed to be reviewed whenever soldiers went off duty.240 The instructions said that
off-duty soldiers had to report immediately to their mobilization grounds or their unit if a
mobilization due to surprise attack were called. Parachutists, airborne troops, and
saboteurs were to be attacked "mercilessly." 24 ' To head off defeatism, the instructions
said "if news that questions the will to resist of the Bundesrat or the Army leadership is
237
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broadcast by radio, flyers, or other means, it is to be considered the invention of enemy
propaganda. Our nation will defend itself to the utmost by any means necessary.242
During the course of the War, two general mobilizations and some 80 partial
mobilizations were carried out. 243 The greatest troop strength was reached during the
Second General Mobilization in May, 1940. 244 All in all, the successful conduct of the
two general mobilizations made a positive impression at home and abroad and raised the
morale of both the troops and the civilian population. 245
At the end of 1941 the Supreme Swiss Commander reported to the Minister of
Defense on the general situation and noted that the threat for Switzerland had increased
so much recently that preventive actions for Army readiness would probably have to be
taken for the sake of the readiness of the Army. To this end, he had the General Staff
determine what measures needed to be taken immediately to guarantee timely destruction
of the Alpine railroad connections in case of attack by airborne troops. He also had them
determine how large the initial troop call-ups would have to be to ensure step-by-step
mobilization. The General Staff came to the following conclusions:
The mines then guarded on railroad lines not only had to continue to be guarded:
They also required tactical protection.
Mobile reserves needed to be placed along the major North-South routes.
Flights over the important railroad routes had to be prevented.
242 Report by the Bundesrat, p. 29. The Commander of the Third Army Corps had requested
keeping only one type of mobilization, i.e., mobilization in response to surprise attack [minutes of
the Army corps commanders' meeting, May 26, 1 941 . BAr E 5795/86].
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The airstrips located near railroad lines had to be defended tactically to prevent
enemy troops from landing.
Preparations for General Mobilization included a general call-up of the air-force
and antiaircraft troops and troops residing in frontier areas where mobilization might be
threatened by an invasion. For this reason, the Supreme Swiss Commander presented the
Bundesrat with the following "Draft National Policy on Preventive Measures for Army
Mobilization:"
The Commander-in-Chief is authorized to call up the extra troops necessary for
guarding the Gotthard and Lotschberg-Simplon line, for guarding main gateways to the
Central area, and those needed to guard the general mobilization itself as a preventive
measure prior to General Mobilization when the situation warrants it. This is particularly
the case for air-defense troops and the air-force. He is also authorized to call up those
troops whose evacuation from exposed frontier areas is necessary because their
mobilization is threatened. 246
The Bundesrat found that there was no reason for a general, anticipatory
authorization,
247
although mobilization had become a sine qua non for the success of the
defense strategy. 248
With the Reduit decision and the withdrawal of the Army into the Alps, the
mobilization plans also had to be updated. Previously, the mobilization centers were
located in the Army's recruiting facilities, mainly outside of the Central Plains. They
Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, December 1 0, 1 941 . BAr E 27/1 4253.
Minister of Defense to Supreme Swiss Commander, December 1 6, 1 941 . BAr E 27/1 4253.
Minutes of the meeting of November 1 2, 1 941 . BAr E 5795/86.
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were now moved to the duty areas within the National Reduit. This basic change in the
system presented the Army High Command with major difficulties. 249 It was now
extremely important to quickly mobilize men, horses, and vehicles in an area served by
only a few, relatively exposed, access routes. The gateways to the National Reduit now
became the Achilles heel of Swiss defense strategy. It was only if mobilization in the
Alpine area could be carried out successfully, only if it were possible for the arriving
troops to be mobilized on time in the National Reduit, that the preconditions for a long,
tough struggle in the Alps could be met. A situation report by the Supreme Swiss
Commander's Personal Staff stressed the previous history of this war, which illustrated
the great significance of the mobilization process. Almost everywhere, but particularly in
Poland, Norway, Belgium, Holland, and Yugoslavia, mobilization had come too late. In
the tense atmosphere prior to a military attack, the decision to mobilize could always be
seen as a provocation by the German Army and simply precipitate the worst
consequences. The examples showed that the governments in such situations generally
ordered the necessary military actions only grudgingly and therefore too late. 250 This
could not be expected to be different in Switzerland, so it was important to learn from
these other cases at both the tactical and strategic levels. The only way to respond to a
"lightning war" was with a "lightning defense." The report even went so far as to call for
eliminating the mobilization process altogether: Admitting that timely mobilization was
not politically or militarily possible led to the conclusion that mobilization should be
249 Report by the Chief of General Staff, p. 275.
250 Memo on defense organization, May 24, 1941. pp. 1-2. BAr E 5795/86.
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entirely eliminated. The report did admit that this thought might appear revolutionary, or
simply crazy, because mobilization had always been the first military action in the war
thus far.
251
Still, the report recommended that Switzerland should concentrate in the
future on the two most important Alpine crossings, Gotthard and Lotschberg, and place
so many troops in these two foci of the National Reduit that a stubborn resistance could
be put up at any time. This "permanent garrison" should be relieved periodically but
always have a full complement. 252 For psychological reasons, the report continued, the
frontier must remain guarded, but there was no need to set up a resistance front in the
Central Plains.
253
In order to at least halfway meet the problem of mobilizing the troops needed to
defend the National Reduit, the Supreme Swiss Commander considered conducting larger
mobilization exercises. Under this scheme, massive troop call-ups in times of danger
were to be camouflaged credibly as routine exercises to avoid provocation and to avoid
the expected difficulties in having the Bundesrat approve a troop call-up in the tense
political situation.
254 An example of the fact that it was rather necessary to practice the
difficult process of mobilization is found in criticism by the Minister of Defense of a
mobilization on the Southern Front, citing streets clogged with commandeered vehicles
and crowds and a lack of organization. 255
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Surprisingly, the Chief of General Staff was against conducting mobilization
exercises, since they would still not "illustrate all the disruptions that can be expected in a
real mobilization."
256 According to the Supreme Swiss Commander's report, the purpose
of such exercises was to "review the mechanism of mobilization of each unit right up to
the point of going into battle." He said it was important to practice mobilization
particularly for some of the new mobilization grounds "that had been established in the
Central Plains since the Reduit decision, in the gateways to the National Reduit, and
inside the National Reduit itself. 257 The first exercise of the Seventh Division took place
in February, 1942. The second was planned for March, but the Bundesrat objected, citing
in particular the costs
258
and the waste of materials involved. The Bundesrat also pointed
out that the exercise coincided with the planting season. Besides, the Bundesrat said, the
lessons from the first exercise could not be applied so soon. The Supreme Swiss
Commander insisted on carrying out the exercise, which he said was based on a
completely different concept. The Bundesrat approved it "despite serious
reservations."
259 The differences of opinion echoed for a long time. 260 In early 1943, the
Bundesrat once again attempted to justify its position, citing an impressive list of
considerations that the military leadership had to keep in mind while performing its
duties:
256 Notes on a conversation of February 1 , 1 943, p. 3. BAr E 5795/1 47.
Report by the Supreme Swiss Commander, p. 140.
The costs of mobilization exercises were approximately one million francs per division
[minutes of the meeting of September 1 , 1943. BAr E 5795/147].
259 Report by the Bundesrat, pp. 35-36.
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The Bundesrat agrees with you that a rapid mobilization and orderly deployment of
the Army it is extremely important to meet an immediate threat of war.... For this reason,
the Bundesrat gave its approval, in early 1942, to conducting two mobilization exercises.
These two exercises should have been sufficient, not because of fear that the enemy could
see a challenge in these actions, as you seem to presume, 261 but because it could be
assumed that after two large exercises the necessary conclusions could be made to govern
the preparations for mobilization. Also, the high costs of such exercises (one million
francs for each division mobilization exercise) and the usage of fuel and other materials
require certain restrictions. A third mobilization would have fallen during the spring
planting season, having a negative impact on agriculture and souring the mood of the
civilian population. More important was the not-unjustified fear that too-frequent
mobilizations would offer our enemy and its spy organization the opportunity to sniff out
our mobilization, deployment, and defense plan. 262
Whatever the Bundesrafs reasons may have been, the Supreme Swiss Commander
was probably not concerned first and foremost with purely military considerations, but
more with overall strategic/defense considerations. The expected political resistance
against large troop call-ups, which had occurred repeatedly in the past, was supposed to
be avoided by making large-scale mobilizations routine for both domestic and foreign
observers. As the war continued and the populace grew increasingly weary of it, it
At the meeting of February 1, 1943, Bundesrat Kobelt confirmed that the Bundesrat had
discussed the problem of provocation [note on meeting of February 1, 1943, p. 2. BAr E 5795/147].
Bundesrat to Supreme Swiss Commander, January 12, 1943, p. 3. BAr E 5795/88.
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became increasingly difficult for the Army High Command to maintain sufficient
presence and readiness among the troops.
D. CLOSING THE BORDERS
The conflict of "national defense versus warfare" was not only played out on the
stage of government versus Army. It encompassed all areas where civilian and military
interests ran up against each other. One example was the nation's frontiers. Here military
activities naturally affected normal frontier activities and sometimes even suppressed
them. During times of lower tensions, it was not the Army, but the Frontier Guard Corps
of the Swiss Finance and Customs Department that was responsible for policing the
frontiers. It was only after initiation of hostilities263 or after the borders were sealed that
the Army took charge. In this case, the regulations on the use of frontier police proved
themselves inflexible. 264
The question of the permeability of the frontiers was a source of conflict from the
very beginning. Commercial and political considerations favored more lenient frontier
enforcement, while military considerations favored more restrictive frontier enforcement.
Regulations for security if the frontier needed to be occupied were laid down before the
war in the "border-deployment regulation" 265 approved by the Bundesrat in November,
1939. The appendix of that document contained instructions on how soldiers should
263 Guidelines for cooperation between frontier guards and the Army, November 10, 1939.
BAr E 27/13180.
264 Report by the Chief of General Staff, pp. 1 83-1 84.
"Vorschriften fur Sicherheitsmassnahmen im Falle einer Grenzbesetzung," August 25, 1939.
BAr E 5795/348.
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manage neutrality based on a Bundesrat policy distributed to all active troops, frontier
guards, and police organizations.
266 Shortly after the war began in the autumn of 1939,
the Army leadership was forced to adapt a special policy to handle small violations of the
frontiers stemming mainly from a lack of awareness of the actual boundaries. The goal
was to avoid trifles escalating out of proportion to the actual incident and leading to
diplomatic protests.
267
This addressed the tactical level of frontier security, but by no means solved the
basic question of permeability in the face of a constantly changing threat. There were
differences of opinion on this problem even within the Army High Command. 268 The
Supreme Swiss Commander initially did not share the opinion of the Chief of General
Staff that certain things could be relaxed. Instead he explicitly criticized the unauthorized
decision by the Commander of the Seventh Frontier Brigade to open up a customs post in
Eastern Switzerland for agricultural traffic. He was particularly displeased because the
decision was made under strong pressure of German civilian authorities who were not
beyond threatening reprisals. 269 The demands for easing frontier passage were supported
by the customs authorities, who asked for more frontier crossings (Tagerwilen, Rheintal,
266
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Schaffhausen, Rafzerberg) in view of the threatened German reprisals, since there was
much more Swiss property in Germany than vice-versa. 270 In point of fact, many
exceptions were granted, for agricultural activities such as cultivating Swiss-owned land
beyond the frontier, for importing gravel and sand from quarries beyond the frontier, for
transporting milk and lumber, for marketing, for transporting materials for power plants,
for trips by doctors and pastors, and for transporting patients. 271 Not only troop
commanders, but also customs officers ordered frontier crossings opened, clearly
overstepping their authority. Because of this, the Supreme Swiss Commander asked for a
general relaxation and a clear regulation of which restrictions and relaxations for special
cases were within the Army leadership's authority. 272 Some flexibility was required to be
able to react to sudden changes in situation in a militarily appropriate way. For this
reason, the Chief of General Staff strongly opposed efforts to make actions to reduce
frontier traffic or close the frontiers dependent on pre-approval by the Bundesrat. "In
emergency situations," the Army leadership "had to be able to take purely military action
under its own responsibility." The ministers, including the Minister of Defense, agreed. 273
The Bundesrat was still inundated with requests for exceptions to closed frontier
crossings.
274 Cantonal governments also pressured the Army leadership. For example,
the government of Basel spoke out "most resolutely" against the closure of two bridges
Chief of General Staff to Supreme Swiss Commander, April 25, 1 940. BAr E 27/1 31 78.
Head of Swiss Finance and Customs Department to Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations,
May 22, 1 940. BAr E 27/1 31 78.
272 Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, May 29, 1 940. BAr E 27/1 31 78.
Minister of Defense to the Head of the Swiss Post and Rail Service, June 21, 1940. BAr E
27/13178.
274 Swiss Finance and Customs Department to the Bundesrat, June 29, 1 940. BAr E 27/1 31 78.
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over the Rhine. 275 At the end of July, 1940, the Bundesrat decided to allow more frontier
crossings by reversing its previous decision on partial frontier closure. At the same time,
it authorized the Army leadership to tighten the controls under its own authority "for
pressing military needs," but only after informing the Bundesrat.
276
The issue of the limits of authority between the Army and civilian authorities in the
matter of frontier crossings is quite symptomatic of the basic conflict between the
military and civilian components of national defense. However, its significance for
military readiness went far beyond that of disputes having to do with preserving the basic
military substance of the Army. There was a constant struggle against a creeping process
of erosion in this area.
Chief of General Staff to Supreme Swiss Commander, May 31,1 940. BAr E 5795/303.
276 Sundesraf Resolution, July 23, 1940. BAr E 27/13178.
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IV. COMBAT VALUE
A. THE CONFLICTING GOALS OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC
DEFENSE
The conflict between the goals of military and economic defense became apparent
in the First General Mobilization in the summer of 1939. The General Staff had
established guidelines for requisitioning motor vehicles for the Army, but not for the war
economy, for which it was also responsible in accordance with a regulation of March 3,
1939. During the mobilization, this hindered transport of very important supplies (such
as milk and flour) and shut down industrial plants essential to supply nationwide. 277
While the Army was able to help out to some extent with its own means of transport, it
was clear that there was no way to avoid dividing up the existing transport between the
Army and the war economy. It was then agreed that the motor vehicles the Army did not
require should be grouped into regional transport pools, with the Army delegating, so to
speak, its requisition authority to the war economy for this purpose. However, this was
not sufficient to meet the increasing need for transport, and the Army leadership was soon
beyond its capabilities. 278
Though the military authorities clearly took precedence during the mobilization,
this was soon to change. In his report to the Nationalrat on December 6, 1939, Bundesrat




Minger, the Minister of Defense, stated that the military defense of the country came first,
but then pointed out that defense problems could not be solved by the Army leadership
alone. The Army and its leadership were responsible for military defense, he noted, and
their involvement in economic affairs was therefore "naturally somewhat limited." 279 In
this statement, Minger broached a problem which would remain unsolved until the end of
the war: During mobilizations, the Army High Command controlled the lion's share of
the nation's potential in terms of labor, means of transport, draught animals, and
machines, and was charged with using these means for purposes of warfare. This
position of power, the lack of an overarching political philosophy with a corresponding
leadership, and the circumstances and duration of the Second World War, placed the
Supreme Swiss Commander in the role of coordinator of overall national defense. His
inarguable charisma and his temperament seem to have practically preordained him to fill
the power vacuum in defense leadership. This trend corresponded fairly closely to the
Army leadership's opinion that the Supreme Swiss Commander was responsible not only
for military, but also for the other areas of defense. In a report on the Supreme Swiss
Commander's position in October, 1940, his room for maneuvering was described as
being correspondingly great. The natural authority of the Supreme Swiss Commander
was described as including "measures to guarantee the material and psychological
readiness and strength of the Army." The authority of the Supreme Swiss Commander,
thus expanded to overall defense, was seen as a basic precondition for a modern Army
leadership and for mobilizing "the economic and psychological energies of the people."
Minutes of Nationalrat session of December 6, 1 939, p. 1 . BAr E 27/5653.
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What was needed was a single, determined national-defense organization that represented
all the people and was free "from inopportune civilian hindrances." 280 This situation gave
rise to a conflict between the Supreme Swiss Commander's responsibility for the military
sphere of overall defense and his overriding duties of coordination and leadership.
According to Bundesrat Minger, the duty of the Army leadership was "to keep the
economy afloat without harming our military defense." 281 The disagreements on this
problem continued until the end of the war and were conducted by both parties with great
determination and sometimes bitterness. 282
Besides promoting domestic production, the focus of government supply efforts by
the end of 1 940 was clearly turned to providing the nation with imported food for both
human beings and livestock. 283 The collapse of France, the entry of Italy into the war, and
the subsequent surrounding of Switzerland by Axis powers led, in the summer and fall of
1940, to the first major disruptions in deliveries of goods within Switzerland. Efforts to
make the country self-sufficient in food production were immediately redoubled. 284
These efforts converged in the Wahlen Plan, 285 which was based on the following
principles:
Economical management of supplies
Exploitation of all resources (planting and recycling)
Report on the Supreme Swiss Commander's-position, October 9, 1940. BAr E 5795/193.
Minutes of Nationalrat session of December 1 2, 1 939, p. 1 . BAr E 27/5653.
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Friedrich Traugott Wahlen was Head of the Section for Agricultural and Home Production
in the Swiss Wartime Supply Office, beginning in 1938. He was also Director of the Oerlikon
Agricultural Experimentation Station and was responsible for increased production.
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Organized use of the means of production where they would be most effective
Well-organized use of human labor, particularly in the area of food production,
consciously restricting all nonessential activities.
286
Agriculture was thus largely based on providing the necessary labor; use of
mechanized means was, of course, severely restricted.
In contrast to other forms of defense, the Swiss militia system with its universal
military service mobilized nearly every "half-capable" man, removing them from the
economy.287 This substantially increased the conflict between military and economic
defense and between military and other areas of overall national defense.
The Bundesrat had already resolved to expand acreage by some 25,000 hectares in
October, 1939. Switzerland needed to reach another level of increased production after
the fall of France. But most farms in the traditional agricultural areas were already at the
upper limit of their capacity. Agriculture had to be extended increasingly to the fringes of
farms and into grazing areas. Many of the farms in these areas, some 10,000 of them,
were "one-man operations." 288 These farmers had neither the necessary experience nor
the infrastructure for large-scale farming. Also, they were very often in the lower age
group and therefore spent longer periods in military service. If a significant increase in
food production was to be achieved in the coming years, these small farms would have to
make a major contribution and would have to be provided with the necessary labor and
286 Wahlen, Bundesrat F.T. Wahlen, p. 43.
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draught animals. This, in turn, would only be possible at the expense of military
potential. The Head of the Wartime Supply Office recognized clearly that the scope of
the increased production expected from agriculture "was limited to a large extent by other
military actions."
289
The total acreage devoted to cultivation in Switzerland had been approximately
180,000 hectares at the start of the war, but by mid- 1941 it increased to approximately
275,000 hectares. This expansion was substantially dependent on increased labor, since
cultivation demanded two-to-three times more labor per hectare than pasture. 290 By 1943,
some 360,000 hectares were being cultivated, almost double the surface area available
before the war. Experts calculated approximately 50 labor days per hectare of increased
cultivation. This resulted in 8,750,000 more working days than before the war. Due to
weather, only 150 days a year were actually available, leading to a need for some 58,300
people fully able to perform work. 291 There was no way of obtaining such a massive
amount of extra labor without a flexible and economical national defense. The demands
made on such a system were complex. First, the momentary military threat and certain
structural principles of Army organization had to be dealt with. In order to be able to
fight at any time, the Army required structured units, not units thrown together every
which way. The Army had to ensure a sufficient level of training for the entire Army, not
just scattered units. This required a more or less equal division of service periods. 292 The
289
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economy, however, had to constantly call on certain laborers with certain expertise.
Agriculture required manpower in certain seasons of the year with wide regional
differences. If we also take into account special interests, we can only underscore the
Supreme Swiss Commander's statement that no relief plan could meet the needs of the
Army, industry, and agriculture at the same time. All three sides would have to make
some concessions.
293 The system for exchanging personnel between the Army and the
economy developed during the course of the war to an extremely complex organization,
where specific, situation-based troop reductions, regular relief for specific units, leave
and dispensation schemes, and deferments overlapped and shaped one another.
B. THE PERSONNEL-EXCHANGE SYSTEM
1. Situation-Based Troop Reductions and Regular Relief
a. General ReliefPlanning
The Army leadership was forced as early as the fall of 1939 to take measures
to relieve the government's finances. In view of the coming fieldwork, the entire Light
Cavalry was placed on leave on September 26, 1939. On October 4, half of the
Territorial Units were relieved, and two weeks later most of the troops on the Southern
Front were also sent home. At that point, only the frontier police (frontier guards
supplemented by mountain machine-gun battalions) and four battalions of barrage
detachments were left in that area. The Supreme Swiss Commander believed that no
more reductions could be tolerated from a military point of view. But recognizing his
293 Minutes of the meeting of September 1 9, 1 942, p. 2. BAr E 5795/1 46.
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responsibility for overall defense policy, he added that if troop reductions had to be made
for other reasons, it was important "not to seriously impact" the Army's combat
strength.
294
At the beginning of 1940, the Supreme Swiss Commander said he was
willing "to consider generously the needs of agriculture and even release entire regiments
and divisions if special conditions require it." The percentage of farmers was very uneven
from unit to unit, he reported. The Seeland Regiment contained only 27% farmers, while
the number of farmers in Mountain-Infantry Regiment 7 was 70%. 295 At the end of
February, various factors prompted the Supreme Swiss Commander to consider
increasing the readiness of the Army essential. But since some troops on duty had to be
relieved for reasons of the economy, new call-ups were required. This was particularly
true for the Frontier Troops, where the older age classes296 had to be called up again, and
the Bicycle Troops, who replaced the younger two age classes in the Light Cavalry. 297
But in an urgent letter to the Bundesrat, the chief executives of the cantons Obwalden and
Nidwalden pointed out that it would present an extreme hardship for agriculture in their
Cantons if Territorial Riflemen Battalion 145 were called in up mid-May, as planned.
Since Mountain-Riflemen Battalions 108 and 47 were already on duty, all the
Nidwaldenner units would be on duty at the same time. 298
Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, November 26, 1939, pp. 1-2. BAr E
27/14245.
295 Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, February 1 7, 1 940. BAr E 27/1 4245.
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Relief plans were instituted in September, 1940, for the entire Army and
maintained until June 10, 1944. The great advantage was that the scope of service and
entry and release date were now known ahead of time, allowing businesses to plan their
use of labor more effectively. The disadvantage was that the plans were repeatedly
disrupted by the military situation and thrown into confusion.
29
" According to the Chief
of General Staff, the situation prior to the invasion of the Balkans
300
would have allowed
two thirds of the Army to be relieved. Before the order could be given, the German
troops rolled back and the renewed heavy military occupation of the frontier areas was
the subject of a heavy press campaign by the Axis powers against Switzerland. For this
reason, the system of two "shifts" of men per division, with one on and one off, was
kept.
301 According to this system, half of the men in each division or mountain brigade
were normally on duty for nine weeks and then received an equivalent period of leave. 302
After Germany invaded the Soviet Union, the Supreme Swiss Commander
reacted immediately by cutting down the number of men on active duty. In a letter of
June 25, 1941, he asked for immediate implementation of a new leave plan. Two types of
troops should be called up: 1. Surveillance troops and 2. Troops for occupying the
National Reduit and for training. 303 The Supreme Swiss Commander told his direct
subordinates that he was taking this measure for financial and economic reasons, but was
Report by the Chief of General Staff, p. 179. See also Chief of General Staff to Supreme
Swiss Commander, March 22, 1940, BAr E 5795/96, which discusses a possible shift to a relief
system.
Germany began its attack on Yugoslavia and Greece on April 6, 1941.
301 Minutes of the meeting of May 19, 1941, p. 2. BAr E 5795/145.
Minutes of the meeting of corps commanders, May 8, 1941, p. 2. BAr E 5795/145.
Supreme Swiss Commander to Chief of General Staff, June 25, 1941, p. 1. BAr E 5795/99.
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fully aware of its military drawbacks. He said he was very unhappy to have to change a
position established only recently, and he was conscious of the difficulties it would
impose on troop commanders. 304
The pressure from the economy and from political authorities did not subside.
In his response to the proposed relief plan for the winter of 1941-42, the Minister of
Defense called for further troop reductions. The Supreme Swiss Commander did add
more troop reductions to his second draft, but he pointed out that "the Army census in
the winter of 1941-42 was completely insufficient for holding off a surprise attack for
even the shortest period of time." He said the troops on duty represented "only the barest
necessity for guarding the frontier, for guarding the interior of the country, and for
providing training within the Army." 305 When the Minister of Defense said he feared that
the planned troop reductions might not be enough for the economy, the Supreme Swiss
Commander calculated that only about 79,000 men could truly be considered to be on
active duty. The recruits that entered active duty on November 11, 1941, could only
begin to be counted as active-duty troops once they had completed their Army training.
Only then could a noticeable reduction in battle troops that would aid the economy be
carried out.
306 As a matter of fact, only four reinforced infantry regiments and the
Cavalry were on active duty at the end of 1941. 307 Meanwhile, the Army leadership
Supreme Swiss Commander to commanders of air-force and anti-aircraft troops, June 28,
1941. BAr E 27/14245, Vol. 22.
Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, Attn.: Bundesrat, September 5, 1941,
p.1. BAr E 27/14245 Vol. 22.
Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, November 3, 1941, p. 2. BAr E
5795/155.
"Die allgemeine militarisch-politische Lage und ihr Einfluss auf die Schweiz, 9.1 2.1 941 ," p.
3. BAr E 27/14253. According to a letter from the Minister of Defense to the Supreme Swiss
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sought further improvements for the sake of the economy. A report on changing the
relief system said that the following measures should be taken to meet the needs of the
economy:
Reduce relief duty and be more strict as regards leave and dispensations.The
younger two age classes should have two one-month relief duties every 1 8 months.
Territorial Units should have only one relief duty every 1 8 months, with no leaves
or dispensations.
No additional service for older men, even if this were at the expense of training,
service by these men was one of the main sources of the economic difficulties and
resulting morale problems caused by military service. Soldiers under 25 were
generally less tied down to a job and did not yet have families.
Earlier mailing of call-up cards so that both employers and employees could better
plan.
308
When the relief plan to be implemented January, 1943, was prepared, the
military-political situation gave no cause for immediate concern. For this reason, besides
trainers, only a certain number of troops were called up for sentry duty at major frontier
crossings and for guarding internees and military targets. A small number of special
forces were also on duty. Given the increase in unemployment, it was even planned to
replace some regulars with the unemployed. When drawing up the relief plan, the Army
Commander, the Cavalry's morale was poor because so many officers compared to troops were
called up, which left many officers without enough to do. This morale problem was spreading
increasingly into agriculture [Minister of Defense to Supreme Swiss Commander, December 12,
1941. BArE 5795/155].
308
Report on new relief system, November 1 7, 1 941 . BAr 27/1 4245, Vol. 42.
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leadership was guided by great care for the needs of business and agriculture. This led to
unwanted peaks in February and March and October and November that had nothing to
do with the military threat. The mobilized troops were also reduced by 60 to 40 percent
of their normal census by deferments, which had to be granted liberally during the
planting and harvest seasons in accordance with Order No. 215. 309 Even the Wartime
Supply Office acknowledged the Army leadership's great consideration for business. It
said that the Army had made a major contribution to ensuring the food supply in the
spring of 1943, so that the planned total acreage was nearly achieved and the harvest was
quite satisfactory.
310
After the serious disagreements on the relief plan for 1943, 3 " when the length
of relief duty was reduced, the Supreme Swiss Commander planned to lengthen service
periods from 32 to 46 days in the summer of 1944. Here he met with the resistance of the
Bundesrat, which protested changing the established procedure which "the people have
gotten used to" for reasons that were mainly psychological. It said that lengthening
service periods would also encourage calls for leave and dispensation. 312 The argument
of fairness in duty allocation was aired more frequently. In a letter to the Army Personnel
Director, the Supreme Swiss Commander reported that a mistaken conception had taken
root among the troops that every man, whatever his assignment, rank, or type of duty, had
to perform the same number of days. In addition, many workers from large firms sought
Minutes of the meeting of the Dispensation Commission, January 26, 1943, p. 2. BAr E
5795/147.
Head of the Wartime Supply Office to the Minister of Defense, August 24, 1943. BAr E
27/14245 Vol. 43.
3
" Ci. p. 36 ff.
Bundesrat to Supreme Swiss Commander, May 16, 1944. BAr E 27/14245.
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longer leaves and dispensations "so that they would not lose ground against their
coworkers who were not required to serve." These were no scattered cases, but a widely
observed phenomenon which could have had major repercussions on the Army." 313
When the Bundesrat refused again in the autumn of 1944 to call in the Light
Cavalry, the Supreme Swiss Commander chose a new tack. He said that not calling in
the Light Cavalry was not only not understood by the motorized units and bicycle units;
the Light Cavalry themselves were surprised and puzzled. There were even rumors that
the Light Cavalry felt ashamed to be left out at a time when the Light Brigades were
receiving new responsibilities. Even the proponents of the Cavalry must have had
misgivings when the impression was afoot that it was unable to provide the expected
military service in times of active duty. In addition, there were complaints that two
classes of farmers were being created: A minority of large farmers who stayed home
because they could afford to provide a cavalry horse, 314 and a majority of small or
medium-sized farmers who had to make a larger contribution to national defense. There
were also reportedly no agricultural reasons for not calling in the Cavalry, because it was
precisely those farmers who could afford a cavalry horse that were among the more
privileged and had other horses, or even tractors. 315
At first, the Bundesrat stood its ground, but the Supreme Swiss Commander
insisted and submitted an opinion by the Chief of the Light Troops favoring a call-up for
Supreme Swiss Commander to Chief of Army Personnel, August 1 1, 1944, pp. 1-2. BAr E
5795/129.
314 The horse was normally the personal property of the Light Cavalry.
Supreme Swiss Commander to the Minister of Defense, September 9, 1944. BAr E
5795/158.
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psychological reasons. Eventually, the Bundesrat gave in, "to avoid conflict with the
Supreme Swiss Commander." However, it did make the proviso that the entire horse
population could not be used. 316 On October 18, 1944, Light Brigades I through III were
replaced by a group of Light Cavalry from all the Light Cavalry squadrons of these
brigades. 317 Even more difficult than those of the rest of the Army were the problems
with relief for the frontier guards.
b. Frontier Guards
To understand the difficulties of the Frontier Guards, we must first recall how
they came into existence. Until 1918, guarding the frontier was the responsibility of
those living near the frontier in oldest age group subject to military service. Although
this type of frontier guard was now far from sufficient to meet the military demands
placed on it, little modernization was attempted until well into 1930. In 1931 it was
decided that in cases of military threat all age groups subject to military service in the
area affected should be alerted and brought together into ad-hoc militias. It soon became
apparent that this method was subject to all the lackings of improvisation. 318 It was then
decided only to call up permanently organized groups. The new solution again related to
all men subject to military service living in frontier regions, but this time in all age
groups. This was the only way of guaranteeing that the Frontier Guards could be alerted
and mobilized quickly. 319 The Bundesrat also approved the creation of a permanent
3,6 Report by the Bundesrat, p. 38.
Minister of Defense to the Bundesrat, October 3, 1944. BAr E 27/14245, Vol. 60.
In late 1937, an article on "the scandalous state of the Swiss frontier guards" appeared in
the magazine Die Tat. It was then echoed in the press and among the authorities [BAr E 27/1 31 75].
3H Report by the Chief of General Staff, p. 71 . ff.
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frontier-guard company made up of 200 volunteer unemployed men. It was later decided
to create eight additional companies, but financial concerns allowed only five companies,
with fewer men, to be created.
320 By May of 1939, there were some 3200 men in 14
volunteer Frontier-Guard companies.
321 On August 29, 1939, the total of some 50,000
Frontier Guards were called up322 to ensure that the entire Swiss Army could be mobilized
"with calm and order." 323 When the threat allowed for troop numbers to be reduced, the
Frontier Guards were also included in the relief-duty system. This allowed the field
Army to be relieved of frontier security. Guarding the frontiers turned out to be a
constant task throughout the entire war, but there was only a small number of Frontier
Troops available to that end, recruited exclusively from areas along the frontiers. This
led to inordinate pressure on the inhabitants of frontier regions. For example, in May,
1941, the "Middle-Rhine-Valley Working Group," an association founded to look after
the economic interests of the region, expressed its displeasure with the fact that frontier
brigades recruited almost exclusively from the Rhine Valley were not released,
complaining that these men were almost exclusively small businessmen, freelance
workers, and low-ranking employees who did not enjoy the generous leave system
allotted to farmers and those employed in the war economy. Everyone had been called up
at once, "from the youngest soldiers to the older troops and the auxiliaries," resulting in a
severe economic impact on the Rhine Valley. The Supreme Swiss Commander was
32(1
Kreis, Auf den Spuren von La Charite, pp. 21-22.
Minutes of the National Defense Commission, May 1 6, 1 939. BAr E 27/4060.
Cautschi, General Henri Guisan, p. 72
Bonjour, Geschichte der schweizerischen Neutralist, Vol. IV, p. 53.
99
therefore asked "to give his attention to economic, political, and psychological
considerations in addition to the military considerations."
324
The proximity of home and work, which constantly reminded soldiers of the
many things they had to do there, was an added psychological burden for the frontier
troops. This, along with the fact that frontier duty was generally monotonous, provoked
general poor morale among the frontier guards. 325 This problem threatened to take on
critical proportions in the later years of the war in particular. This is seen in a letter from
an officer in the French-speaking area voicing his concern over an unusual amount of
dissatisfaction in all spheres of the civilian population. He said the dissatisfaction was
rooted in the long service period of the frontier troops. Alarming news came in from all
around, and the recently-released frontier troops received new marching orders, even
though the Supreme Swiss Commander had sent a personal letter to the women in the
area promising "to relieve the frontier troops for a longer period." The officer reported
that the morale problem was "thus not simply a flagging of the military will to fight, but a
hopeless dissatisfaction with the relief schedule used." He said that he feared "ominous
events" if steps were not taken, particularly since "the majority of the officers, right up to
the highest commanders, were publicly expressing their dissatisfaction." 326
Rhine-Valley Working Group to Supreme Swiss Commander, May 16, 1941. BAr E
27/14245. Such moves were also attempted by members of parliament [see the inquiry by
Nationalrat Gressot regarding a just relief system of June 5, 1941 (BAr E 27/14252) and the
parliamentary inquiry by Grossrat Terrier on service by frontier troops of May 14, 1941. BAr E
27/14252].
325
Cf. Sfanderaf Schmucki to Minister of Defense, May 27, 1941. BAr E 27/14245, Vol. 23.
326
Letter from Direktor H. Fritzsche to Captain B. Frei, November 7, 1944, pp. 1-2. BAr E
5795/129.
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The Army leadership was flooded by reports from the canton authorities on
widespread morale problems among the Frontier Troops because the latter did not see the
reasons for their heavier load relative to other troops.
32 Bundesrat Kobelt expected the
matter of Frontier Troops to be the object of discussions in the upcoming session of
parliament. His questions for the Supreme Swiss Commander included a reference to
relief for two Frontier Brigades whose continued service he found particularly unhealthy
for the economy. 328 The unpopular 14-day relief cycle had only been carried out at
Frontier Brigade IV, the Supreme Swiss Commander answered, "so that all soldiers could
finish their winter preparations before the arrival of the frost." He said that during
October the Brigade Commander had consulted his men on a two-week or four-week
relief cycle and a vote in Riflemen Battalion 246 had resulted in an equal number
favoring each solution, with the farmers and small businessmen favoring shorter duty
periods and those in industry and construction favoring longer duty periods. The
commander then opted for a three-week cycle. 329 The Chief of General Staff said it was
understandable that soldiers should make comparisons with other units, but the military
standpoint had to consider the organization of troops when issuing orders. 330
The members of the younger age class serving as Frontier Troops were
assigned to core units called Stammverbdnde, with organization and armament
Various reports by cantonal military offices, October 1944-January 1945. BAr E 27/14245,
Vol. 59.
Minister of Defense to Supreme Swiss Commander, November 4, 1944. BAr E 27/14245,
Vol. 59.
Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, November 16, 1944. BAr E 27/14245,
Vol. 59.
Chief of General Staff to Minister of Defense, November 5, 1 944. BAr E 27/14245 Vol. 59.
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corresponding to those of the other troops of the youngest age class. If these
Stammverbdnde were used for other assignments, such as for guarding the gateways to
the National Reduit, the structure of the Frontier Troops was then incomplete. Moreover,
the method was impracticable because there was insufficient transport. It could only be
used for Frontier-Police activities, 331 and hindered the leave cycle for the Frontier Troops,
worsening the situation. By the summer of 1943, the need for Frontier Troops had grown
so much that the Stammverbanden could only be relieved to perform other duties with
difficulty. For this reason, the Stammverbanden used thus far to guard the gateways to
the National Reduit had to be replaced by other troops. To avoid additional call-ups, the
Supreme Swiss Commander suggested using recruit regiments for this task. According to
this plan, recruit schools should spend their final month, that is, their field-training
period, in the gateways to the National Reduit, which resulted in expanding recruit
training by two and one-half weeks. 332
The canton of Graubiinden, most of whose men were assigned to Frontier
units, had things particularly difficult. The canton's business and agriculture were under a
particularly heavy load. For many local men, service meant "that the economic existence
of their families was being put at risk." The decision in late 1944 to assign the regiment
of the youngest age class from the canton of Graubiinden regiment to duty in the canton
of Ticino provoked "particular discontent" among the older generation. The chief
executive of the cantonal government then wrote to the Army High Command, saying
331 Report by the Chief of General Staff, p. 74.
332 Minutes of the Bundesrat meeting of May 4, 1 943. BAr E 5795/1 57.
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that there had been widespread hope "that these three battalions of the youngest age class
would serve turns relieving the Frontier Guards in the canton of Graubiinden during the
winter."
333
Economic concerns made it necessary to treat the different age classes
differently as regards relief duty.
334 The reasons for the poor morale, which was
particularly noticeable among the Frontier Troops near the war's end, were many:
Boredom and monotonous service in familiar frontier areas, near the place of residence
and work; a feeling that the service was useless; fraternization between officers and men,
which had a negative affect on discipline; different amounts of work to be done in the
various sectors; different treatment in terms of leave; long service periods; and difficulties
between the different age groups among the frontier guards. All ages of men, from young
soldiers fresh out of recruit training to 55-year-old Landsturm soldiers, were represented
in the Frontier Troops. This led to problems of compatibility, particularly when there
was no threat. In this climate, errors in leadership on the part of military superiors were
often the straw that broke the camel's back. The motto of one company of frontier troops
was "if attacked, don't fire." 335
2. The Leave System
If troops dismissed were later recalled, they had to be "remobilized:" They
reported again to their mobilization grounds, picked up their equipment, deployed to their
Chief of executive of the canton of Graubunden to Army High Command, November 18,
1944. BAr E 27/14245 Vol. 59.
334
Report by the Chief of General Staff, p. 76.
"Etat d' esprit de la population Suisse dans certaines regions," November 20, 1944. BAr E
5795/129.
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service areas, built the required infrastructure, and assumed battle positions. This process
lasted several days, days that could be decisive for the fate of the nation. Furthermore,
mobilizing troops were at risk of enemy attack. For this reason, the Supreme Swiss
Commander spoke out at the end of 1939 in favor of a universal leave system instead of
relieving entire troop units. He planned to grant leave to 35 to 50% of the full
complement of troops. Because their local organization allowed rapid remobilization, the
Frontier Troops could be dismissed en masse where appropriate. The same is true of the
Territorial Units and the Bicycle Troops, since these troops required relatively little
equipment, in particular, no horses.
The main military advantage of universal leave was that returning troops did not
report to mobilization grounds, but reported directly to their place of service. This
basically maintained the readiness of the units in question. However, their readiness for
actual combat was impacted, since numbers of horses were also reduced and took several
days to restore. 336 Economically, too, the system of individual leave appeared
advantageous at first glance. It seemed more flexible in that business could actually be
given those individuals what it needed most urgently. 33 However, if military readiness
was to remain unchanged, more leaves could result very quickly in larger troop call-ups.
From a military standpoint, granting leave to entire bodies of men was somewhat
preferable, since reducing the strength of a unit by up to 50% practically made it
For logistical reasons, horses and their riders could only be mobilized at the mobilization
grounds.
Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, November 26, 1939. BAr E 27/14245.
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impossible for many units to carry out their mandates and made efficient training
extraordinarily difficult. It was a problem of squaring the circle.
Before 1939 was out, a leave system was introduced which allowed a certain
percentage of the men assigned to a unit to be granted leave for a shorter or longer time.
Moreover, business was given the use of personnel for longer periods of time by means of
dispensations. According to the Commander of the Fourth Army Corps, however, this
would not be enough to meet the needs of the economy. After all, during the winter some
170,000 to 180,000 men were still on duty,
338
at a daily cost of 3-4 million francs. By
mid-1940, the total costs for the military presence had amounted to some 2.5 billion
francs.
339
At the end of February, 1940, the Army High Command reduced leave rates for
individual units from 35% or 50% to 20%, with the 20% not calculated by unit, but by
battalion. The entire leave and relief system was rethought and set down in new rules.
To address the needs of agriculture, the new leave system provided that agricultural
leaves should "normally" be granted for at least three weeks. 340
At a meeting of unit commanders on July 6, 1940, the Supreme Swiss
Commander once again called for a review of the question of whether a universal
percentage leave system or a system of granting leaves to entire units at a time should be
followed. 341 Lieutenant General Miescher got to the heart of the matter when he said that
According to a report, the total troop census on December 31,1 939, was 1 68,000 men.
Commander of the Fourth Army Corps to Supreme Swiss Commander, April 6, 1 940, p. 2.
BArE 5795/142.
Order from the Commander of the Ninth Division on leave for soldiers, March 1 , 1 940. p.
1. BAr E 5795/303.
341 Minutes of the meeting of July 6, 1 940. BAr E 5795/1 45.
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it was exceedingly difficult to please everyone, whether through individual or battalion
leaves. In one division the battalion system of leaves was reported to be functioning well,
but the cantonal government of Schwyz wanted individual, not battalion, leaves for the
Ninth Division. The government of the canton of Nidwalden wanted leaves by battalion
for the Eighth Division and also protested a new call-up of Territorial Units. It said that it
was most unfortunate that the politicians were not conscious of the seriousness of the
situation.
342
In the beginning of 1941, the Army High Command considered two other
variants: First: Simultaneous call-ups of a total of eight divisions in their full numbers
and leave for the soldiers depending on the needs of agriculture. If the number of men on
leave exceeded 50% of the total men, the other half of the unit in question should also be
sent on leave. Second: Maintaining the current practice of relief by turns by unit.
According to this system, the various divisions were called up alternately with the
number of leaves granted kept as low as possible. For units that included a large
percentage of farmers, service had to be postponed until after the "main planting
season."
343
The Supreme Swiss Commander opted for maintaining the current practice with
some modifications, which gave the following numbers for the first half of 1941
:
March 1 : 88,000
342 Minutes of the meeting of April 29, 1940, p. 12. BAr E 5795/145.
Excerpt from minutes of the Bundesrat meeting of January 24, 1941, p. 1. BAr E 27/245,
Vol. 20. The share of farmers in the infantry regiments was between six and 74% [report by the





The number of men actually on duty was much lower, since the leave rates
sometimes reached 50%. The Supreme Swiss Commander pointed out that the relief plan
suggested called for the smallest possible troop strength and he reserved the right to take
additional steps should the threat worsen.
344 At a meeting on January 17, 1941,
Lieutenant General Miescher was extremely critical of further concessions by the Army
to agriculture:
Personally, I have the embarrassing impression that the Army is being weakened
irresponsibly in the effort to win the "agricultural battle." The tendency is to try to win
the "agricultural battle" using soldiers, without using additional civilians. This is a very
dangerous tendency indeed. The Army must make it quite clear that all possibilities of
using the civilian population must be exhausted before the armed forces are called in. We
must not continue for another year with the same comprehensive leave plan that serves
only the interests of agriculture. Those who are not farmers are already anxious that a
single class should receive privileges without similar leave privileges being granted to
workers and small businessmen. 345
Subsequently, the "leaves for farmers during the 1941 planting season" in
Personnel Order No. 1 72 were completely revised. The Army High Command made a
Excerpt from minutes of the Bundesrat meeting of January 24, 1941, p. 4. BAr E 27/245
Vol. 20.
345 Minutes of the meeting of January 17, 1941, p. 2. BAr E 5795/145.
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militarily fateful concession by ceding the authority to decide on the length of leaves to a
civilian authority, the Local Farming Office. 346 According to a directive by the Army
Personnel Director implementing Order No. 172, this reduced troop commanders'
authority in questions of leave to practically zero. The company commander, he said, not
only had to approve the request by the head of the Local Farming Office—"except in the
case of superior military needs," but also had to agree with keeping the duration and date
of return open and having them set by the Local Farming Office in cooperation with the
military representative of the community. The Chief of Army Personnel's directive gave
the following justification: "The exact duration of the leave cannot be set at its beginning
because of weather. For this reason the communal military representative and the head of
the Local Farming Office have been charged with determining the return date. If there
are extended periods of bad weather, leaves may be interrupted. 347
This made efficient planning of training and military routine nearly impossible.
Troop commanders' resistance to Order No. 1 72 was accordingly heavy and even went as
far as open obstructionism. 348 Numerous abuses also added to the ill feelings. 349 The
Army High Command and many troop commanders felt that the generous leave system
346 Order No. 172, January 20, 1941. BAr E 27/5653.1. The Local Farming Office was
responsible for supervising and coordinating agricultural work in a local area.
Directive for implementing Order No. 172 of January 20, 1941, regarding vacation for
farmers during the 1 941 planting season, February 1 2, 1 941 . BAr E 27/5653.
348 A letter from the Chief of General Staff to Commander of the First Army Corps reports that
the orders of the Commander of Frontier Brigade III on vacation for farmers "were in flagrant
contradiction to Order No. 172 of the Army Chief of Personnel [April 24, 1941, BAr E 5795/132].
In the case of the Commander of the Sixth Division, the Supreme Swiss Commander wrote to
Commander of the Fourth Army Corps that there should be no punishment for failure to follow
Order No. 172, since it had since been lifted [Supreme Swiss Commander to Commander of the
Fourth Army Corps, June 5, 1 941 , E 5795/1 43]
.
349 Cf . minutes of the meeting of corps commanders, May, 8, 1941, p. 2. BAr E 5795/145.
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led to "neglect of discipline" and to displeasure among small businessmen-soldiers and
soldiers in freelance professions, and also caused severe difficulties for unitary training.
350
In fact, many training problems were caused by the fact that commanders rarely had over
60% of their full complement of troops. 351 Inquiries by the Army Personnel Director had
shown that the number of men actually on duty during the 1941 planting season "taking
into account all possible leaves" sank to 40%. This meant that only 40% of the men
formally on duty were immediately available. Whereas the ups and downs of
international tensions did not lead immediately to military measures during times of
higher numbers of troops, the lower census now meant that there had to be a reaction to
even minimal fluctuations in the military situation. 352
After his first experiences with it, the Supreme Swiss Commander also noted
that "from a military standpoint, Order No. 172 went too far." He said he had only
approved the order because the threat at the time had allowed troops to be reduced
somewhat. He felt that the "militarily highly questionable situation" had to be changed
"via strict application of the leave system by the Army leadership." 353 From a military
point of view, a decent level of battle-readiness in the Army had to be ensured. If this
limit was violated for any reason, military defense would have to be given up on entirely,
as the Army Personnel Director pointedly said: "If it is believed that the 500,000 hectares
cannot be planted without the Army and the food supply is therefore in jeopardy, it is
350 Minutes of the meeting of May 19, 1941, p. 1. BAr E 5795/145.
351 Report by the Chief of General Staff, p. 1 76.
Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, January 31, 1941, p. 1. BAr E
27/5653.
Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, January, 27, 1941, p. 1. BAr E
27/5658.
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better to demobilize entirely. Nothing is more dangerous than allowing the people to
believe that the Army is prepared when this is not the case." 354
Order No. 172 was "a failed attempt" 355 to harmonize the needs of the nation's
military defense with those of the economy, and from a military viewpoint, it had to be
repealed. As the Supreme Swiss Commander said during the meeting with the Corps
commanders on May 26, 1941, he believed that "the people from the Wartime Nutrition
Office" were basing their actions on completely false suppositions when they assumed
that the war was over and the Army could be relieved. The Bundesrat might be forced
from one day to the next to appeal to the Army if the enemy made "inconceivable
demands; for this reason, we must remain at the ready and may not allow inordinate
concern for other interests to destroy the Army." 356 By the end of May, Order No. 172
was replaced by Order No. 1 90, which severely tightened up the leave rules in favor of
the Army. The leave limit was set at 1 5% for troops whose regular relief service did not
last more than two months. For those serving longer, the limit was set at 30% of the full
complement. However, unit commanders were given the authority to exceed these limits
for the sake of agriculture according to their own judgment. A particularly strong new
restriction was that leaves exceeding 14 days had to be made up by serving an equal
amount of time in another unit. 357
3S4 Minutes of the meeting of May 19, 1941, pp. 3-4. BAr E 5795/145.
Ibid., p. 2; quote from the Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant Huber.
Minutes of the meeting of corps commanders, May 26, 1 941
, p. 2. BAr E 5795/1 45.
357 Order No. 190, May 13, 1941. BAr E 27/14245. Lieutenant General Lardelli believed
that 14 days was a generous period; he believed that, at the most, eight davs should be allowed
without makeup. [Minutes of the meeting of May 26, 1941, p. 3. BAr E 579^ 145].
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A veritable storm of anger and criticism broke out when Order No. 1 72 was
lifted and replaced by Order No. 190. The Head of the Wartime Nutrition Office said
that the solution was completely unacceptable for the nation's food supply, that "under
these conditions he was obliged to accept no responsibility for future food supply." He
suggested revising Order No. 190 "closely following Order No. 172." 358 The Swiss
Farmers' Association also entered the fray and urgently requested that the system set at
the beginning of the year under Order No. 1 72 be maintained for the summer and autumn
months. 359 After it had reviewed the new system, the Farmers' Association said it had
serious objections to newly-issued Order No. 190. 360 When this did not provide results,
it presented examples of the alleged failings of the new system:
We have since had experiences in seeing Leave Order No. 190 as
implemented. The Order has disappointed Agriculture by and large Some men
of the oldest age class who do not have any assistants and cannot have any because
of considerations granted to keeping the industry of their area running well were
called up to serve as street guards immediately before hay-gathering. One man had
his only horse confiscated because he supposedly violated a military rule last
winter. In the Gurbetal region in the canton of Bern not only the youngest age
class, but also the older two, are currently on duty. In fact, even the auxiliary
detachments are on duty, so that the whole valley is without able-bodied men. At a
23-hectare farm in Ruswil, three men had to report for duty, including the foreman
and two milkers. Back home, facing the hay season alone, were a father aged
seventy and a handicapped boy aged sixteen. 361
358 Head of the Wartime Nutrition Office to Chief of Army Personnel, May 20, 1941 . BAr E
27/14245.
Letter from the Swiss Farmers' Association to Chief of General Staff, May .5, 1941, p. 2.
BAr E 27/5653.
Letter from the Swiss Farmers' Association to Chief of General Staff, May 21, 1941 . BAr E
27/5653.
Letter from the Swiss Farmers' Association to Chief of General Staff, June 16, 1941. BAr E
27/5653.
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The Swiss Farmers' Association also used other channels to bring pressure on
the Army leadership, such as the Minister of Justice and Police. He referred the Supreme
Swiss Commander in accusatory tones to a letter from the Swiss Farmers' Association in
September, when the fruit, potato, and grape crops were harvested and when vegetables
should be planted for the next year, but all age groups on the right bank of Lake Zurich
had been called up. 362 Various cantonal governments also wrote to the Minister of
Defense, expressing their "regret for the shoddy" replacement of Order No. 172 by Order
No. 190. They reported that the available farmers were insufficient for achieving the
increased production and the successes attained through Order 190 had been undone. The
mood of the farmers was reported to be poor, since they had to bear the full burden of the
increased production and could expect little help from citydwellers. The Secretary of
Agriculture of Ticino complained that Ticino's farmers were having to perform the work
that was previously done by 2,500 to 3,000 "guest workers" from Italy, and the War
Economy Office of the canton of Zurich reported that "further support for increased
production without ensuring the availability of local labor" would be strictly rejected "as
an unreasonable demand." 363 An office for coordinating agricultural work in the Zurich
area (Ackerbaustelle) passed resolution protesting the fact that a leave lasting more than
14 days would have to be made up, while laborers in companies involved in the war
economy "could be simply dismissed for a whole year with no further ado." This
Jb2
Letter from the Head of the Swiss Justice and Police Ministry, September 9, 1941. BAr E
27/14245, Vol. 28.
Letters from various cantonal governments to Minister of Defense, May 16-18, 1941 . BAr E
27/5653.
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complaint came to a head in the question: "Which is more important: The food supply or
the war industry
?" 364
This echoes the question of national defense versus warfare.
In a letter to the Head of the Swiss Nutrition Office, the Zurich Farmers'
Association demanded that "the ratio of military-service requirements and
increased-agricultural-production duty for 1941/42" be clearly explained. The farmers
had to be able to plan ahead. This meant that they needed clarity on their military duties
"for the entire growing season, including the harvest and subsequent processing." The
farmers did not want agricultural production depending on leave orders that changed
every few months and "were modified after their issue by numerous explanations,
instructions, and supplements." The farmers believed that depending on military orders in
this way harmed agricultural production. They demanded that farmers, who were serving
their country by providing an increased food supply have a system which would "free
them from the mercy of company commanders and deliver them from the favor or
disfavor of military authorities." They said that there was a widespread but unclear notion
that people active in public administration or the war economy were freed without much
fuss, even for long periods of time, while farmers, who needed "a couple days of leave" to
do their civilian duty of growing food "were subject to accusations from all sides:
Agriculture has had enough of broken promises." 365
The Army leadership had no intention of returning to Order No. 172. 366 But
Order No. 190 could not be kept in its original version, either. By May 29, the new order
Resolution by the owners of local acreage, June 1 5, 1 941 . BAr E 27/5653.
Zurich Farming Association to Head of the Swiss Nutrition Office, July 11, 1941. BAr E
27/5653.
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had been watered down by supplemental instructions from the Army Personnel Director.
The requirement to make up missed duty was severely weakened. 367 At a meeting of the
corps commanders on June 3, 1941, it was found that the storm of protest against Leave
Order No. 190 was continuing and a "general offensive by the parliament" in the near
future could not be ruled out. For this reason, the Supreme Swiss Commander asked his
subordinates to strictly follow the instructions from the Chief of Personnel. 368 The
Supreme Swiss Commander also issued an order on June 20 that all leave requests related
to the current hay harvest "should be granted immediately, even if this meant a serious
temporary reduction in troop strengths." Troops in training and in construction work
should also be reduced to a minimum so that the men could help bring in the hay. 369
The constant struggle over using the available work force was not only apparent
in the constant haggling over regular leave numbers; it was also apparent in the
discussions on dispensations. Here, too, the Army showed great consideration for the
economy.
3. The Dispensation System
a. Basic Model
In the autumn of 1939, the Army leadership expressed emergency needs for
materiel, which resulted in a flood of emergency-leave requests 370 from those in the war
366 Chief of General Staff to Swiss Farmers' Association, June 21, 1941. BAr E 27/5653.
367
Instructions for implementation of Order No. 1 90, May 29, 1 941
, p. 1 . BAr E 27/5653.
Minutes of the meeting of corps commanders, June 3, 1 941
, p. 9. BAr E 5795/1 45.
Army Order on bringing in the hay crop, June 20, 1 941 . BAr E 27/5658
In this document, dispensation basically means exemption from active duty for the
common good, as compared to ordinary leave, which was a release for personal reasons [report by
the Chief of Army Personnel, p. 231]. In practice, however, it was often difficult to distinguish
clearly between personal needs and the public interest, particularly in agriculture.
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economy and materiel-procurement industries. Since little recognition had been given to
dispensations in all their significance before the war, the emergency-leave system was by
no means up to the situation.
371 According to a report of the Head of the Section for
Evacuations and Dispensations in the Defense Ministry,
372
the Section had issued over
50,000 dispensations by the end of 1939, mostly to younger soldiers and many to the
most capable men in the Army.
An attempt in late 1939 to approve only emergency-leave requests that had
been submitted based on the nation's general economic well-being did not ease the
situation.
373
This loss of personnel also immediately led to resistance on the part of the
troop commanders: The Evacuation and Emergency-Leave Section was accused out of
hand of incompetence by many troop commanders, who then refused to dismiss soldiers
who had received a dispensation. One regiment commander even went so far as to order
his company commanders to return emergency-leave documents to the Evacuation and
Emergency-Leave Section. 374 Employers and the Swiss War Industry and Employment
Office also complained about the difficulty of the emergency-leave procedure. 375 The
Report by the Bundesrat, p. 17. See also the report by the Chief of Army Personnel, p.
230, reporting that preparations for the emergency-leave system "had been absolutely insufficient"
and some 10,000 dispensations would be sufficient to handle the first shock to the economy.
According to a rule dated January 4, 1938, on responsibilities and organization of the
Ministry of Defense after the Army was called to active service, the Section for Evacuations and
Dispensations was under the Minister of Defense. The Supreme Swiss Commander had already
been responsible for evacuation since the beginning of mobilization [rule on evacuation of July 13,
1937]. At the request of the Minister of Defense and the Supreme Swiss Commander, the Section for
Dispensations was also placed under the Army High Command, by virtue of a Bundesrat decision of
May 3, 1 940 [Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, June 27, 1 941 . BAr E 27/5658].
373 Report by the Chief of Army Personnel, p. 232.
Orientation report for the meeting of January 17, 1940, with a foreword by the Swiss
Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Central Association of Swiss Employer Organizations,




issue was also brought up in parliament, where members requested a faster and simpler
emergency-leave procedure. 376 According to a Bundesrat circular, dispensations should
only be granted for extremely urgent cases and should not harm the readiness of the
Army, because dispensations were of more decisive importance for the Army than
temporary regular leave for soldiers.
377
The peak of dispensations was reached in July of 1940, when 38,000 Army
troops were granted leave from military service. The Supreme Swiss Commander then
saw himself forced to reduce the number of laborers on leave for providing Army
materiel to 8,000.
378
In late May, 1941, the Chief of General Staff asked the Section for
Evacuations and Dispensations to decide whether leave for the export industry could be
eliminated. In his response, the Section Head pointed out the significance of exports for
military readiness in particular:
Facilitating a healthy export business is in the highest national interest. This
includes exports both within Europe and overseas. It cannot be emphasized enough that
without exports overseas, it would not be possible for our country to obtain the necessary
amounts of grains, feed, and raw materials from overseas.... Export within Europe,
particularly to the Axis powers, is also absolutely essential if we want to guarantee the
376
Cf. minutes of the Bundesrat, Melly's inquiry, June, 1940. BAr Vol. 398, p. 991. There
were also speeches in parliament in favor of limiting dispensations. One example was Nationalrat
Holenstein, who called on March 26, 1941, for employees of Federal, cantonal, and local
governments who had dispensations to provide relief service to their units [BAr E 27/5661].
Orientation report for the meeting of January 17, 1940, with the Swiss Chamber of
Commerce and Industry and the Central Association of Swiss Employer Organizations, January 16,
1940, p. 4. BAr E 5795/522.
378 Report by the Bundesrat, p. 18. In early August, the Department of the Interior requested
tax auditors be granted leave to process the new war-profits tax [Supreme Swiss Commander to
Head of the Department of the Interior, August 5, 1 941 . BAr E 5795/522].
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extraordinary supply of coal, steel, iron pyrites, sulfur, bauxite, liquid fuels, and
agricultural products such as fodder, seeds, fertilizer, etc., that we need, and to secure
something of vital importance for our country: The right to transit through it. This is
important to our national defense in the broadest sense of the word....
A workable arrangement for our foreign-trade relations is only possible if we
can reciprocate foreign nations through exporting. This is of the greatest significance for
our military situation, regardless of the fact that thus far we have been able to protect our
country from severe unemployment, mainly through exports to the Axis powers. It is
indisputable that the possibility of large-scale employment is of decisive importance for
our people's moral and physical force to resist. 379
On May 31, 1941, only an estimated 2,000 to 2,500 of the 23,500 men who
had been granted dispensations were occupied in the export sector, as far as this could be
determined. With the express support of the Army Personnel Director, the Head of the
Section for Dispensations pressed for the existing practice to be maintained. 380
The signing of the German-Swiss economic accords on July 18, 1941,
seemed to give the Army High Command an additional difficulty in the area of
dispensations. One of Switzerland's obligations stemming from the accords was as
follows:
The Swiss government shall specifically, neither directly nor indirectly, nor
through special measures, prevent the signing or execution of any requests for
Letter from the Section for Evacuations and Dispensations to Chief of General Staff, June
19, 1941, pp. 1-2. BArE 27/5659.
Ibid., p. 3.
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loans, nor shall it tolerate any rules which would infringe upon the use of Swiss
industrial capacity for filling orders placed by Germany.""
As the Director of the Trade Section stated in his letter to the Minister of
Defense on July 23, 1941, this obligation was "of course also relevant for military
measures." He said that it must "absolutely be possible to use call-ups and
emergency-leave granting" such that "industrial orders placed in Switzerland by the
German Reich could be filled with as little disturbance as possible." 382 The Supreme
Swiss Commander protested strongly against the obligations being undertaken without
prior consultation with the Army leadership. He said that if this passage actually read the
way reported by the Director of the Trade Section, it would have "extraordinarily serious
consequences" for which he could no longer take responsibility in the military arena. He
said that even indirect interference by Germany in Swiss military preparations had to be
rejected in the strongest possible terms. The Army's Technical Division also had serious
reservations regarding Switzerland's arms production to meet its own needs, if it were
actually possible that the country's own urgent armament needs were going to be
considered an infringement against making Swiss capacity available for Germany. 383 The
vague assurances by the Swiss Economics Minister that national defense "basically was
not seriously affected" by the German-Swiss economic treaty did not satisfy the Supreme
381
Letter from the Director of the Trade Section to Minister of Defense, June 23, 1 941
, p. 1
.
BAr 27/5659. Swiss arms shipments were only some .5% of the German armament, but they were
of special importance due to specialized technical production [Fink, Die Schweiz aus der Sicht des
Dritten Reiches 1933-1945, p. 163]. According to the diary of the Chief of General Staff of the
German Army, Swiss exports were even specially needed for transport for the attack on the Soviet
Union [Haider, Kriegstagebuch, Vol. II, p. 256].
Letter from the Director of the Trade Section to Minister of Defense, June 23, 1941 . BAr E
27/5659.
Deputy Minister of Defense to Swiss Economics Ministry, August 13, 1 941 . BAr E 27/5659.
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Swiss Commander at all. 384 Given the newly elaborated relief plan, which included
substantial troop reductions, he had to be certain that the Army's readiness could be
guaranteed in any situation.
385 At a meeting, the Minister of Defense personally assured
the Supreme Swiss Commander that according to the Director of the Trade Section, the
text of the trade treaty was authoritative and did not contain any allusions to military
matters.
386 But this was diametrically opposed to his interpretation of July 23. Although
Bundesrat Kobelt explained that "any fears in this regard were totally ungrounded," the
Supreme Swiss Commander asked for a written confirmation. 387
In general, those who had unlimited dispensations had to serve 34 days per
year relief duty. Those who had a limited dispensation did no duty during their leave
time if the leave lasted no more than eight months. 388 These arrangements were in effect
much longer than any orders regarding regular leaves, but here, too, the Army leadership
was unable to avoid trying to find special solutions for some professions. 389
Letter from the Swiss Economics Minister to Minister of Defense, August 13, 1941. BAr E
27/5658.
Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, September 3, 1 941 . E 27/5659.




Minutes of the meeting of the Dispensation Commission of January 26, 1943, p. 5. BAr E
5795/147.
When active duty came to an end, the following were the dispensation categories:
Unlimited war dispensation, in which case the soldier in question did not have to report for duty
during general mobilization, but had continue to fulfill his civilian functions; Unlimited and limited
active-duty dispensation under special orders, in which case the soldier had to report for general
mobilizations, but not for partial mobilizations; Unlimited and limited active-duty dispensation
without special orders, in which the soldier had to report for both general and partial mobilizations,
but did not have to perform routine active duty [report by the Chief of Army Personnel, p. 233].
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b. Dispensations in the Pasturing Sector
The example of the Pasture sector is intended to also represent other sectors
of the economy where more extensive dispensations were necessary. This was one of the
sectors enjoying a special emergency-leave system. In 1941, some 5,500 dispensations
were granted in the Pasture sector, divided among 3,845 different pasturing operations. 390
There were serious difficulties, particularly for units from mountain areas, if they were
called up in the summer months. 391 In the spring of 1942, "the question of how to plan
for soldiers involved in the pasturing and dairy industries" was again raised. However,
the Army High Command refused to restore the system of limited dispensations. The
rules currently in effect required that those on dispensation in the pasturing sector had to
return on the fifth day of general mobilizations, but did not have to return for partial
mobilizations.
392
It left open the question of what would happen to cattle left in Alpine
pastures during a General Mobilization. The Army Leadership suggested that the
mountain communities affected "should create an emergency organization that could
replace pasturemen who had to serve within a few days in the case of a General
Mobilization. 393
Chief of Army Personnel to Chief of General Staff, November 1 2, 1 942. BAr E 27/5653.
For example, Brigade 1 1 had served only 47 days of active duty by the end of March,
1940, and had to be called in for additional service. Given the fact that Brigade 1 1 was recruited
from areas heavily involved in pasturing, livestock raising, and the tourist industry, it should have
been called up in mid-April and dismissed after two months [Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister
of Defense, March 30, 1940. BAr E 27/14245].
Letter from the Section for Milk and Milk Products of the Swiss Nutrition Office to Chief of
Army Staff, October 6, 1942. BAr E 27/5653. See also Chief of Army Staff to Section for Milk and
Milk Products, August 17, 1942, p. 1. BAr E 27/5653.
Army Chief of Personnell to Section for Milk and Milk Products, August 17, 1942. BAr E
27/5653.
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A detailed examination by the Alpine cantons revealed almost without
exception that the communities in question were not able to make such an arrangement.
The military leadership of the canton of Bern believed that creating such an organization
was simply "impossible," because there were simply no capable men left in these Alpine
communities. Investigations had shown, among other things, that one community with
approximately 30 medium to large-sized pasturing operations could not find a single man
suitable for replacement. In another town with some 50 large operations requiring 120 to
150 men, only 22 men were available. 394 A similar reply was received from the
Employment Office of the canton of Schwyz. Already, during the General Mobilizations
of 1939 and 1940, it had been very difficult there to provide the valley farms with the
essential personnel. The planned substitutes, those subject to auxiliary service, were
increasingly assigned to antiaircraft, destruction detachments, or the Home Guards, and
were thus unavailable for service in their communities. 395 To find substitutes for the
pasturing sector, too, in this situation was "simply impossible." 396
Section for Milk and Milk Products to Chief of Army Staff, October 10, 1942. BAr E
27/5653.
In 1939, the Army leadership had considered the idea of creating an Ortswehr, comparable
to the British "Home Guard." The events of 1940 in Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and
Luxembourg showed very clearly "that only total defense will serve against total war." In May, 1940,
the Bundesrat authorized the Supreme Swiss Commander to create a home guard. These bodies of
men, made up entirely of volunteers, replaced the Army for certain activities (defending the home
town, performing sentry duty, fighting airborne troops and tanks which had broken through the
lines, taking over internment camps, etc.), "preventing splintering of front-line troops, as had been
the case in the aftermath of the airborne actions behind the front in the other countries." By 1943,
the Home Guard, numbering over 100,000 men, consisted mainly of older man, around 50% of
them between 50 and 70 years of age. Promotional recruiting of young men from age 1 6 to 19 was
intensified, to gain appropriate men for observation and communications duty [report by the Chief
of General Staff, p. 253 ffl.
Section for Milk and Milk Products to Army Chief of Personnel, October 6, 1941, p. 2.
BAr E 27/5653.
121
The Agriculture Office of the canton of Nidwalden found that the existing
arrangement "already met with disbelief and resistance everywhere" and was not
understood, and believed that it would be quite impossible to carry out the proposed plan.
It was impossible to replace the reporting pasturemen within the planned five-day period,
the Employment Office of the canton of Glarus added. The Employment Office of the
Military and Finance Department of the canton of Graubunden believed that bringing all
cattle down from the Alps to the valleys in case of remobilization as inevitable under the
suggested system, and would result in a serious shortage of feed in the valley. Since
"nearly every last man has been called for military service" and the few who were exempt
from military service were needed to keep valley farms going, 397 almost all the Alpine
cantons affected said that the solution suggested by the Army leadership was
impracticable. 398
The solution proposed by the Army leadership was discarded. In accordance
with the instructions of the Chief of General Staff, the arrangement for 1943 should be
based on the following principle: Pasturemen and cheesemakers subject to auxiliary
service should be first in line for dispensations. Second in line should be men of the
oldest age class. Dispensation should only be granted to men in the middle age class as
an exception. The other men absolutely necessary for pasturing should still receive
limited dispensations and required to return by the fifth day after any General
See also letter from the Office of the War Comissary to Army High Command, December 3,
1942. BAr E 27/5653.
398 Section for Milk and Milk Products to Chief of General Staff, October 6, 1941. BAr E
27/5653.
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Mobilization. In case of conflict between Home-Guard service and civilian pasturing
activities, the man in question should conduct his civilian activity during the summer and
do his Home-Guard service during the winter.
39
' This called the attention of the canton of
Valais to the plan, since for military reasons, they did not wish any unlimited
dispensations for those subject to auxiliary service. In the canton of Valais, these were
mainly in the Frontier Troops and Guard Companies of Mountain Brigades, which were
already short of peronnell. The Army Personnel Director, however, held fast to the
system set up for 1 943 and said that the wishes of the canton of Valais might be met by
the 1944 plan for pasturing assignments.
400
The disputes on assignments for pasturing show clearly just how complex the
interrelationships between the needs of the military and of a functional economy were
and how little room for maneuvering the Army High Command had for carrying out its
military duties.
4. Deferments
The Army High Command continued to try to find a formula for personnel
exchange which would be suitable for both sides. With the 1942 relief plan, the Supreme
Swiss Commander responded to the principle, favored by several parties, of smaller
call-ups and a very restrictive leave practice. 401 Now that relief duty was shorter and less
frequent, a deferment system similar to the one practiced in peacetime was instituted with
Chief of General Staff to Army Chief of Personnell, January 25, 1 943. BAr E 27/5653. See
also the position paper from Colonel Trachsel to the Chief of General Staff, June 16, 1943. BAr E
27/5653.
Army Chief of Personnel to Chief of General Staff, July 23, 1 943. BAr E 27/5653.
401
Maurer, Anbauschlacht, p. 1 1 1
.
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Order No. 215. 402 According to a supplement to Order No. 215 on May 4, 1942,
requests for deferments between March 1 and October 3 1 had to be granted. However,
the categories to which this requirement applied were strictly delimited. 403 As was the
case with Order No. 1 72, this system had unforeseeable results from a military point of
view. The Commander of the Sixth Division complained that the requests for deferments
submitted had taken on such proportions that it was completely impossible "to put
together a body of troops halfway capable of fighting a war." Of the 800 deferment
requests, 240 had been submitted within the last eight days before service began, and 1 20
were even submitted after duty had begun. Under the existing system, "dirty and
dangerous nonsense" was being practiced, which led to doubts about the earnestness of
service and damaged the posture and discipline of the troops. 404 In mid-year, the Supreme
Swiss Commander said that "something had to be done urgently to rectify the referral
system." So far, 11,572 deferments had been granted in the First Army Corps, 6,000 in
the Second Army Corps, and 5,283 in the Third Army Corps. Something had to be done
about these excesses. 405
In early 1943 this system was dropped and Order No. 235 took effect, lasting
until the end of the war. This Order eliminated deferments and limited releases from duty
to simple leaves for the troops. 406
402 Report by the Army Chief of Personnel, p. 235.
403 Maurer, Anbauschlacht, p. 112.
Commander of the Sixth Division to Commander of the Fourth Army Corps, June 29, 1 942.
BArE 5795/140.
Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, August 1 7, 1 942. BAr E 27/1 4245,
Vol. 43.
Maurer, Die Anbauschlacht, p. 1 1 2; see also report by the Army Chief of Personnel, p.
235.
124
C. THE LIMITS OF MILITARIZATION
1. Signs of Exhaustion
Haggling over leaves of absence, rules for being excused from service, relief
plans and reductions in Army call-ups started shortly after the first General Mobilization
in September, 1939. Of course, the criticism and expressions of discontent were isolated
and sporadic and seemed to derive more from opportunistic and egotistical thinking,
special interests and political gain than from any real emergency situation. Nevertheless,
they were symptoms of a latent conflict between military defense and overall national
defense policy. Expressions of discontent by those required to perform military service
and political maneuvers by those representing special interests were already
commonplace at the start of the war. In November, 1939, a member of parliament
demanded that the age groups that had served during the time of World War I be the first
to be released from service. 407 A second parliamentarian wanted to reduce active-service
periods for fathers of families with many children. 408 In March of 1940, 36 members of
the conscripted militia from the region of Neuenburger Jura submitted a written petition
to the Bundesrat complaining about being conscripted for frontier-guard duty. They
claimed that they had already put in enough active service and that men in this age group
from other parts of Switzerland had already been released from duty. They subsequently
added the following significant statement: "We also would like it to be known that this
Minutes of the Bundesrat, Parliamentary Inquiry by Fenk, November 19, 1939. BAr Vol.
391,
p. 2204.
Minutes of the Bundesrat, Question by Gressot, January 1 6, 1 940. BAr Vol. 393, p. 62.
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form of conscription is highly unpopular among the general public." 409 In May 1940,
Nationalrat Briner posed a parliamentary inquiry asking whether the Bundesrat was
aware of the fact that entire school buildings in the city of Zurich had been continuously
occupied by the military since early September, 1939, resulting in drastic reductions in
classes and a long walk to school. Claims were also made that the military presence
would result in "severe neglect of school children," because fathers would languish in
military service while mothers had to work to supplement their income. The response of
the Bundesrat was unambiguous in pointing out that billeting troops on active service
would have to be based on different principles than during peacetime service, and that the
sole determining factor would be tactical requirements. This would also apply to the
occupation of the school buildings in Zurich. 410
It was not until France collapsed in June, 1 940, and Switzerland was completely
surrounded by Axis powers, that the regulations at the disposal of the Army High
Command were subjected to the full brunt of the heavy, "politically organized" pressure
and the criticism voiced by the general public, first and foremost from the agricultural
sector. On September 2, 1940, Nationalrat Roman Abt, agricultural representative and
prominent member of the lower house of parliament, protested to the Chief of Light
Troops against the call-up of the entire cavalry during the harvest season. He said this
action sparked great unrest among the populace, and even he himself could not
comprehend such a move. Moreover, he said there was a rumor that the call-up was the
Memo to the Bundesrat, March 4, 1940. BAr E 27/14245, Vol. 9.
Minutes of the Bundesrat, Parliamentary Inquiry by Briner, May 1940, Vol. 397, p. 740 ft.
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result of a personal initiative on the part of the Chief of Light Troops, whose personal
ambition was to lead a light division himself. Major General Jordi, Chief of Light
Troops, angrily rejected the accusation, but considered "the entire problem to be so
symptomatic" that he forwarded the letter to the Army High Command. The Supreme
Swiss Commander then pointed out to Nationalrat Abt that the cavalry, in contrast to all
other troops of the youngest age class, had more than three months of leave each year of
active service. He also stated that the call-up was based solely on military factors: He
said that the events that had occurred at the Swiss frontier since the second General
Mobilization of the Army on May 11, 1940, had forced him to take additional
measures.
4
" As a result, he said, the Light Troops had been assigned new duties in new
sectors that had made an immediate call-up appear necessary. In particular, he said, the
field fortifications associated with the new order would have to be erected before the
onset of bad weather. He also claimed that the corn harvest during the period of the
call-up had basically been completed and that plans were in place to release the cavalry
for fall planting. Unfortunately, he said, certain groups lacked a sufficient understanding
of the most urgent activities of national defense. 412 Abt presented his own assessment of
the situation, which contrasted quite extensively with that of the Army High Command:
I wish to take this opportunity to express to you with absolute candor the
same opinion I gave to the Minister of War before the Select Committee: ... as
matters currently stand, the scope of the military call-ups is not primarily a military
question but a political one for which the Bundesrat should bear responsibility and
not the Army High Command;. . . I do not feel that there is currently any serious
For information regarding the acute threat to Switzerland in summer 1940, see Urner, Die
Schweiz muss noch geschluckt werden! ["Switzerland must still be swallowed up!"].
Supreme Swiss Commander to Nationalrat Abt, September 9, 1940. BAr E 5795/398.
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foreign threat, consequently, call-ups should be reduced. Two or three divisions
less those on leave for the economy plus the unemployed should suffice. An
advantage of this is that the economy would be put back on track and isolated
industries and livelihoods would not be ruined, and the willingness to military duty
would remain intact; ... in any event, even if a major call-up is left to stand, more
attention should be given to providing the country with vital goods than has been
the case up to now. The Army does not place enough importance on maintaining
agricultural production, a position that cannot be justified in view of the current
supplies of food. 413
The longer the war continued and the more pressure that was put on the labor
force and the national resources, the more acute became the conflict between the military
and civilian interests and needs. Inquiries that the coordinator for increased agricultural
production carried out in approximately 60 communities in early 1943 revealed a
sobering picture. They suggested that if a new General Mobilization was undertaken it
would not even be possible to guarantee that cows would be milked "even using all the
civilian labor force and demanding the utmost from all those who have stayed behind."414
In view of this almost complete level of militarization, all military and civilian options
for fulfilling the tasks at hand were legitimately exhausted. Thus, the civilian authorities
tried to make full use of active troops for agriculture during the periods critical to
planting and harvesting. Requests to relocate troops because of economic factors were
made, for example, by the Head of the Economics Department of the Canton of
Solothurn. He asked the Supreme Swiss Commander to house the "troops of the Seventh
Division amassed in the Olten area in the various communities of the Olten and Gosgen
regions by company if possible" so that they could spend half a day bringing in the
Nationalrat Abt to Supreme Swiss Commander, September 16, 1940, p. 2. BAr E
5795/153.
Army Chief of Personnel to Supreme Swiss Commander, March 1 7, 1 943. BAr 5795/524.
128
harvest on a systematic basis."
415
In response, the Supreme Swiss Commander once again
referred to the priority of operational factors in relocating troops, but stated that he was
willing to look into whether or not the request "could be fulfilled at least partially."
416
The sensitivity and irritability on both sides grew. In fact, the military
department of the canton of Neunburg felt it was necessary to issue a memo to the
Ministry of Defense protesting the remarks of a company commander who had furiously
responded to an interruption during a heated feedback session with the troops, "Du plan
Wahlen, je m'en fous!" [I don't give a damn about the Wahlen Plan!]417 In November,
1944, a petition was made to the cantonal legislature of Bern emphasizing that the
nation's supply situation would grow increasingly difficult as a result of the precarious
import conditions. Barely half the seeds had been planted, and other work was still far
behind schedule. The petitioner concluded that the Army had underestimated the
significance of the needs of the agricultural sector. He asked the cantonal government to
lodge a complaint with the proper office to ensure that the Army gave more consideration
to the economy in the future. In justifying his request, the petitioner not only complained
bitterly that the recent partial mobilizations had siphoned off a large part of the work
force from the economy, particularly agriculture, but he also scourged the injustices of
the system. He said he knew of industrial firms with "influential men on their boards"
whose employees were excused without any reason being sought. He said civil servants
Memo of the Department for Economics of canton Solothurn to Supreme Swiss
Commander, October 11,1 944. BAr E 27/1 4245, Vol. 57.
Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, October 1 2, 1 944. BAr E 5795/1 58.
Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, December 1 9, 1 944. BAr E 5795/1 58.
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and employees of federal firms were also largely excused from service without being
required to make up for it. He substantiated his claim that too little consideration was
given to agriculture by providing various examples of hardship cases, of which there were
undoubtedly many; one is presented here to illustrate the conditions in the agricultural
sector:
A small farm operation had two sons that spent the entire fall in the service. The
70-year-old mother had to do all the work alone with one assistant, particularly the barn
work. Both sons had received no more than six days of leave. Outcome: The mother is
now sick, overworked; most of the apples have fallen off the trees; the fields are not
planted. The older of the two sons explained: In the spring, we sow only what we need
for ourselves. When asked why, he responded: People have so little understanding of us
that apparently they no longer need us. 418
A wide array of groups shared the opinion that the Army gave too little
consideration to farming even though economic national defense is said to be the
prerequisite for military national defense. Rather than using the troops to support
agriculture, the people complained, the commanders conducted alarm exercises. A
division commander reportedly recommended that the entire division be used to harvest
fruit and potatoes on, of all days, a rainy one. 419 The petitioner quoted a unit commander
4 ' 8 Inquiry by Burren, without date, pp. 1-2. BAr E 27/14245, Vol 44-57.
The fact that this accusation of a lack of understanding was not merely a concoction is
confirmed, for example, by the collection of letters compiled by E. Wehrli, which on page 74
describes one such deployment of a detachment for civilian tasks: "The regiment ordered me to
assign 1 5 men to the "Goldbrunnenbucht." Once again it is apparently a matter of some projects for
civilian purposes, like we are always having to do. We do not like doing this work." The orders
were then carried out reluctantly and with as many obstructive tactics as possible; the letters also
provide interesting insight into how faithful the commanders were to the orders they received.
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he had approached who serenely asked "whether military exercises could be canceled if
the weather was favorable for farming duty."
420
After more than five years of war, Switzerland's material, economic, manpower,
and psychological resources of were either stretched to their limit or already largely
exhausted. It is true that cultivation considerably increased the level of self-sufficiency421
in the food supply. However, despite a doubling in the acreage used for farming, despite
the modernization in agriculture and increases in yield, Switzerland did not reach a state
of complete self-sufficiency with regard to food as the Wahlen Plan had originally
forecast. Nevertheless, even though some signs toward the end of the war indicated that
some population groups were nearing the physiological minimum for existence, the
supplies in stock were still designated as satisfactory when compared to the rest of the
world. 422 In the spring of 1 944, substantial quantities of grains could still be imported and
also compensated for in the event of interruptions in imports. However, imports came to
a complete standstill starting in early 1944. In early 1945, the head of the Swiss Grain
Administration emphasized that the level of grain production would have to be at least
equal that of the preceding year to ensure the Amy's bread supply. Consequently, he
warned against concessions in the area of cultivation commitments. Additional output
was demanded from agriculture in the seventh additional cultivation stage of the war in
1945. 423 "Physical exhaustion and a shortage of labor, the absence of mass industrial
420
Inquiry by Burren, without date, pp. 3-6. BAr E 27/14245, Vol. 44-57.
The literature reveals major differences in the calculation of the percentage for
Switzerland' s level of self-sufficiency, depending on the conditions that were used as a basis.
Maurer uses a cautious figure of over 50% but points out other computational variations [cf.
Maurer, Die Anbauschlacht, p. 1 00 ff.].
422
Maurer, Die Anbauschlacht, p. 100 ff.
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unemployment, and the lack of complete deliveries despite some breakthroughs were the
main reasons additional cultivation stagnated at 350,000 to 360,000 hectares and was not
expanded to 500,000 hectares as originally forecast. 424
Agricultural production for 1945 was also made more difficult by the
"convergence of unfavorable conditions:" Farmers were once again put under additional
strain by the military service in the second half of 1944, and the weather conditions in
the fall were so bad that farm work fell far behind schedule. 40,000 to 50,000 hectares in
winter seeds could not be sowed and 260,000 hectares in farm land remained to be tilled
and planted for spring 1945. This would have required 100,000 to 130,000 men and
100,000 to 120,000 horses. 425 The chief executive of the Basel-Land canton sought
support from the Minister of Economics:
As a result of the bad weather and the partial mobilization of many troops and
military horses in our canton, agricultural work has fallen way behind schedule....
We are not able to do the work with the resources available to us. The obligation to
work cannot make up for the manpower shortage, because the labor force at the
factories and businesses has been drastically reduced by call-ups for military duty.
Organizing streamlined use of draught animals will become impossible if the
majority of the horses fit for military service are called up. We have communities
in which more than half the horses are in service....
In the interest of the nation's food supply, we feel it is necessary that a general
Army command be issued that provides for a quite massive deployment of troops in
agriculture as long as the frontiers are at peace. This is the only way it will be possible to
Minutes of the 11th session of the Expert Commission for Handling Issues of Additional
Planting and the main cantonal offices for agriculture, January 9, 1945, p. 3. BAr E 27/5653.




complete the agricultural work on time. If only 10% of the troops and military horses are
made available, as has been allowed in one unit in our region, it would not be sufficient
today. Military readiness will certainly not be compromised if the troops temporarily
perform service in agriculture. 426
This same sentiment was heard throughout the country toward the end of the
war, and emphasis was always placed on the claim that "the military demands placed on
those in the agricultural sector" were the main cause of the difficult situation. 427 The
main issues to be solved were "finding an adequate leave system, hesitating to call up
auxiliary units, putting internees to better use, and restricting construction projects during
the planting season." Agricultural representatives demanded "specific assurances" with
regard to military leaves and being excused from service. If these could not be granted,
Letter from the chief executive of the canton of Basel-Land to the Minister of Economics,
October 9, 1944. BAr E 27/14245, Vol. 57.
The petition for a deferment in service by the tenant of the chief executive of the canton of
Appenzell-Ausserrhoden is presented here as an example of the prevailing mood: The petition for a
deferment in service by a rifleman was rejected by the company commander in charge due to the
following passage: "I permit myself in all modesty to express the opinion that, at present, the
economic national defense, i.e., supply, is more urgent and to point out that farmers are excused
from service even in the countries waging the War so that the Army and the people will receive the
necessary food supplies and so that these supplies can be ensured. However, this is not the case if
the agricultural sector is summoned for military service at the busiest time of year when they all
have their hands full. Pasturemen are granted leave as a matter of course, while we must explain
our situation each time that we are called for military service at an inopportune time." Rather than a
revised petition, the company commander received a sharp challenge from the chief executive of
the canton Appenzell-Ausserrhoden, who informed him that he himself had written the petition for
his tenant and that such a rejection must not be allowed to occur. The company commander then
informed his division commander, who pointed out in his response to the chief executive that the
military superiors of the Appenzell troops faced no easy task in "making the essential nature of
military duty credible to their people when the soldiers could refer to the opposing opinion put forth
by their highest cantonal magistrates." The Supreme Swiss Commander handed the correspondence
over to the Minister of Defense on the assumption that the latter would perhaps have an opportunity
in the next session of Parliament to make a representative of the canton aware of the questionable
actions of the canton' s chief executive [Commander of the 7th Division to Cantonal Chief Executive
Hofstetter, June 5, 1944. BAr E 5795/158],
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agriculture would have to "capitulate." The existing orders and their use would no longer
suffice and would have to be replaced by a system such as the one put into place with
Order Number 172. Economic readiness for war had to be made as important as military
readiness, and the civilian bodies could not be placed under the authority of the military
ones.
428 Of course, the Chief of General Staff assessed the situation differently: He said
that out of an available 113,000 horses, the Army used only 10,000, with many of them
used as delivery horses, and agriculture could certainly withstand that number. 429 In
addition, the approximately 80,000 men who were in service made up only about 5% of
the male farm population and the farm managers who were performing military duty were
still able to stay home one day a week. 430 In contrast, however, the Framing Coordinator,
Stdnderat Wahlen, 431 was still of the opinion that the Army was consuming too much of
the available manpower. 432
There is no doubt that the Army had access to the largest pool of labor in the
country, so it was no surprise that the labor in short supply was sought there first. Of
course, troop call-up depended on the level of possible danger, and this could be neither
predicted nor controlled. Relief plans could only be adhered to insofar as the
military-political situation in Europe did not require any fundamental change in the
Minutes of the 11th session of the Expert Commission for Handling Issues of Additional
Planting and the main cantonal offices for agriculture, January 9, 1945, p. 6 ff. BAr E 27/5653.
According to Dr. Wahlen' s calculations, 145,000-150,000 horses would have been
needed to plant 300,000 hectares [Report by the Chief of General Staff, p. 306/307].
Minutes from the meeting on Measures by the Army to Ensure Planting, February 2, 1945,
p. 8. BAr E 5795/147.
The Standerat corresponds most nearly to the American Senate. Standerat is also the title of
its members.
Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, January 30, 1945. BAr E 27/5653.
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Army's activities and any increase in the level of threat could be dealt with merely by
increasing the number of troops called up. The Army High Command no longer let itself
get involved in discussions about reviving a system modeled after Order Number 172.
Rather, it sought a solution based on the following principle: The smallest number of
call-ups possible, but with full outfits, i.e., few leaves of absence.433 The Supreme Swiss
Commander was quite aware of the difficulties in the agricultural sector and attempted to
further reduce the number of troops in service. At the beginning of 1945, he first reduced
the number of troops in guard units, reducing them by 10 battalions or about one third of
their total strength. Subsequently, the scheduled relief released a large number of farmers
and farm workers. For example, the 18 squadrons making up the entire cavalry brigade
were discharged without being replaced, and the total number of Frontier Troops was
reduced to a minimum. 434
Nevertheless, the Economics Minister issued "an urgent plea" to the Minister of
Defense, asking him once again to "emphasize a more flexible structure for the system
governing leaves and dispensations." He said he could not accept responsibility for
insufficient domestic production and dwindling supplies. Furthermore, he said that when
attacked by the legislature and the public, he would publicly state "the real reasons the
agricultural program had not been fulfilled." 435 The Supreme Swiss Commander then
Minutes of the 11th session of the Expert Commission for Handling Issues of Additional
Planting and the main cantonal offices for agriculture, January 9, 1945, p. 17. BAr E 27/5653.
Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, January 24, 1 945. BAr E 27/5653.
Minister of Economics to Minister of Defense, January 6, 1945. BAr E 27/5653.
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proposed placing greater numbers of internees in "farm camps" and using them for
agricultural purposes.
436
Just as the Army required a minimum number of troops, it also needed a certain
number of horses. One reason for this was that motor vehicles could no longer be used
due to a shortage of fuel, and even motorized troops were obliged to use horses. Another
reason was that the infantry was no longer sufficient to transport even just the military
equipment of the troops. 437
At the end of February, 1945, only about 65,000-70,000 men were still in
service—quite a substantial cutback in light of the fact that approximately
100,000-120,000 were in service at the start of the year and that approximately 200,000
men were in service the previous year. Leave quotas were limited by the deployability of
the units. Yet, the Supreme Swiss Commander stated that he was ready to discuss greater
flexibility in this area also.
438
This was done at a meeting on "actions by the Army to
ensure planting" on February 2, 1945, led by Bundesrat Kobelt. The basic purpose of this
meeting was also "coordination of needs between military and economic national
defense." It was not just by chance that the Minister of Defense stated at the outset that-
the meeting would promote "a peaceful [emphasis by the author] discussion of concrete
actions that would be fair to both military and economic interests."439 Just as
Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, January 30, 1945. BAr E 27/5653.
Even the Army employed increasing numbers of internees, particularly for highway construction
and for clean-up activities [report by the Chief of Army Personnel, p. 289].
Minutes of the session of the Expert Commission for Handling Issues of Additional Planting
and the main cantonal offices for agriculture, January 9, 1 945, p. 1 7. BAr E 27/5653.
Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, January 24, 1945. BAr E 27/5653.
Minutes of the meeting on the Measures of the Army to Ensure Planting, February 2, 1 945,
pp. 1-2. BAr E 5795/147.
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stereotypically as those responsible for supply stuck to the argument that military defense
was far too dominant and the level of militarization was too high, the military leadership
stubbornly pointed to the insufficient fighting power and lack of readiness.
2. Critical Low Points in Military Preparedness
Despite the experiences of the First World War, Swiss military defense was still
based on an enormously high level of militarization and was basically geared towards
"high intensity conflict"—a level of militarization that could be maintained only for
extremely short periods of time. The first symptoms of this dilemma occurred shortly
after the first General Mobilization, in the fall of 1939, when commanders began to issue
warnings about a far too rigorous downsizing of the military presence and a creeping
erosion of fighting power. One of the first was the Commander of the Second Army
Corps, Lieutenant General Prisi. As early as November, 1939, he sent a memo to the
Personnel Division pointing out the increasing discrepancy between military readiness
and the effects of the system of leaves and dispensation. Apart from the fact that the
troop commanders could no longer fulfill their fighting duties, "the entire system of
issuing leaves of absence and excusing men from service on a mass scale" undermined
the morale of the troops. The low number of troops even further reduced the possibility
of those on duty obtaining leaves of absence, giving them the impression they were being
treated unfairly. This does not even take into account the other advantages of those who
had been excused from service or granted long leaves of absence, who were able to enjoy
not only their "domesticity" but also their civilian service. 440
Commander of the Second Army Corps to Army Chief of Personnel on the dispensation
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A study of Frontier Company I/255 441 revealed that 85 to 90% of the members
were farmers who periodically had to be given leaves of absence. In addition, 1 7 of the
employees of an industrial firm who lived in the Company's intake area were excused
from service for the entire time. This was done at the request of the Army Technical
Department, even though a memo from the Company Commander stated that only one
sixth of the production of this firm went directly to the Army. The majority of the
production was sold to private business. 442 Lieutenant General Prisi saw this as a severe
lack of monitoring as to "whether those excused from their military obligations actually
work for the Army" or whether they were used "to help profit-hungry companies under
the cloak of 'Army deliveries' to flourishing private businesses." 443 On the qualifying day,
the Company, which was supposed to have a total of 1 50 men, actually had only 86 men.
This was only because a high state of readiness was in effect at the time of the study, and
all leaves of absence had been interrupted. As soon as the leaves of absence went back
into effect, the company lost approximately 15% of its actual complement, i.e., another
12 or 13 men. This was not even 50% of the officially mandated number. If a surprise
attack had occurred, these men would have been expected to defend an area 2.4 km
wide. 444
system and level of readiness among the troops, November 24, 1939. BAr E 27/5650.
This company was under the command of the son of the Commander of the Fifth Division,
Major General Bircher; according to Lieutenant General Prisi, the company was randomly selected
for the study.
Commander of the Second Army Corps to Army Chief of Personnel on the dispensation
system and level of readiness among the troops, Attachment 4, November 11,1 939. BAr E 27/5650.
Commander of the Second Army Corps to Army Chief of Personnel on the dispensation




The extraordinarily heavy burden placed on the frontier troops reflected large
military shortages practically everywhere, as confirmed by the Commander of Frontier
Brigade 6:
As a result of the demands of the guards, the high rate of leaves of absence
and partial releases, no uniform progress has been made in training. We must not
let occasional large or small exercises with troops put together ad hoc deceive us as
regards the fact that only a small part of the youngest men in the brigade was
involved. Both the individual men and the platoons and companies of the frontier
battalions need to have basic battle training, based on the war thus far. This implies
that some changes in thinking will be necessary. All the Frontier Brigades should
be called up for any future relief duty, not just the number of troops necessary for
the guard duty. 445
The Commander of Frontier Brigade 6 felt that the training for the troops slated
for external defense of the bunkers was particularly urgent. After extensive wire barriers
had been set up or completed, defense forces would have to be given practical training
under the new conditions.
The frontier brigade could not be deemed ready for war until it had met the
following requirements:
Battle training for officers and enlisted men
Battle training for fortress personnel
Refurbishing dilapidated or partially obsolete field fortifications
Delivery of scheduled weaponry (machine guns and infantry cannons)
Although it was apparently possible to maintain the good spirits of the troops,
the soldiers on duty were so few in number that they were completely absorbed by the
Commander of Light Brigade 3 to Commander of the Second Army Corps, December 3,
1940, p. 1. BArE 27/13180.
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guards. The Commander of the Second Army Corps confirmed that, unfortunately, this
same state of affairs also applied to all other frontier brigades within the corps. 446
In April, 1940, the Commander of the Fourth Army Corps declared the
applicable regulations for discharges and recalls "no longer possible to follow" both
militarily and economically. Negative consequences became apparent first and foremost
in the spirit, discipline, and "civility" of the troops. Many soldiers began having
problems due to the long-lasting periods of service and the uncertainty that accompanied
this situation. The unequal demands for service experienced by the various troop
segments were increasingly perceived as unfair, making discipline even more of a
problem. 447 Lieutenant General Labhart also harshly criticized the dispensation system.
There was some doubt as to whether the more than 30,000 dispensations that had been
granted for a long time without consulting the troop commanders were all "essential:"
In various parts of Eastern Switzerland, a sense of discord is rife among the
population, because for some companies men holding the lowest professions were
excused from service, while small businessmen and those in the trades, who mostly have
to rely on themselves, had to make do with short leaves. Even station trainees in the
Swiss National Railway had to be excused from service as being "essential" to
operations."*
Ibid., p. 2.





Thus, the existing system seemed to contain more disadvantages than
advantages for training, because the commanders never had a full troop of soldiers at their
disposal. The Commander of the Fourth Army Corps proposed discharging "most of the
Army that was on standby," and leaving only two or at most three Army units in a
"position reflecting neutrality." This was not only for economic reasons, but also very
much for military ones. As a result of the leave system and continuing relief, units
became so mixed that there was almost no guarantee of smooth remobilization. In
addition, materiel was once again urgently in need of maintenance. The military felt that
the original position was being returned to after all.
449
In light of the permanent
fluctuations even among the guard units of important demolition targets, the Commander
of the Fourth Army Corps suggested creating "permanent commands." Because they
would be the most familiar with the local conditions and the security measures to be
taken, they would guarantee an expert and smooth program for training the constantly
changing guard troops. 450
Negative effects were noticed primarily in the area of training, in work on
building fortifications and fortifying terrain, and in troop morale. 451 Non-permanent
structures (e.g., dugouts, trenches, infantry barricades, etc.) largely had to be built by the
troops themselves. Without sufficient manpower, it would not have been possible to
complete fortification-building to the extent desired and militarily necessary. Particularly
Ibid., p. 4ff.
Minutes of the meeting of January 19, 1943, on the relief plan for 1943, pp. 3-4. BAr E
5795/147.
451 Memo on the relief plan for the first half of 1941, p. 1. BAr E 5795/86.
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in the mountains, a large body of men would have been required during the summer
months. Furthermore, the fact that the troops had to spend so much of their time on
construction projects drastically cut into the time they could spend on training. 452
According to a press release on the meeting of canton agricultural directors
dated January 23, 1941, the increase in agricultural production should be the
responsibility of the Army, a proposal that elicited "severe displeasure" from the Army
leadership. The Supreme Swiss Commander protested against such any such tendency in
a letter to the head of the military department. 453 He was of the opinion that people were
going too far with"propagandistically exaggerating the 'battle for agriculture'" and
demanded that all civilian options first be exhausted before turning to the Army. 454
"Belittling of the importance of the soldier would have a negative effect on morale.
People should not say that resistance is not possible without food. More emphasis should
be placed on the opposite, because even the best-laid agricultural plans will not ensure the
nation's independence without the Army." 455
An assessment of the situation did not permit any further reduction in readiness
for the second half of 1941. The risks that the Army leadership had faced in spring of
1941 in order to make more manpower available for agriculture could no longer be taken.
In addition, an intensified expansion of the fortifications was imposed. As a result of the
generous leave of absence system practiced in the first half year, not only was troop
452
Session minutes, May 1941, pp. 5-8. BAr E 5795/146.
Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, January 1 , 1 941 . BAr E 27/5653.
Minutes of the meeting on credit conditions in the Army, January 21, 1941, p. 9. BAr E
5795/145.
Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, January 27, 1 941 . BAr E 5795/524.
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discipline " dangerously undermined," but the "strike power" of the Army was weakened
to an "irresponsibly low level," and the training of the troops had "suffered severely due
to the constant coming and going."456 As mentioned earlier, the troop commanders had to
deal with the devastating consequences of the deferments that were a result of Order
Number 125. According to the Commander of the Second Army Corps, training and
readiness suffered "quite heavily" from leaves and deferments. The best training
programs were of no use if the constant changes in personnel meant that training always
had to start over from the beginning. Lieutenant General Prisi noted that "it is an illusion
to think that we can obtain well-trained troops by means of replacement service under the
current leave of absence system." 457
According to a letter the commander of the Sixth Division sent to his military
superior, Lieutenant General Labhart, the requests for deferments had reached such a
level by mid- 1942 that it appeared impossible "to create a fighting force that was even
moderately ready for battle." He also claimed that the number of men available in the
summer was far too low for effective training, while it was too high in the winter. On the
other hand, the morale of the troops was being undermined:
The Army understands quite well that it is necessary to shift service by those
men required for national supply to the worst time of year. It also understands that
men employed in certain manufacturing industries and commercial enterprises that
are involved in this endeavor or that contribute to our national defense should
receive deferments. However, it does not understand why merchants, business
owners, civil servants, bookkeepers, clerks, salesmen, bank tellers, teachers,
Supreme Swiss Commander to Minister of Defense, May 21, 1941. E 27/14245, Vol. 22.
Minutes of the meeting held January 19, 1943, regarding the relief plan for 1943, p. 16.
BArE 5795/147.
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bartenders, bakers, barbers, butchers, drivers, etc. ..should receive deferments in
service.
The Army is correct in thinking that the reduction of the service time to four
weeks and the timely announcement of the date makes it possible to manage so
long as good will is maintained.... 45 *
The commander of the Sixth Division believed that these negative experiences
with deferments in service represented "negative symptom of the will of the people, the
Army, and the authorities to fight for self defense." 459 The Army High Command clearly
understood that units weak in number or units that had a large number of soldiers from
other units that had deferred their service were "not sufficiently ready for battle." That is
because soldiers who did not serve their time with their primary unit usually did not know
the special tasks of the other unit in the war. 460 The 1943 relief plan led to such
manpower bottlenecks from April through September that at times there were no
regiments available to guard the Alpine railway crossings, and battle positions had to be
adapted.
461
The Supreme Swiss Commander placed great importance on maintaining the
level of training in the Army to sufficient degree that "its striking power would be
respected abroad." Therefore, he considered training programs that mandated two
four-week stints for the youngest age class and one four-week stint for the Territorial
Commander of the Sixth Division to Commander of the Fourth Army Corps, June 29, 1 942,
pp. 1-2. BAr E 5795/140.
Commander of the Sixth Division to Commander of the Fourth Army Corps, )une 29, 1 942,
p. 2. BAr E 5795/140.
Minutes of the Meeting of the Dispensation Commission, January 26, 1943, p. 1. BAr E
5795/147.
Minutes of the meeting of January 19, 1943, p. 14, BAr E 5795/147. Cf. the disagreement
between the Bundesrat and the Supreme Swiss Commander on the relief plan for 1 943, pp. 68 ff.
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Units the "absolute minimum requirement." No one could be excused from this service
regardless of profession or the number of days already served, because, when face to face
with the enemy, all that mattered was the skill of the soldier, which, in turn, was
determined "not by the civilian profession but by having completed duty in military
training."
462 There is no question that great progress was made in, above all, the areas of
technical handling of weapons and equipment and in the combat behavior of the Army by
the end of the war. However, the Head of Training discerned that "fundamental
problems" were still present toward the end of active service, such as "amassing of
resources highly vulnerable to loss, insufficient use of terrain coverage, insufficient
scouting and combat reconnaissance, and inappropriate behavior during air attacks."
Tactical training was in part burdened by rigid defense thinking up to the end of active
service, a way of thinking that was rooted in the First World War; it concentrated far too
much on organizing the war and not enough on how it was to be conducted. 463 It became
clear time and time again that the militia officers experienced far fewer difficulties in
preparing for war than in actually conducting it. The reason for this is no doubt the fact
that conducting a war is much farther removed from the normal activities of civilian
life.
464
The object of the previously mentioned meeting on "actions by the Army to
ensure planting " revealed how deeply the military leadership was involved in








nonmilitary areas of overall defense during the last year of the war. Once again, various
participants referred to the desirability of reinstating Order No. 172, but the Supreme
Swiss Commander avoided dealing with this matter. Rather, he countered with the
principles of the new relief plan:
In keeping with the motto "all farmers to the fields," all farmers should dedicate
themselves to work in the fields during the month of April "when at all possible."
The troops called up for the end of March should come from urban areas or
mountainous regions, where planting started later, without regard for structure of
the military.
All troops in service were expected to assist in the farm work where they were
stationed.
The artillery was provided with trucks as far as possible so that most horses and
tractors could be freed up for agricultural use.
The horses the Army had to keep should come not from one region of the country
but from various regions.
During the month of April, farmers were expressly given priority for leaves of
absence that seemed necessary above and beyond the above measures.
During the planting season, no training exercises were to be initiated. There should
also not be any local militia training during the spring, and the restricted areas for
internees should be relaxed so that their efforts could be used more broadly in the
agricultural sector.
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The Supreme Swiss Commander emphasized, however, that the number of
divisions ready for combat must never fall below two at any time. 465 These two
battle-ready divisions also probably indicated the level of militarization that could be
maintained over a longer period of time (though with great difficulty) at the end of the
war.
466 The Commander of the Second Army Corps brilliantly summarized the
precarious position of military defense in his pointed statement: "We know...what the
military requirements are but are unable to translate them into fact."467
Minutes of the meeting on the Measures of the Army to Ensure Planting, February 2, 1 945.
BArE 5795/147.
Interestingly, both Nationalrat Abt and Lieutenant General Labhart spoke of two to three
divisions [cf. pp. 114 and 126, respectively].
Minutes of the corps commanders' meeting, March 6, 1943, p. 6. BAr E 5795/147.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
Even though Switzerland never became seriously involved in the events of World
War II, it found itself, at least from a psychological viewpoint, clearly on the side of the
victors. Given its hopeless strategic position in the center of the long-contested power
region of the aggressive Axis powers, Switzerland was unquestionably successful in
preserving a remarkable level of independence. At the end of the war, it stood intact in
the middle of a completely devastated, socially shattered Europe. It is no wonder that the
debate over the reasons for this beneficent course of recent Swiss history has not yet
subsided and has often played a role in political argumentation for or against strong
territorial defense. Actually, there were many reasons why Switzerland was spared from
the war. The various political camps each have their own, e.g., the military integrity and
readiness of Switzerland, the incontestable and often-deplored economic cooperation with
the Axis powers, the skillful diplomacy, the importance of Switzerland as a financial and
espionage hub, etc. A one-dimensional interpretation would without question be
incorrect and unrealistic, and would not reflect the historical facts. But it will probably
never be possible to prove conclusively just how dissuasive the Swiss "trump cards"
listed above were on the aggressiveness of the German dictator in particular, so it is
pointless to argue about it. The historical truth is probably described best by the foreign
observer who stated:
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It is certainly true that various factors contributed to the success of the Swiss
deterrent strategy—including economic factors, geopolitical factors, vigorous democracy,
wise diplomacy, and the organization of the nation under a state of emergency. Yet
without the self-assertive will of the Swiss, without their military integrity and their
Army, without the threat of destroying transport routes and industry, this success is
hardly conceivable.
468
In reality, the dissuasive effect was even more significant than is suggested by the
lowest common denominator of military preparedness described, to the extent this can be
ascertained today from the files. To find the clearest reason for this, perhaps it is better to
look not at the purely military opinion of the Germans but at their recognition that the
will of the Swiss people for independence and freedom could never be completely broken
despite everything that took place in the war. In all military reservations that the German
General Staff makes with respect to the strength of the Swiss Army, the assessment
ultimately boils down the following observation: "The resolve of the government and
people to defend Swiss neutrality against any attacker is indisputable." 469
It cannot be denied that there were exceptional acts of valor in all areas relevant to
security, including the military, under the most difficult of conditions. The question,
however, is whether the positive outcome of the war, the blessing of being spared, also
represents a justification of the military order imposed at that time and the security
Duic, Die Schweiz 1939-1945: Erfahrungen in der Sicherheitspolitik und umfassenden
Landesverteidigung, Part II, p. 544.
Kleines Orientierungsheft Schweiz, German Wehrmacht, Foreign Armies West Department,
edition of September, 1942, p. 49, BMA RH D 18/173.
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measures that were taken. If a country is on the "winning side," there is always great
danger that the eyes of those who try to analyze the issue will be clouded. The creation
of the myth around the National Reduit is a sign that the Swiss, too, have fallen prey to
this syndrome.
Even if Switzerland was largely spared military acts of force during the Second
World War, it was nevertheless subjected to another sort of "act of force" that lasted for
several years. As a result of its strategic location, Switzerland survived a conflict
situation during the Second World War that in some ways resembled a modern "low
intensity conflict." Encirclement by the Axis powers impacted the nation's behavior,
whether from purely hostile or even just egotistical motives, having a sweeping,
"warlike" effect on the survival of the country. Under these circumstances, the actions of
the Axis often threatened "to throttle the national life." 470
This comprehensive threat could only be met through defense measures that
covered the entire spectrum of areas relevant to security. In addition, the duration of the
situation of conflict forced both the military and the civilian leadership to develop
long-term strategies for survival and to create the apparatus for surviving. Switzerland
saw itself—though only due to the shock of the events—thoroughly caught up in a
Europe-wide trend that had already taken hold in other countries after the First World
War. It was in Germany, more than any other country, that two strategic schools of
thought developed after the frightening experiences and horrible losses of the First World
War. One of these schools looked for an integral, security-related comprehensive view of
47n See note 3.
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a future war, while the other focused on the idea of a new conventional approach to using
military resources. Yet, in contrast to the traditional military conflicts suffered by most
European countries even in the Second World War, Switzerland was challenged not
primarily in military terms but above all in other areas having to do with national
survival. Thus, it became painfully clear that the military component of overall defense,
i.e., the Army, was still geared to the perception of war in the 19th century with respect to
its basic structures and its prioritization of security within the framework of the nation as
a whole.
As an organization that relied on universal military service, the Army occupied
most of the available manpower and material resources of the nation. The Army
leadership, and the Supreme Swiss Commander in particular, were forced early on into a
leadership role with respect to total defense that surpassed the status of the military in the
concrete conflict situation of the Second World War. Not only Guisan's charisma and his
remarkable understanding of security but also the directives and actions of the Bundesrat
contributed to the natural way in which the Supreme Swiss Commander grew in this role.
However, the discrepancy the true status of the military component of the overall defense
and the Supreme Swiss Commander's leading role in national security contributed
substantially to intensifying the conflict between overall "national defense" and the
requirements of conventional warfare during the Second World War.
In keeping with the militia system, the way the nation's defense was designed, as
well as the structure and organization of the Army, was tailored to the number of men
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required to perform military duty. Moreover, the Swiss militia army of the Second World
War was poorly equipped with respect to materiel, and it was cumbersome and inflexible.
In his report to the Supreme Swiss Commander, the Chief of General Staff bluntly stated
at the end of the war that the conditions brought about "by years of insufficient bond
issues for war preparations would have led to a catastrophe if Switzerland had entered the
war in 1939" 471 Under these conditions, it was impossible to consider waging war in a
flexible manner;
472
the only option considered was relatively static: either linear (Limmat
Line) or an area defense (Reduit while maintaining the Frontier Guard and the forces for
stalling resistance in the interior).
From the start, the Chief of General Staff pointed out the personnel intensity of
such an area defense: "The need for defending the area of the entire country rules out the
option of dismissing entire Army units. Either the situation will progress to a point where
the entire Army can be demobilized, or all Army units must be kept armed in their new
combat zones, and only some of them (regiments) can be granted leave on a rotating
schedule," he wrote to the Supreme Swiss Commander on July 2, 1940. 473 One of the
most important advantages of a militia army is its large manpower resources, which
Report by the Chief of General Staff, p. 418. In another place, the Chief of General Staff
described the arming of the Army at the beginning of the war as "generally insufficient and
antiquated." Above all, there was a lack of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weaponry, and the artillery in
part still had obsolete guns from the previous century. [Report by the Chief of General Staff, p.
111]. The tank troops consisted out of just three tank companies with eight Praga tanks each [Kurz,
Die Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg, p. 1 86].
472
Draft situation report, July 10, 1940, p. 1. BAr E 5795/304. Even the former Chief of
General Staff and future commander of the Fourth Army Corps confirmed this: "We do not have any
infantry battalions and regiments that are thoroughly trained for battle. We are completely
ill-equipped for mobile warfare as it has been witnessed in this war" [Commander of the Fourth
Army Corps to Supreme Swiss Commander, June 21, 1940. p. 3. BAr E 27/14321].
473 Chief of General Staff to Supreme Swiss Commander, July 2, 1940. BAr E 27/14321
.
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should be used in an optimal manner. The basis for the philosophy and organization of
the Army was the mass army. Under these conditions, extensive downsizing of the Army
meant not merely a thinning of the military presence, but also quickly touched on the
principles of the conception of the area defense and the fighting power of the units. In his
response to the reorganization of the Army in May, 1942, Captain Ernst correctly pointed
out that the Swiss military could not manage the long-term military readiness that was
expected, "because the Swiss military is not designed for active service lasting years at a
time."
474 The Army leadership would have to choose a defense strategy that accounted
for material deficiencies and could optimize the use of the a large infantry Army that was
relatively poorly equipped and inflexible. Thus, even at the outset, the military's
operational freedom was extremely limited. At the time, there were sound military
reasons and even better non-military reasons to opt for both the Limmat Line and the
National Reduit. Both deployment plans were based on the overall military resources of
Switzerland, and both could achieve their full military potential only under this condition.
Both were based on military philosophies that placed heavy emphasis on great
manpower.
On top of this were the components of dissuasion, which was accepted as
inviolable from the beginning. Dissuasion stipulated the permanent maintenance of a
militarily credible readiness, because this was the only way to achieve the desired
dissuasive effect. However, the increasing difficulties of ensuring suitable military
Study of the efforts of the General Staff Officers and Instruction Officers to Reorganize the
Army, May 15, 1942, p. 8/9. BAr E 5795/260.
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presence and readiness led to a state where the credibility of the defense efforts depended
more and more on the process of mobilization, which was extremely tricky in nature and
susceptible to interference. Political and economic resistance to this process mounted.
Mobilization became, from a military perspective, the Achilles heel of all war
preparations. The Supreme Swiss Commander was probably correct in pointing out that
an enemy would seek first and foremost to use this weakness to its advantage. The
enemy would attack when the "demands of our authorities and our people"-- who were
primarily interested in their economic well-being and questions regarding leave—were
yielded to and the military presence was inadequate. 475
With the exception of the immediate assumption of the battle, various aspects of
national survival were always important when troops were called up. It was by no means
a strictly military matter, but instead a political one and, "in a quite eminent sense, an
economic one." This last factor became increasingly important the more the war effort
became a matter of maintaining general readiness as a means of protecting Swiss
neutrality over a long period of time. If the Bundesrat represented the opinion that these
decisions could not be left up to the Army High Command, then this was certainly
fundamentally correct,476 but possible only if a comprehensive security policy and the
corresponding leadership structures were in place. Both were completely lacking during
the Second World War.
Supreme Swiss Commander to Bundesrat, January 19, 1943, p. 2. BAr E 5795/88.
476
Report by the Bundesrat, pp. 23-24.
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However, the manpower and material resources that were militarily
indispensable for the reasons discussed above were extracted from civilian life,
particularly the economy, on the basis of the militia system's heavy demands for
manpower, which were not bearable over a long period of time. However, military
survival could only be ensured if the economy were secured. Thus, there was no way to
avoid splitting up the manpower and material resources of the country between the
military and essential civilian areas, and this held true not only for. an intense short-term
effort but over a period of several years. The prerequisites for doing this were not met at
the start of the war, neither with regard to the economy nor~notably~with regard to the
military. Instead, Swiss military defense rested on the planned use of all human and
material resources that the militia system made available to the Army leadership. Thus,
the conflict was inevitable and could not be resolved within the time that mattered, i.e.,
the Second World War.
This study is not intended to examine who won out by presenting themselves
and their position best, be it the Bundesrat, the Supreme Swiss Commander, economic
interests, the agricultural sector, or political parties. Rather, what is depicted here is the
basic inevitability of conflict and its effect on military defense. This study has shown
that, despite the unrelenting efforts of the Supreme Swiss Commander and the Army
leadership, it was not possible to maintain indisputable military readiness for the duration
of active duty. According to military experts and the Supreme Swiss Commander
himself, readiness actually fell far below the critical threshold at times and was nothing
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more than symbolic in character. It also became clear that the mobilization, which
became the most crucial military operation due to the insufficient military presence, was
increasingly placed in jeopardy. This is because the political and economic obstacles
became too high during the tense and exhausting years of active service. Haggling over
personnel also severely damaged the sense of spirit among the population and the Army,
and the extreme fluctuations in manpower strained the military fabric. Under the
conditions in effect, it was simply impossible to find a system of military/civilian
manpower sharing that satisfied everyone, because the manpower to which the Army laid
clam via universal military service was completely unrealistic in light of the historical
developments. Yet the demands were due to the system itself, and the Army leadership
was fatally caught up in the system as well, because it did not have the operational
freedom to act on its own, nor the labor-saving weapons, the flexibility in calling up
troops, or the authority for mobilization. The conflicts of World War II clearly showed
that the prevailing defense structure did not meet modern security requirements, which
were placed on Switzerland precisely during World War II. As a result, military
readiness suffered severe deficiencies. The major contribution of the Army leadership
under Supreme Swiss Commander Guisan can probably be found in the—possibly
intuitive—fact that military national defense was possible only in the overall context of
security and in the notably successful acceptance of the leadership role in the area of
overall defense. Guisan was both an apolitical, nonpartisan father figure and a leading
political figure in the battle against the latent tendency toward capitulation.477 Thus,
Kreis, Auf den Spuren von La Charite, pp. 199.
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General Henri Guisan came very close to meeting the criterion that Creveld sets for
military greatness in his book Command in War. "To know what one can do on the basis
of the available means, and to do it; to know what one cannot do, and refrain from trying;
and to distinguish between the two—that, after all, is the very definition of military
greatness, as it is of human genius in general." 478
Switzerland's pioneering experiences during the unique conflict of the Second
World War forced both civilian and military authorities to adopt a holistic security
philosophy. The years of threat to the nation's very existence made both the necessity
and the absence of a comprehensive security philosophy bluntly and painfully clear. It
became apparent that the disproportionate role of the military component, largely caused
by the authoritarian militia system practiced at that time, did not measure up to the threat
and was at odds with a modern, overall security policy. The results were not limited to
the serious, practically insoluble conflicts between civilian and military authorities: The
preparedness and dissuasive power of the Swiss Army were also called into question.
The fact that Switzerland survived the Second World War unscathed allowed the nation
to quickly forget the hard lessons it had learned. They were replaced by the mythos of
the Reduit and a faith in the Army lasting well into the 1960s.
Nonetheless, the historical experiences of the Second World War speak clearly:
Modern territorial defense of a small nation requires first and foremost a balance between
the individual components of security policy, not a blind numerical reduction in military
forces. Instead, the military defense philosophy must be carefully adapted to the political,
Van Creveld, Command in War, p.102.
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economic, and psychological realities of the nation. The mission of territorial defense
must be at the center of the military component of security policy and must not be
threatened by fashionable demands for multifunctionality or subordinated to the principle
of universal military service, and the advantages of a differentially applied militia must be
kept in mind. The experiences of the Second World War showed clearly that the Swiss
Army can only fulfill its military mission if it can concentrate the personnel and material
resources at its disposal on its original task of military defense of the Swiss territory when
this becomes necessary. In the terminology of World War II, the Army is responsible for
"warfare," not "national defense."
158
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung zum Bericht des Generals iiber den
Aktivdienst 1939-145 vom 7.1.1947, Bern 1947 [Report by the Bundesrat].
Bericht des Kommandanten der Flieger- und Fliegerabwehrtruppen, des
Generaladjutanten der Armee, des Chefs der Ausbildung der Armee, des Chefs des
Personellen der Armee an den Oberbefehlshaber der Armee iiber den Aktivdienst
1939-1945. [Reports by the Commander of Air Force And Antiaircraft Troops, the Head
of Army Personnel, the Head of Training, etc.]
Bericht an die Bundesversammlung iiber den Aktivdienst 1939-1945 von General Henri
Guisan, Lausanne 1946 [Report by the Supreme Swiss Commander].
Bericht des Chefs des Generalstabes der Armee an den Oberbefehlshaber der Armee iiber
den Aktivdienst 1939-1945. [Report by the Chief of General Staff].
Bond, Brian. War and Society in Europe 1870-1970. Oxford University Press, 1 984.
Bonjour, Edgar. Geschichte der schweizerischen Neutralitdt, Vier Jahrhunderte
eidgenossischer Aussenpolitik, Volumes IV-VI. Basel/Stuttgart, 1971-1980.
Boschenstein, Hermann. Bedrohte Heimat, Die Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Bern,
1965.
Braunschweig, Pierre-Th. Geheimer Draht nach Berlin, Die Nachrichtenlinie
Masson-Schellenberg und der schweizerische Nachrichtendienst im Zweiten
Weltkrieg. Zurich, 1989.
Bucher, Erwin. Zwischen Bundesrat und General, Schweizer Politik und Armee im
Zweiten Weltkrieg. Zurich, 1993.
Bundesrat RudolfMinger. Bern 1981.
Couchepin, Louis. Das Reduit, Wie unsere Armee die Schweiz verteidigt, Translated into
German by Major Fritz Hummler. Zurich, 1943.
Daniker, Gustav. Dissuasion, Schweizerische Abhaltestrategie heute und morgen.
Frauenfeld, 1987.
159
Daniker, Gustav, and Andre Aloys Wicki. Die Armee im Rahmen der
Gesamtverteidigung. Zurich: Verein zur Forderung des Wehrwillens und der
Wehrwissenschaft, 1969.
"Die Entwicklung des Kriegsbildes im Westen vom Ersten zum Zweiten Weltkrieg."
ASMZ2, 1980.
Duic, Mario. "Die Schweiz 1939-1945: Erfahrungen in Sicherheitspolitik und
umfassender Landesverteidigung." Oesterreichische Militdr Zeitschrift 5-6, 1985.
Erinnerungsbuch Gebirgs-Infanterie-Regiment 16, herausgegeben in Zusammenarbeit
von Offizieren, Unteroffizieren und SoIdaten. Burgdorf, 1946.
Ernst, Alfred. Die Konzeption der schweizerischen Landesverteidigung 1815 bis 1966.
Frauenfeld, 1971.
Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, Headquarters Department of the Army
and the Air Force, Washington D.C., 1990.
Fink, Jiirg. Die Schweiz aus der Sicht des Dritten Reiches 1933-1945. Zurich, 1985.
Frick, Hans. "Die Schweiz als strategisches Problem," in Die Schweiz im Notstand der
Gegenwart, Kultur- und staatswirtschaftliche Schriften, Volume 79. Zurich,
1952.
Fuhrer, Hans Rudolf. Spionage gegen die Schweiz, Die geheimen deutschen
Nachrichtendienste gegen die Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945.
Frauenfeld, 1982.
Gautschi, Willi. General Henri Guisan, Die schweizerische Armeefuhrung im Zweiten
Weltkrieg. Zurich, 1989.
Hafher, Georg. Walther Stampfli, Bundesrat im Krieg, Vater der AHV. Olten, 1986.
Haider, Franz. Kriegstagebuch, Tdgliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes
desHeeres 1939-1942. Stuttgart, 1962-1964.
Hilty, Hans Rudolf. "Aus den Papieren einer Unperson der schweizerischen
Zeitgeschichte." Weltwoche. March 24, 1976.
Hofer, Viktor. Die Bedeutung des Berichtes General Guisans iiber den Aktivdienst
1939-1945 fur die Gestaltung des schweizerischen Wehrwesens. Basel/Stuttgart,
1970.
160
Jenni, Peter. "Basel im Zweiten Weltkrieg." Doppelstab. September 14, 1974.
Keegan, John. The Face ofBattle. Penguin Books, London, 1976.
Kimche, Jon. General Guisans Zweifrontenkrieg, Die Schweiz zwischen 1939 und 1945.
Berlin, 1962.
Kreis, Georg. Aufden Spuren von La Charite, Die schweizerische Armeefuhrung im
Spannungsfeld des deutsch-franzosischen Gegensatzes 1936-1941.
Basel/Stuttgart, 1976.
Kriegstagebuch des OKW (Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab), ed. P.E. Schramm, four volumes,
Frankfurt 1 96 1 - 1 965 . [War log of the Army High Command.]
Kurz, Hans-Rudolf. Die Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Das grosse Erinnerungswerk an
den Aktivdienst 1939-45. Thun, 1959.
Kurz, Hans Rudolf. "Der schweizerische General." Schweizer Soldat 7, 1984.
Lezzi, Bruno. "Das Reduit—ein militarischer Mythos, Standortbestimmung der
Gesellschaft fur militarhistorische Studienreisen." Neue Zurcher Zeitung. May 8,
1984.
Liss, Ulrich. Westfront, Erinnerungen des Feindbearbeiters im Oberkommando des
Heeres (OKH). Neckargemiind, 1959.
Luder, Fritz. Die Gebirgs-Fusilier-Kompanie 1/32 im Aktivdienst 1939-45. Thun, 1975.
Maurer, Paul. Anbauschlacht, Landwirtschaftspolitik, Plan Wahlen, Anbauwerk
1937-1945. Zurich, 1985.
Meyer, Rudolf. "Die schweizerische Reduit-Strategie im Zweiten Weltkrieg." Schweizer
Soldat 6, 1993.
Minott, Rodney G. The Fortress that Never Was: The Myth ofHitler's Bavarian
Stronghold. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964.
Muller, Hans. Bundesrat Karl Kobelt 1891-1968, Eine Gedenkschrift. Bern, 1975.
Odermatt, Franz. Zur Genese der Reduitstrategie, Die Reaktion der schweizerischen
Armeefuhrung aufeinen strategischen Sonderfall im Sommer 1940. Bern, 1983.
Odermatt, Franz. "Zwischen Realitat und militarischem Mythos: Zur Entstehung der
Reduistrategie im Jahre 1940." ASMZ 8-9, 1987.
161
Paret, Peter. Makers ofModern Strategyfrom Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton
University Press, 1986.
Rosen, Werner. Bedrohte Schweiz, Die deutschen Operationsplanungen gegen die
Schweiz im Sommer/Herbst 1940 und die Abwehrbereitschaft der Armee im
Oktober 1940. Frauenfeld, 1986.
Rosenkranz Paul. "Reduit und Rutlirapport, Die Schweiz nach dem Fall von Frankreich."
Bundner Tagblatt. May 11, 1981.
Schaufelberger, Walter. "Das 'Reduit National' 1940, Ein militarhistorischer Sonderfall."
Zurich, 1992.
Schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik im Wandel, Bericht 90 des Bundesrates an die
Bundesversammlung iiber die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz. Bern, 1 990.
Schweizerische Vereinigung fiir Militargeschichte und Militarwissenschaften. Neutrale
Kleinstaaten im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Miinsingen, 1973.
Schweizerische Dissuasionsstrategie im Zweiten Weltkrieg, in: Bindschedler,
Schwedische und schweizerische Neutralitdt im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Zurich/Aarau,
1945.
Senn, Hans. Die Entwicklung der Fuhrungsstruktur im Eidgenossischen
Militdrdepartement. Gesamtverteidigung und Armee, Vol. 9.
Frauenfeld/Stuttgart, 1982.
Siegenthaler, Paul. Der Oberbefehlshaber nach schweizerischem Staatsrecht. Bern,
Zofingen, 1946.
Tanner, Jakob. Bundeshaushalt, Wdhrung und Kriegswirtschaft, Eine
finanzsoziologische Analyse der Schweiz zwischen 1938 und 1953. Zurich, 1 986.
Urner, KJaus, Die Schweiz muss noch geschluckt werdenl Hitlers Aktionspldne gegen die
Schweiz, Zwei Studien zur Bedrohungslage der Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg.
Zurich, 1990.
Van Creveld, Martin. Command in War. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.
Vetsch, Christian, Aufmarsch gegen die Schweiz, Der deutsche "Fall Gelb"-Irrefuhrung
der Schweizer Armee 1939-1940. Olten, 1973.
162
Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter
Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
Von Lossberg, Bernhard. Im Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab. Hamburg, 1 949.
Wahlen, Hermann. Bundesrat F.T. Wahlen. Bern, 1975.
Walde, Karl J. GeneralstabschefJakob Huber 1883-1953. Aarau 1983.
Warlimont, Walter. Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht 1939-1945.
Grundlagen, Formen, Gestalten. Frankfurt, 1962.
Wehrli Edmund. "Vom zaghaften zum wehrhaften Reduit, Anmerkungen zu General
Guisans operativen Uberlegungen." Neue Zurcher Zeitung. February 5 and 1 1
,
1987.
Wehrli, Edmund. Briefe aus dem Aktivdienst 1939-1940, Heft 12 der Schriftenreihe der









Chief of Naval Operations
The Pentagon, Room 4D562
Washington, District of Columbia 20350-2000
3. Dr. Thomas Bruneau, Code NS/Bn
Chairman, National Security Affairs Department
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
4. Dr. Donald Abenheim, Code NS/Ah
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
5. Dr. Rodney Kennedy-Minott, Code NS/Mi
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
6. Dr. Hans Wegmueller
Amselweg 22
CH-31 10 Muensingen
Switzerland
164




DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
.40NTERfcY CA 93S43-5101

